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Abstract 
 
"Partial realism" is a common position in the contemporary philosophy of science 
literature. It states that the "essential" elements of empirically successful scientific 
theories accurately represent corresponding features the world. This thesis makes 
several novel contributions related to this position. Firstly, it offers a new definition 
of the concept of “empirical success”, representing a principled merger between 
the use-novelty and unification accounts. Secondly, it provides a comparative 
critical analysis of various accounts of which elements are “essential” to the 
success of a theory, including structural realism and the divide et impera strategy. 
A novel account of essentialness, entitled the “empirically successful sub-theory 
account”, is defended. Thirdly, it is argued that the realism/anti-realism debate 
should put to the side metaphysical questions and focus instead on partial 
realism’s commitment to the continuity of science. Because this commitment lacks 
metaphysical implications, it is referred to as “deflationary realism”. Anti-realists 
cannot reject deflationary realism as a matter of a priori principle; its overall viability 
(and therefore that of partial realism) can therefore only be assessed by a careful 
examination of the history of science. Finally, another consequence of partial 
realism, named "partial rationalism", is defended. Partial rationalism states that, in 
cases where several competing theories have been suggested, scientists are 
rational just in case they accept the essential elements of each of the scientific 
theories on offer. This novel position subverts the existing literature on scientific 
“revolutions”, as it sometimes demands that scientists devise a synthesis between 
competing scientific theories, instead of “choosing” only one. The philosophical 
points defended in this thesis are illustrated and supported by case studies from 
the history of science, including Fresnel’s wave theory of light, the Copernican 
revolution, the “neo-Darwinian synthesis” in evolutionary biology, the “prion 
revolution” in molecular biology, the miasma theory of disease, and the chemical 
revolution  
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Thesis overview 
 
Scientific realism claims, roughly, that our best scientific theories are at least 
approximately true. In response to various criticisms of this naive formulation, most 
advocates of realism today advocate some or other version of what I call “partial 
realism” (PR). This states that only the "essential" elements of empirically 
successful scientific theories accurately represent corresponding features of the 
mind-independent world. In this thesis, I also articulate a particular consequence of 
PR, which I call “deflationary realism” (DR). This states that the essential elements 
of empirically successful theories will be preserved in successor theories, but offers 
no metaphysical explanation of why this is the case. DR is a purely empirical claim 
about the history of science, past and future. 
 
My aims in this thesis are three-fold. Firstly, by synthesising arguments already 
present in the literature and devising new arguments, I will attempt to articulate as 
defensible an account of PR as possible. Secondly, I will propose DR both as an 
elegant vehicle for furthering the realism/anti-realism debate, and as a defensible 
position in its own right. Thirdly, as means of assessing DR’s claims about the 
history of science, I will examine several historical case studies.  
 
In Chapter 1, it is shown that PR emerges as a reasonable response to the crucial 
arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively the “no-miracles 
argument” (NMA) and the “pessimistic meta-induction” (PMI). However, PR, as it is 
expressed in this chapter, is more a broad philosophical approach than a specific 
position. This is because different authors disagree on the appropriate 
interpretations of the terms “empirical success” and “essential”. Thus, the major 
project of Chapters 2 and 3 is to provide defensible interpretations of these terms.  
 
The idea of empirical success is addressed in Chapter 2. One of the major 
typological differences between different accounts of empirical success is that 
between logical approaches, which emphasise the objective relations between 
theory and evidence, and historical approaches, which emphasise the context in 
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which a particular piece of evidence for the theory is introduced. The currently 
dominant approach to empirical success in the scientific realism literature 
emphasises the value of novel predictive success, thus representing a type of 
historical approach. However, it is shown in this chapter that historical accounts are 
quite generally unsatisfactory, as the fact that a theory satisfies such an account is 
not sufficient to regard it as confirmed under the NMA. A general approach with the 
name “weak predictivism” is therefore advocated instead of novel prediction 
approaches. Weak predictivist accounts regard a theory as well-confirmed to the 
extent that it effectively unifies verified empirical results. Under these accounts, 
successful novel prediction is merely, under some circumstances, an indicator that 
a theory has unifying power. One specific weak predictivist account, named the 
“unification view” (UV), and based on Worrall’s version of the use-novelty (UN) 
account of prediction is defended. The UV states that a theory is confirmed to the 
extent that it gives rise to more verified empirical results than are required to 
construct it. 
 
The question of what parts of a theory are essential to the empirical success of that 
theory is addressed in Chapter 3. The bulk of this chapter consists of a systematic 
critical analysis of particular accounts of essentialness that have been proposed in 
the literature. The NMA, if valid, licences the inference from some empirical 
success to the truth of the propositions “responsible” for that success. Since the 
motivating force behind PR is the NMA, the most important principle in comparing 
various accounts of essentialness is the following: whatever elements are picked 
out by the favoured account must be sufficient to explain the empirical success of 
the theory. This account, moreover, should not exclude any theoretical propositions 
which would, if true, genuinely contribute to an explanation. On the basis of these 
two desiderata, direct reference theories and structural realism are rejected as 
being too “inclusive”, whereas entity realism, phenomenological realism and the 
working posits idea (under the most reasonable interpretation so far offered) are 
rejected as being too “exclusive”. I go on to defend an account of essentialness 
that is based on the account of empirical success endorsed in Chapter 2, and 
which is therefore named the “empirically successful sub-theory account” (ESSA). 
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The ESSA characterises as essential just those theoretical posits which give rise to 
more lower-level posits than required to construct them.  
 
The general form of DR, like that of PR, is underspecified because it contains the 
vague terms “empirical success” and “essential”. Despite the fact that DR lacks the 
metaphysical commitments which give rise to the interpretations of these terms 
proposed in Chapters 2 and 3, it is nevertheless suggested that DR should adopt 
these interpretations. This ensures that any dispute over the accuracy of DR has 
relevance for the larger realist debate since, if DR is a logical consequence of PR, 
any refutation of the former is also a refutation of the latter. It is demonstrated in 
Chapter 1, however, that it is also possible to construct an “optimistic induction” for 
DR in its own right. If theoretical continuity (of the specified form) is thus 
established as a genuine regularity in the history of science, then scientists have a 
good pragmatic reason to theorise conservatively (in a certain way). Indeed, even 
the constructive empiricist might by this route come to have a reasoned 
commitment to the continuity of science. 
 
The larger part of Chapters 4 and 5 is concerned with examining the tenability of 
DR (and thus PR) in light of various episodes from the history of science. In 
Chapter 4, the issue of continuity in science is connected explicitly to the related 
debate around rationality in cases of theory choice. In this chapter, two broad 
approaches will be compared. The first of these is “Kuhnian history” which states 
that, while objective epistemic standards constrain the choices of scientists, they 
do not completely determine them. The second approach is “rationalism”, which 
states that objective factors are, at least much of the time, sufficient to fully 
determine the rational course of action in cases of theory choice. A particular form 
of rationalism, called “partial rationalism”, is derivable from PR. It states that, during 
episodes of theory change, scientists are rational to accept those parts of theories 
responsible for empirical successes (and have largely done so). In consequence, 
this account states that it is sometimes rational to accept some synthesis of several 
competing theories, rather than choose between them. The claims of partial 
rationalism, it is argued, are largely borne out in the three case studies examined in 
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this chapter, namely the Copernican revolution, the “neo-Darwinian” synthesis and 
the “prion revolution”.  
 
In Chapter 5, the focus is more explicitly on potential counterexamples to DR, and 
thus to scientific realism generally. The chapter begins with a reasonably 
comprehensive list of the putative counterexamples suggested so far in the 
literature. From this list, two particular theories are selected for closer study, 
namely the miasma theory of disease and the phlogiston theory of chemistry. 
Given the focus in this thesis placed on continuity in science, these theories are 
examined in the contexts in which they were rejected by the scientific community in 
favour of newer theories. It is shown that, although there is no substantial 
continuity between the miasma theory and later theories of disease, this is not a 
challenge to the realist because the miasma theory was not substantively 
empirically successful. The phlogiston theory was empirically successful, and 
concepts that are structurally similar to those of phlogiston theory are found in 
modern electrochemistry. Analogues of these concepts are not, however, found in 
the immediate successor theory to phlogiston, namely Lavoisier’s oxygen theory. In 
consequence, it is suggested that DR is not always descriptively accurate in the 
short run, but may nevertheless be valuable as a source of methodological 
guidance.  
 
  
14 
 
Chapter 1. Naive realism, partial realism and deflationary realism 
 
1. Chapter overview 
 
Scientific realism claims, roughly, that our best scientific theories are at least 
approximately true. The first few sections of this chapter introduce scientific realism 
in more detail, and state some of the key arguments for and against it. The major 
argument in support of scientific realism, called the no-miracles argument (NMA), 
is introduced in section 2, and some of the objections to it are discussed in section 
3. The primary argument against scientific realism, the pessimistic meta-induction 
(PMI), and responses to it are discussed in section 4.  
 
The major response of scientific realists to the PMI has been to adopt various, 
more moderate, forms of realism, which I group under the heading of “partial 
realism”. Partial realism claims that we are only justified in regarding as true those 
parts of theories “essential” for their empirical success. I articulate a particular 
consequence of partial realism, which I call “deflationary realism” (DR). This states 
that those parts of theories essential for their empirical success will be preserved in 
successor theories. It is thus a commitment to the continuity of science. Both of 
these positions are outlined in section 5. The idea of a theoretical element being 
preserved across theory change is described in considerably more detail in section 
6.  
 
In defining a metaphysically deflationary view, the intent is not to deny that the 
metaphysical commitments of (partial) scientific realism are important. Indeed, 
these metaphysical comments also define the particular version of DR that will be 
examined in the later chapters of this thesis. The intent is to define a minimal 
position that can be tested simply as an empirical hypothesis. This minimal position 
remains relevant to the broader debate precisely because it is a logical 
consequence of metaphysically inflationary realism, and so a refutation of it counts 
as a refutation of the latter also.  
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Despite the emphasis on refutation, in section 7, a positive argumentative strategy 
in support of DR is proposed. Since DR is an empirical hypothesis, this has the 
form of an “optimistic induction”. Relatedly, in section 8, it is demonstrated that DR 
is compatible with constructive empiricism and how the constructive empiricist 
might therefore be led to adopt a stronger stance on the continuity of science.   
 
Section 9 investigates an argumentative strategy whereby DR might be ‘re-inflated’ 
to yield a metaphysically substantial form of realism. This strategy starts from the 
supposition that the fact of theoretical continuity itself demands explanation, and 
then suggests that the best explanation of this fact is the truth of the theories 
concerned. This is named the “argument from continuity to truth”. Interestingly, the 
most difficult problem for this argument also represents a problem for the optimistic 
induction in support of DR itself. In consequence, some qualifications to the 
optimistic induction are suggested. The chapter is summarised in section 10.  
 
2. Scientific realism and the no-miracles argument 
 
Since much of the argumentation in this thesis will centre on the tenability of 
scientific realism, it is worth defining the commitments of this view carefully. An 
early articulation of a realist view is found in Poincaré: 
 
“[T]hese equations [of Fresnel’s theory of light] express relations, and if the 
equations remain true, it is because the relations preserve their reality. They 
teach us now, as they did then, that there is such and such a relation 
between this thing and that...” (Poincaré, 1902/1952, p. 161) 
 
A similar view is expressed by Poincaré’s contemporary, Duhem (1906/1954). 
More recently, the anti-realist Van Fraassen defines scientific realism as the view 
that:  
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“Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the 
world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it 
is true” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 8).  
 
And Chakravartty, in a survey article in the Stanford Encyclopedia, states that  
 
“Scientific realism is a [position  that endorses belief in the reality of] ...  
whatever is described by our best scientific theories” (Chakravartty, 2011) 
 
What is common to all these definitions is that, according to the scientific realist, 
the entities and processes described by our “best” or most “mature” scientific 
theories are real. Another way of putting this is that the statements of these 
theories are true. 
 
The assertion that something is real is rendered a great deal more informative 
when conveyed alongside some idea of what the world would be like if this thing 
were not real. Scientific realism is often contrasted with instrumentalist or empiricist 
views. These assert, roughly, that our best scientific theories should not be thought 
of as accurate representations of the world, but simply as tools for dealing with it 
effectively. Not only is it unsound to infer that our best theories are true, but is a 
mistake to think of them as even aiming at the truth.   
 
The dispute between scientific realists and anti-realists is not new. Indeed, both 
positions are represented in Copernicus’ great work, De revolutionibus, published 
in 1543. This work introduced the heliocentric model of the universe, and is one of 
the seminal works of the European Scientific Revolution. A Lutheran preacher 
named Osiander, who supervised the publication of this book, wrote a preface to it 
entitled “To the Reader Concerning the Hypotheses of this Work”. In this preface 
he states that: 
 
“[I]t is the duty of an astronomer to compose the history of the celestial 
motions through careful and expert study. Then he must conceive and 
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devise the causes of these motions or hypotheses about them. Since he 
cannot in any way attain to the true causes, he will adopt whatever 
suppositions enable the motions to be computed correctly from the 
principles of geometry for the future as well as for the past. The present 
author has performed both these duties excellently. For these hypotheses 
need not be true nor even probable. On the contrary, if they provide a 
calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough.” (Osiander 
in Copernicus, 1543/1978) 
 
It is accepted by both Copernicus and Osiander that the heliocentric model 
proposed in this book was powerful and insightful. However, while there is every 
indication that Copernicus accepted it as a true description of the state of the 
heavens (although he does not state this explicitly), Osiander applies an 
instrumentalist, anti-realist interpretation.  
 
Much more recently, and partly in response to the arguments of sophisticated anti-
realists like van Fraassen, proponents of scientific realism have distinguished three 
separate commitments that together comprise realism. This formulation is 
suggested, for example, by Chakravartty (2011), Psillos (1999) and Niiniluoto, 
(1999). The three commitments are:  
1. A metaphysical claim, that there is a mind-independent world. This rules out 
various idealist positions, but leaves many other issues quite open. Some 
authors argue that the world is characterised by a “natural kind” or “causal” 
structure, but other formulations are also compatible with the basic claim.  
2. A semantic claim, that scientific theories are to be interpreted literally, and 
so can be true or false as descriptions of the mind-independent world.  
3. An epistemic claim, that our ‘most successful’ scientific theories are at least 
approximately and/or partially true as descriptions of the world.  
 
Notice that these claims are not logically independent – the second claim 
presupposes the first, and the third presupposes the first and second. In the 
existing literature, the third, epistemic, claim has in recent years been the focus of 
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debate. This is partly because the most currently influential strain of anti-realism, 
namely van Fraassen’s (1980) “constructive empiricism”, accepts the second 
claim, is neutral on the first, but denies the third. Moreover, as we shall see below, 
some prima facie very powerful arguments have been levelled both for and against 
the third claim, and much effort has consequently been directed towards assessing 
the soundness of these arguments. For the purposes of this thesis therefore, I will 
follow the broad trend in the literature and assume that the metaphysical and 
semantic claims of scientific realism are granted, focusing narrowly on the 
epistemic claim.   
 
The most intuitively powerful argument in favour of the epistemic claim of scientific 
realism is the so-called “no-miracles argument” (NMA). The most frequently-cited 
example of this argument, and that which provides its name, is given by Putnam: 
 
“The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that does 
not make the success of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific 
theories typically refer ..., that the theories accepted in a mature science are 
typically approximately true, that the same terms can refer to the same even 
when they occurs in different theories—these statements are viewed not as 
necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of the success 
of science, and hence as part of any adequate description of science and its 
relations to its objects” (Putnam 1975a, p. 73). 
 
We should, in other words, believe in the literal truth of most successful scientific 
theories precisely because their truth would explain this success.  It is worth noting 
that several proponents of this argument in fact produced their versions before 
Putnam, including Poincaré (1902/1952), Duhem, (1906/1954), Maxwell (1962) 
and Smart (1963). More recently, very sophisticated and precise formulations of 
this argument have been given by Boyd (1980; 1983; 1985; 1989), Brown (1982), 
Musgrave (1988), Lipton (1994) and Psillos (1999, esp. ch. 4), among others. 
Although there are, of course, differences in emphasis between the various 
formulations of this argument presented by these different authors, the common 
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approach is one of appealing to realism as a means of explaining the success of 
scientific theories. Fine (1986a) accordingly dubs this the “explanationist defence 
of realism”.  
 
It is worth making a few points of clarification before examining the NMA in detail. 
Firstly, notice that, while this argument takes the “success” of science as a basic 
premise, there are various possible definitions of “success”. All scientific realists 
are concerned with a theory’s empirical success, as opposed to, say, its success 
as an object of aesthetic admiration. Many contemporary authors interpret 
“success” as predictive success, but this interpretation is not the only one 
available. Boyd, for instance, understands overall empirical success, including 
explanatory success, to provide evidence for the truth of a theory. In Chapter 2 I 
will review arguments for and against according a special epistemic status to 
predictive success. Ultimately, I will endorse an account of theory confirmation 
which emphasises the importance of the unifying power of a theory, with novel 
empirical prediction serving merely as a reliable indicator that this underlying virtue 
is satisfied. For the purposes of the current chapter, however, our initial, admittedly 
vague, appeal to the notion of empirical success will suffice.  
 
Secondly, it is worth noting that many anti-realists, including van Fraassen, accept 
that our best scientific theories are true insofar as they describe observable entities 
and processes. So the anti-realist can accept that the empirical success of our best 
theories is explained by their truth, although the claim under this formulation is 
relatively trivial. The realist, of course, wishes to claim that that our most successful 
scientific theories also give (approximately and/or partially) true descriptions of 
unobservable entities and processes. As Boyd puts it: “... non-observational terms 
in scientific theories should typically be interpreted as putative referring 
expressions" (Boyd, 1980, p. 613). In the remainder of this section, ascriptions of 
truth or approximate truth to a theory will therefore be taken to encompass the 
theory’s existence claims regarding, and descriptions of, both observable and 
unobservable entities.  
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Thirdly, there are in fact two distinct versions of the NMA on offer. Under one 
version, we take the overall “success of science” as our explanandum and argue 
that this lead to the conclusion that scientific methodology is capable, when carried 
out correctly, of arriving at approximate truth. Alternatively, we could argue from 
the empirical success of particular scientific theories to the truth of (at least some 
of) the claims contained within these theories. Reflecting upon this difference in 
emphasis Magnus and Callender (2004) distinguish between “wholesale” and 
“retail” arguments. I shall argue shortly that wholesale arguments are ultimately not 
tenable, though my reasoning differs somewhat from that of Magnus and 
Callender. It is also worth noting that the distinction between the two is not 
watertight. A retail version of the NMA could conceivably be applied successfully to 
all or most actually successful scientific theories, thus achieving a similar overall 
result to a successful wholesale argument. 
 
Having addressed these clarificatory points, let us now examine the NMA in more 
detail. Although Putnam’s argument quoted above is relatively informal, we can 
formalise the argument using the template of “inference to the best explanation” 
(IBE). This form of argument has been discussed by Peirce (1958, book 2) under 
the heading of “abduction” and has been developed recently and in more detail by 
Harman (1965) and Lipton (2004). In general, IBE starts with some set of empirical 
facts as a premise. It then states that some postulate is the best explanation of 
these facts. Finally, it concludes that the postulate so identified is therefore very 
likely to be (approximately and/or partially) true. Note, however, that a postulate 
cannot be designated the “best explanation” simply on the grounds that it is most 
likely to be true; if we knew that in advance, we wouldn’t need to go through the 
tedious process of reasoning at all. Rather, “best” is defined in terms of 
“explanatory virtues”, such as simplicity, fit with the data, etc (Lipton, rather 
poetically, says that we choose the “loveliest explanation”).  
  
This argument form is clearly not deductively valid. Indeed, if we interpret 
explanation as a type of deductive argument, then IBE is quite straightforwardly an 
example of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Nevertheless, as with all 
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ampliative arguments, we can formulate a deductively valid version of the NMA by 
adding additional premises. For clarity, I shall formulate both wholesale and retail 
versions of the argument: 
 
NMA (wholesale version) 
WP1:  Science is empirically successful 
WP2:  We should believe the best (“loveliest”) of the available explanations for the 
empirical success of science 
WP3:  There are exactly two available explanations for the empirical success of 
science: (a) that the methodology of science is reliably truth-conducive, and 
(b) that the success of science is the result of an unlikely coincidence (a 
“miracle”) 
P4: Positing the occurrence of an unlikely coincidence is never the best 
explanation if any other options are available 
WC: Therefore, we should believe that the methodology of science is reliably 
conducive to ((at least approximate) truth.  
 
NMA (retail version) 
RP1:  Theory T has been empirically successful 
WP2:  We should believe the best (“loveliest”) of the available explanations for the 
empirical success of T 
RP3:  There are exactly two available explanations for the empirical success of T: 
(a) that T is (approximately and/or partially) true, and (b) that the success of 
T is the result of an unlikely coincidence (a “miracle”) 
P4: Positing the occurrence of an unlikely coincidence is never the best 
explanation if any other options are available 
RC: Therefore, we should believe that T is (approximately and/or partially) true.  
 
By formally stating both version of the NMA in this way, we can assess the overall 
soundness of these arguments by examining the soundness of their premises. In 
the following section, I shall therefore examine some objections to these premises. 
Along the way, I shall survey selection arguments, due to Fine and van Fraassen, 
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which demonstrate that the wholesale version of the NMA is untenable (or, at least, 
even less tenable than the retail version).  
 
3. Critical analysis of the NMA 
 
Fine, (1984; 1986a; 1986b; 1991) has made several objections to the NMA. One 
objection questions the claim that science is “instrumentally successful”, thus 
potentially discrediting both WP1 and RP1: 
 
“If, for example, we could examine the myriad attempts in laboratories 
around the world just (literally) yesterday to turn basic science to the 
production of a useful instrument, then, I think, we would find failure on a 
massive scale, and certainly not any overall success... For the application of 
science involves an enormous amount of plain old trial and error; hence, it 
always entails an enormous amount of error. I think a reasonable historical 
picture would be to draw each success as sitting on top of a great mountain 
of failure.” (Fine, 1986a, pp. 152-153) 
 
By “instrumental success”, Fine seems to have it mind the ability to produce 
technological applications. This argument can, however, be very simply extended 
to include empirical success more generally. If we consider all the scientific 
hypotheses that are ever proposed, we will see that only a small proportion ever 
turn out to be empirically successful. It is only after a hypothesis is at least slightly 
successful that it will ever be formally reported, or even widely discussed.  
 
So scientific methodology is not always, or even most of the time, effective at 
arriving at empirically successful theories. The generalised “success of science” 
that the NMA takes as a datum is in fact the result of a certain sort of confirmation 
or selection bias. We focus only the theories which do happen to be empirically 
successful, even though this result is not typical (see below for a detailed 
discussion of van Fraassen’s selection argument against the NMA, which is closely 
related to Fine’s). Note, however that, while this argument may be well-taken when 
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directed against WP1 and therefore the wholesale version of the NMA, it is not 
obviously applicable to the retail version. RP1 in this retail argument refers to the 
success of a particular scientific theory, not to the enterprise as a whole. All parties 
to the debate, moreover, accept the existence of at least some empirically 
successful theories. I shall therefore take it that the soundness of RP1 is not 
contested by this argument.   
 
Premises WP2 and RP2 essentially state that IBE is a truth-conducive (though not 
strictly truth-preserving) form of reasoning. Fine has also produced several 
arguments directed against this proposition. The first argument simply questions 
the claim that the success of science even requires an explanation.  As Fine puts 
it: “[O]nce we have reached the age of reason we no longer accept just any 
explanatory challenge and history shows that, often enough, we are right not to do 
so” (Fine, 1991, p. 82). It is not altogether clear what history Fine has in mind here, 
but one plausible interpretation is that he is concerned about the proliferation of 
metaphysical claims on the basis of explanatory considerations.  A line of 
argument can be reconstructed as follows. Empirical observation is the only truly 
sound rationale for coming to believe a given hypothesis. There is therefore never 
any reason to believe the truth of a hypothesis which is metaphysical in the sense 
that it is not empirically testable. Explanatory considerations can serve as a useful 
set of heuristics for devising new hypotheses to test, but they do not by themselves 
give us rational grounds for believing the truth of these hypotheses.  
 
One possible response to this line of argument is to deny that scientific realism is a 
purely metaphysical thesis that is empty of empirical content. This thesis does 
make certain claims about what we should expect to see in the history of science, 
and these claims can be tested by a close examination of this history. This is a line 
of thinking I develop more fully in the remainder of this chapter, and so will not 
discuss it further in this section. 
 
Alternatively, the realist may seek to provide some general positive argument for 
the truth-conduciveness of IBE. Fine, however, argues that any attempt to defend 
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IBE against an anti-realist opponent will inevitably be either question-begging or 
circular. Anti-realists, recall, do not accept the validity of even the “first-order” 
inference to the truth of a particular explanatory claim on the grounds that it is a 
good explanation of some set of empirical phenomena in science. So the anti-
realist will be, if anything, doubly sceptical about applying a “second-order” 
inference to the truth of scientific theories on the grounds that this explains the 
success of these theories. As Fine puts it, “the realist is not free to assume the 
validity of any principle whose validity is itself under debate” (Fine, 1986a, pp. 160-
161). If the realist does wish to construct an argument for the truth of scientific 
theories, she must “employ methods more stringent than those of ordinary 
scientific practice” (Fine, 1984, pp. 85-86). Anything less is simply question-
begging. 
 
Psillos, nevertheless attempts to provide a defence of IBE that is avowedly and 
unashamedly circular: 
 
“[The NMA] suggests that the best explanation of the instrumental reliability 
of scientific methodology is that background theories are relevantly 
approximately true. These background scientific theories have themselves 
been typically arrived at by abductive reasoning. Hence, it is reasonable to 
believe that abductive reasoning is reliable: it tends to generate 
approximately true theories.” (Psillos, 1999, p. 77) 
  
So application of the second-order IBE, namely the NMA, tells us that first-order 
applications of IBE tend to give true beliefs. Hence, by induction over these 
instances of sound reasoning, we conclude that IBE is reliably truth-conducive. 
Psillos, taking his cue from various inductive defences of inductive reasoning (see 
Braithwaite 1953/1968, pp. 255-292; Black, 1958; van Cleve, 1984; Papineau,  
1992; 1993, ch. 5), claims that the circularity of this argument is not a logical flaw. 
He distinguishes between “premise-circularity” and “rule-circularity”, and argues 
that only the former is “viciously circular”.  A premise-circular argument is one in 
which the conclusion is identical to one of the premises of the argument. A rule-
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circular argument, in contrast, is one in which the reliability of some inferential rule 
is obtained as the conclusion of an argument which uses that very rule, but the 
reliability of the rule is not stated in the premises.  
 
Psillos argues that rule-circularity is not viciously circular on the grounds that 
application of the rule does not require making any assumptions about whether or 
not it is reliable. He supports this claim by appealing to epistemic externalism, also 
known as reliabilism:  
 
“When an instance of a rule is offered as the link between a set of (true) 
premisses and a conclusion, what matters for the correctness of the 
conclusion is whether or not the rule is reliable... Any assumptions that need 
to be made about the reliability of the rule of inference, be they implicit or 
explicit, do not matter for the correctness of the conclusion. Hence, their 
defence is not necessary for the correctness of the conclusion.” (Psillos, 
1999, p. 81, emphasis in original) 
 
This type of externalist view has been advocated by Goldman (1979; 1986), among 
others. The opposed, so-called “internalist”, view is that any premise or form of 
inference used in an argument must be backed up by some sort of justification or 
reason before that argument can legitimately be accepted.  
 
The fundamental difficulty with externalist approaches to knowledge is expressed 
by Papineau, as follows: 
 
“[R]eliabilism implies that whether or not we know will often hinge on 
matters, such as the reliability of some visual process, which lie quite 
outside our consciousness. But this seems to imply that we are at the mercy 
of nature, that we cannot do anything to affect whether or not we know. And 
this then makes reliabilist epistemology seem a quite different subject from 
the traditional version [of epistemology]. ... For surely a central concern of 
26 
 
traditional epistemology was the normative question of what we should do in 
order to ensure that our beliefs are knowledge.” (Papineau 1993, ch. 5, s. 4) 
 
We can all agree, in a metaphysical vein, that there is some fact of the matter 
about which of our epistemic practices are reliable. But lacking independent 
epistemic access to these facts, these metaphysical speculations do not help in the 
slightest in assessing whether a given practice is in fact reliable. Because it is not 
in any way action-guiding, therefore, the approach proposed by Psillos is therefore 
unsatisfactory.  
 
It is, in any case, deeply implausible that the proponent of IBE will ever be able to 
devise any argument for it, internalist or externalist, that will persuade a sceptic. 
Just as, following Hume, we should regard it is deeply implausible that the 
proponent of inductive reasoning can convince a sceptic. And indeed, as argued by 
Carroll (1895), even deductive reasoning is not immune to challenge by a 
sufficiently determined (though probably only hypothetical) sceptic1. At best, the 
advocate of IBE can show that this form of argumentation gives rise to an overall 
coherent system of propositions; this, of course, being simply a different way of 
describing the circularity of Psillos’ argument sketched out above. The best case 
scenario for the proponent of IBE, is that we conclude that there are no decisive 
rational arguments against accepting it. This allows for a sort of ‘voluntarist’ attitude 
towards this mode of reasoning. That is, to either accept it or reject it is to enter 
into one particular ‘style’ or ‘practice’ of rationality. Under the voluntarist picture, 
there are no rational arguments that the proponent of either style could offer that 
could hope to convince her opponent. As indicated above, however, this is not 
necessarily a terrible position for the IBE advocate, as inductive and deductive 
reasoning would seem to be in the same boat.  
 
                                            
1
 This sceptic (Carroll’s tortoise) may ask why, given the premises A and A→B, he ought to believe 
B. It seems the only possible response is to add another premise “If A and A→B, then B”. But then 
the sceptic will still doubt that the conclusion follows from these three premises, and so a regress 
ensues.  
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van Fraassen (1989, pp. 142-150), however, has an argument which threatens to 
confound IBE even on its own terms. Suppose we accept that it is possible to rank 
a given set of theories according to some criterion that correlates with truth, so we 
can always select the theory that is closest to the truth. But this ranking always 
takes as its input only those theories that have actually been proposed. And these 
may all be quite far from the truth. So IBE may only give us the “best of a bad lot”. 
While it will get us progressively closer to the truth, it never justifies the assertion 
that a given hypothesis is (even approximately and/or partially) true.  
 
There are various possible replies to the “bad lot” argument, several of which are 
outlined by Lipton (1993; 2004, pp. 151-163) and Psillos (1999, pp. 208-214). The 
most promising of these is Lipton’s proposal to “eliminate the gap between 
comparative and absolute ranking... by exhaustion” (Lipton, 1993, p. 94). That is, if 
the set of theories from which we draw contains every logically possible option, and 
our ranking reliably picks out the theory closest to the truth, then we will be able to 
draw a true theory from this set. This argument is cogent, so far as it goes. The 
obvious problem with it is that no actual case of theory choice in science takes the 
entire space of logically possible theories as input. In real cases, there are always 
logically possible theories that have not been considered.  
 
Lipton puts a great deal of weight on the one exception to this general problem, the 
case where a set of proposed hypotheses consists of only a single hypothesis and 
its negation. For example, the claim that some entity X is the cause of a particular 
phenomenon and the claim that it is not together comprise such a set. If, ex 
hypothesi, we have the means to pick from a set the hypothesis that is closest to 
the truth, then we will always pick the true hypothesis from such a set. Again, 
however, it is extremely unclear how this argument could be carried over to real 
cases, as very few genuine scientific hypotheses consist of single isolated 
propositions. Moreover, as Ladyman (in Ladyman & Lipton, 2006) points out, the 
goal of the NMA is merely to select theories that are (at least) approximately true. 
Even given a case of mutually contradictory theories, Lipton’s reasoning does not 
help with this more modest goal. The approximate truth of A does not entail the 
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falsity of ¬A. They can both be approximately true together, even if they are strictly 
logically incompatible.  
 
The difficulty of constructing a general defence against the bad lot objection is 
perhaps not so surprising when one recognises that this objection quite closely 
resembles the both the old and intractable problem of underdetermination of theory 
by evidence and Stanford’s (2006) more recent “problem of unconceived 
alternatives”. All of these problems arise because there is always a logical 
possibility (or, as some would argue, near-certainty) that, for any given theory 
which is accepted by scientists, there other theories which have not been 
considered and yet which would be regarded as better confirmed by all the 
available evidence if they were.  
 
Proponents of the underdetermination problem are entirely correct in arguing that 
the logical possibility of another theory that is both radically dissimilar to and better-
confirmed than the one in question can never be eliminated. However, in this 
context, the NMA can be viewed as an attempt to show that this possibility is 
remote. Interestingly, it attempts to do so by offering a putatively exhaustive set of 
explanations for a putatively accepted fact, namely that some theory (or science in 
general) is successful. Focussing on the retail argument (though the same point 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the wholesale argument), RP3 asserts that there are 
only two possible explanations for the success of a theory, namely (a) that the 
theory is (approximately and/or partially) true; and (b) that it is radically false (i.e. 
not even approximately and/or partially true) but successful because of a lucky 
coincidence. Explanation (b) is intended as a catch-all that is true just in case any 
of the alternatives to the favoured theory is in fact true. P4 then simply denies that 
(b) can be true, leaving the truth of the successful theory as the only explanation. If 
sound, this argument defeats both the problem of underdetermination and the bad 
lot argument.  
 
This brings us quite naturally, then, to a closer examination of WP3 and RP3. 
These premises each assert that there are only two possible explanations for the 
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success of science, or the success of a particular theory, respectively. These 
premises can therefore be undermined simply by introducing plausible alternatives 
to these two possibilities. van Fraassen (1980) offers a specific alternative, as 
follows: 
 
“In just the same way, I claim that the success of current scientific theories 
is no miracle. It is not even surprising to the scientific (Darwinist) mind. For 
any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition, a jungle red in 
tooth and claw. Only the successful theories survive—the ones which in fact 
latched on to actual regularities in nature.” (op. cit., p. 40) 
 
Accepted theories tend to be empirically successful, in other words, because 
scientists are only willing to accept the small number of theories that happen to be 
successful. This “selectionist argument” and some of the responses to it are ably 
summarised by Wray (2007, 2010). 
 
Lipton ( 2004, pp. 193-195) has shown van Fraassen’s selectionist argument to be 
unsatisfactory. Firstly, he points out that the proposed explanation is not 
incompatible with the explanation that the theory in question is true. It may be that 
the theory is empirically successful, and so is selected, precisely because it is true. 
But the anti-realist could concede this and still argue that the selection mechanism 
is sufficient to explain the phenomenon in question, so any additional explanation 
is superfluous. The selectionist explanation, in Lipton’s words, “pre-empts” the 
explanation in terms of truth.  
 
Lipton, however, gives two further arguments against the selection explanation. 
Referring to Nozick (1974), p. 22), he notes that a selection mechanism can 
explain why all members of some collection have a certain property, but will not 
explain why each of them has that property. For instance, we can explain why all 
members of a club have red hair by reference to the fact that the club only admits 
those with red hair. But referring to this policy does not explain why each of these 
individuals has red hair; an explanation of this fact would presumably require 
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knowledge of the genetic makeup of each of the individuals concerned, or 
something along these lines. Analogously, we can concede that all the theories 
that we accept are empirically successful precisely because we accept only 
successful theories, and still demand an explanation for why each theory is 
successful. Notice, incidentally, that this argument amounts to a concession that 
the selectionist argument works against a wholesale version of the NMA. Indeed, in 
this respect, van Fraassen’s argument is substantially identical to Fine’s argument 
given in the first paragraph of this section.  
 
So the question is whether the selectionist argument can undermine a retail 
version of the NMA. This brings us to Lipton’s second criticism of the selectionist 
argument, that it is ambiguous on the notion of “empirical success”. The 
selectionist argument seems perfectly able to explain why we now have theories 
that successfully describe empirical phenomena that we have observed in the past. 
But it is unable to explain why some theories are able to successfully predict 
phenomena that were unobserved at the time the theory was initially accepted. 
Van Fraassen says that empirically successful theories have “latched on to actual 
regularities in nature”, but given the overall project of constructive empiricism, it is 
clear he means regularities in observable phenomena. Setting aside the problem of 
induction, we can assume that all parties to this debate accept that statements of 
empirical regularities can legitimately be projected into the future to give 
predictions. But this type of low-level induction only works for phenomena in the 
same broad class as those observed before. The prediction of any new type of 
phenomenon inevitably appeals to claims that the theory in question makes about 
unobservable entities or processes. An explanation by reference to truth explains 
why theories selected for their success in describing one set of empirical 
phenomena can successfully predict a different set of phenomena, whereas the 
selectionist explanation cannot. Thus the selectionist explanation is not a plausible 
alternative for the explanations suggested in RP3.  
 
This, finally, brings us to a consideration of premise P4, which denies the 
explanatory legitimacy of an appeal to lucky coincidence. There are two main 
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objections to this premise. van Fraassen argues simply that coincidences are 
frequently quite explicable: 
 
“[I]t is illegitimate to equate being a lucky accident, or a coincidence, with 
having no explanation. It was by coincidence that I met my friend in the 
market—but I can explain why I was there, and he can explain why he 
came, so together we can explain how this meeting happened. We call it a 
coincidence, not because the occurrence was inexplicable, but because we 
did not severally go to the market in order to meet. There cannot be a 
requirement upon science to provide a theoretical elimination of 
coincidences, or accidental correlations in general, for that does not even 
make sense.” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 25) 
 
This, surely, is correct as far as it goes. But Forster (1988a) and Ladyman (2002, 
p. 216) argue that it is not a legitimate analogy to the empirical success of a 
scientific theory. They claim that repeated coincidences of this nature eventually 
rule out coincidence as an explanation. As Forster puts it: “[I]f each man went to 
the market at irregular times just once a week and kept on meeting week after 
week, then we would suspect that there is something more to be said” (op. cit., p. 
544). 
 
While Forster and Ladyman are correct in stating that van Fraassen’s analogy is 
spurious, there is a stronger reply available. To introduce this reply, let us briefly 
consider the lottery paradox (Kyburg, 1961, p. 197). Suppose exactly one ticket for 
the lottery will be selected, randomly, as the winner. But a large number of tickets 
have been sold, so it is extremely unlikely that any given ticket will be the winning 
ticket. And yet some ticket has to win. So an extremely unlikely event is certain to 
occur! One way of resolving this paradox is to notice that there is an ambiguity in 
how we have specified the event – it is unlikely for a specified particular ticket to be 
chosen, but it is not unlikely (indeed, it is certain) that some ticket will be chosen. 
The point is that it does not require any great predictive capacities to say that some 
ticket will win, or that a given person will at some point run into some friend in the 
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market, or even that some theory will repeatedly predict the results of 
measurements. Given the structure of the respective event spaces, these events 
are all in fact quite likely. A special explanation is only required if a particular ticket 
(specified in advance by a guru, say) wins the lottery, or the theory accepted by 
scientists on separate grounds predicts the results of an experiment. In fact Forster 
and Ladyman’s intuition that repeated occurrences of a given type of event require 
a special explanation probably stems from the fact that the first occurrence 
generates a tacit ‘prediction’ that there will be a recurrence. And it is the 
satisfaction of this prediction that demands an explanation.  
 
The final argument to address is the “base-rate” argument given by Howson (2000, 
pp. 52-54) and also discussed recently by Lipton (2004, pp. 197-198) and Magnus 
and Callender (2004). Before beginning in earnest, it is worth noting that Howson 
(a good Bayesian if ever there was one) thinks of the NMA in probabilistic terms. 
So a successful version of the NMA would be able to assign a high probability to 
the hypothesis that a theory is (approximately and/or partially) true. The base-rate 
argument purports to show, contra P4, that even assuming a theory is empirically 
successful, it is not legitimate to infer that the probability of this theory being 
successful by “lucky coincidence” is lower than that of it being true. Suppose that 
all true theories are successful. However, suppose also that some number of false 
theories are successful. The information that a theory is empirically successful 
therefore tells us only that it is in the class containing true theories and successful 
false theories. Because there are many more false theories than true theories, if 
even a tiny proportion of false theories are successful, there may nevertheless be 
sufficiently many of them to vastly outnumber the true theories in this class. 
Therefore, although discovering that a theory is successful certainly should 
increase the subjective likelihood of it being true, it doesn’t necessarily warrant the 
belief that it is likely to be true (even approximately and/or partially). To make such 
an inference ignores the “base rate”, or the proportion of ‘good’ cases in the class 
from which samples are being drawn. 
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The base-rate objection, incidentally, should not be understood as claiming that 
empirically successful theories are likely to be false. Its purpose is simply to draw 
attention to the fact that we have no idea what the correct base-rate, or prior 
probability, is of a given theory being true. To put this another way, we do not know 
anything about the structure of the ‘population’ from which a particular theory is 
being selected. One way for the realist to respond to the base-rate objection, then, 
would be to provide some argument for the claim that the theories typically 
considered by scientists have a relatively high probability of being true. Note that 
this probability still need not even approach unity – it only needs to be substantially 
higher than the probability of a given successful theory being false. If it is legitimate 
to assume a relatively high prior, then the additional evidence that a particular 
theory is empirically successful provides good evidence that this theory is likely to 
be true.  
 
One example of such an argument is given by Psillos (2006), who argues that it is 
legitimate to set priors by applying the principle of indifference to an outcome 
space consisting of only two propositions: the theory in question (T) and its 
negation (¬T). The result of this calculation is that the prior probability of both T 
and ¬T is set to 0.5. With such a distribution of priors, the observation of evidence 
compatible with T can legitimately lead to the judgement that T is likely to be 
(approximately and/or partially) true. The obvious problem with this argument, one 
that at least potentially affects any application of the principle of indifference, is that 
the outcome space is blatantly gerrymandered to reflect the desired outcome. It is 
hard to see how the truth of one theory and the truth of all the other possible 
theories can legitimately count as one outcome each. Howson’s approach is, in this 
respect, far more defensible. Notice that the base-rate argument also tacitly applies 
the principle of indifference, except that it imposes a prima facie much more neutral 
classification of outcomes, treating the truth of every possible theory as an 
outcome, and accordingly arguing that the initial probability should be distributed 
uniformly across them. Howson’s conclusion that we cannot state any particular 
value for the prior probability of T (even a very low one) follows relatively 
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straightforward from this procedure plus our ignorance about the size of the 
population, and what proportion of the theories it contains is true. 
 
 Worrall’s (2005) resolution (note, not “solution”) to this problem is slightly more 
satisfactory. He connects the NMA, and IBE more generally, explicitly to the 
problem of induction. However much we dress each up in deductive or probabilistic 
language, he argues, each form of reasoning remains fundamentally the 
application of a pre-theoretical intuition. And, while it is certainly possible that these 
intuitive judgements turn out to be systematically mistaken, the “reasonable default 
position” is that inductive generalisations and judgements about the (approximate) 
truth of theories turn out to be correct. This “default position” on NMA can be 
interpreted as a tacit assumption that the theories found in mature sciences enjoy 
high priors, just as the intuitive application of inductive reasoning can be 
interpreted as tacitly presupposing the ‘uniformity of nature’ (or something similar). 
And both forms of reasoning can quite legitimately be rejected by rejecting these 
assumptions.  But they can legitimately be accepted also.  
 
This, then, returns us to the sort of ‘voluntarist’ attitude towards IBE suggested 
above. There is no rational argument that will convince the committed sceptic of 
IBE; but it is also not irrational to apply these intuitive forms of reasoning. Rather, 
the adherent and the sceptic inhabit different modes or ‘styles’ of rationality. In the 
remainder of this thesis, therefore, I will not take a position on the soundness of the 
NMA. I will, in later chapters, make some arguments about what other positions 
realists ought to accept given that they accept the NMA. But I will not try to judge 
whether, as a metaphysical position, any given form of realism is rationally justified. 
It is sufficient for the arguments that follow that scientific realists are committed to 
the NMA under some formulation.  
 
4. Naive realism and the pessimistic meta-induction  
 
A large part of the argumentation in this thesis is directed instead towards a 
particular consequence of the NMA, specifically a commitment to substantial 
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continuity in the history of science. Consider a scientific theory that is 
uncontroversially empirically successful at some period in history, past or present. 
If the NMA is valid, then this theory is (approximately and/or partially) true. 
However, generations of scientists following this period will almost certainly arrive 
at some successor theory which is also successful. Applying the NMA again, it 
follows that this successor theory is also (approximately and/or partially) true. To 
say that a theory is (approximately) true is to say that it (approximately) accurately 
describes those parts of the mind-independent world it purports to describe. Any 
two theories or models which approximately accurately describe the same part of 
the world must be substantially ‘similar’ to each other in important respects. There 
should therefore be substantial continuity between a successful theory and any 
later theories in the same domain that are also successful (The notions of 
“similarity” and “continuity” are left deliberately vague here. They will be defined 
with much more precision in later sections of this thesis). Adding this corollary 
explicitly to the commitments of scientific realism, “naive realism” (NR) is defined 
as follows: 
 
If a theory is empirically successful, then we have good reason to believe (i) 
that it is (approximately and/or partially) true and (ii) that there will 
substantial continuity between it and any successor theory. 
 
As any regular reader of philosophy knows, any position labelled “naive” is surely 
doomed. And so it is here. In the hands of anti-realists, the commitment to 
continuity is wielded as an argument against scientific realism. This is the so-called 
“pessimistic meta-induction” (PMI). An early version of this argument is found in 
Poincaré: 
 
“The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the 
world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one 
after the other; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories 
in fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes 
that they are absolutely in vain.” (Poincaré, 1905/1952, p. 160) 
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It has also been suggested more recently by Putnam: 
 
“What if all the theoretical entities postulated by one generation (molecules, 
genes, etc., as well as electrons) invariably 'don't exist' from the standpoint 
of later science? This is, of course, a form of the old sceptical 'argument 
from error' - how do you know you aren't in error now? But it is the form in 
which the argument from error is a serious worry for many people today, 
and not just a 'philosophical doubt'. One reason this is a serious worry is 
that eventually the following meta-induction becomes overwhelmingly 
compelling: just as no term used in the science of more than fifty (or 
whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no term used now 
(except maybe observation terms, if there are such) refers.” (Putnam, 1978, 
pp. 24-25) 
 
However, the best-known version of the PMI is Laudan’s, perhaps because he 
offers a concrete list of theories which he claims are “both successful and (so far 
as we can judge) non-referential with respect to many of their central explanatory 
concepts” (Laudan, 1981, p. 33). In each case, the argument begins with the claim 
that most past scientific theories that were highly empirically successful are 
nevertheless, by the lights of contemporary science, not even approximately true. It 
then inductively generalises from the falsity of these empirically successful theories 
in the past to the falsity of our current empirically successful theories. Hence, 
realism is refuted.  
 
The PMI can be written down more formally, as follows: 
 
P1: For most cases in the history of science where, at different times, different 
theories have purported to describe the same set of empirical phenomena, 
there is radical discontinuity between earlier and later theories. This is the 
case even where both theories concerned are empirically successful.  
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C1:  Thus, in these cases, at least one of the older or the later theory must not be 
even approximately true.  
P2: (Assume that) theories that are currently empirically successful are 
approximately true. 
C2: So, any past theory which bears the relation of radical discontinuity to our 
present theories cannot be even approximately true.  
C3: Therefore most empirically successful theories in the past have been not 
even approximately true.  
 
This intermediate conclusion establishes an inductive base of historical theories 
that we should regard as false, despite their success. To perform an inductive 
inference requires as an additional premise: 
 
P3: Present scientists are in relevantly similar epistemic circumstances to their 
scientific ancestors.  
 
Eventually producing the final conclusion: 
 
C4: Therefore, by inductive generalisation from past theories, theories that are 
currently empirically are very probably not even approximately true.  
 
Thus, argues the anti-realist, scientific realism is refuted. Notice that, formulated 
above, this argument assumes at P2 the crucial realist claim that is later refuted in 
the conclusion. It therefore has the form of a reductio. Various criticisms of this 
argument can be assessed by careful examination the soundness of the various 
premises, and the validity of the inductive step. To start, although it is a trivial point, 
it is worth mentioning that no realist critic of the PMI attacks P2. This claim, after 
all, is precisely what the realist intends to defend.  
 
Premise P1 has been attacked on several grounds. The most prominent response 
will be elaborated in detail in the following section, under the heading of “partial 
realism”. Partial realism claims that, despite all superficial appearances, there is in 
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fact generally substantial continuity between theories which are empirically 
successful in the same broad domain at different times. This is because the parts 
of theories actually “essential” for their empirical success tends to be conserved in 
successor theories. Note, however, that this response effectively concedes the 
point that naive realism – the view that empirically successful theories are 
approximately true in every respect – is susceptible to the PMI.  
 
Notice that P1 claims that most of the relevant cases of theory change are 
characterised by radical discontinuity. For simplicity, assume the validity of 
Reichenbach’s (1949, p. 446) ‘straight rule’ of inductive generalisation. That is, that 
the proportion of cases of interest in the overall population (in this case, empirically 
successful theories that turn out to be false) will roughly approximate the relative 
frequency of cases of interest in the sample observed so far. So, the claim that 
most cases of theory change are characterised by radical discontinuity is 
necessary to sustain an inductive generalisation to the effect that our currently 
successful theories are “very probably” not approximately true. The realist, in 
response, might however grant that some proportion of successful theories fail to 
be even approximately true (say those on Laudan’s list). But she may deny that 
most or even many do. Perhaps, she might argue, the cases cited by Laudan and 
others are actually quite unusual, and the vast majority of empirically successful 
theories turn out be approximately true. If this is the case, one might inductively 
infer that our current empirically successful theories are very probably 
approximately true. So the PMI can be turned out its head to create an optimistic 
induction. This idea is discussed in more detail in section 7. 
 
P3 has recently come under attack by Roush (2009). She concedes that our 
scientific predecessors were epistemically unreliable (i.e. often believed in false 
theories). But Roush points out, correctly, that an inductive inference can be 
undermined by pointing to some relevant factor that differs between the inductive 
base and the case for which a conclusion is to be drawn. And she argues that the 
fact that current methods of scientific investigation differ from (and are superior to) 
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those in the past is a sufficient reason to regard the inference as unsound. The 
obvious rejoinder to this line of thinking, however, is raised by Roush herself: 
 
“The pessimist may reasonably protest that even if we show our methods to 
be different from our predecessors’, many of our predecessors also had 
methods that were different from their predecessors’. A lot of good it did 
them since they ended up wrong a lot of the time.” (op. cit., p. 53) 
 
She responds to this concern by stating that a difference in method is always 
sufficient to undermine any inductive generalisation about reliability from one 
situation to the next. Indeed, she goes so far as to say that “our predecessors’ 
predecessors’ failures did not render our predecessors’ confidence unjustified 
either” (op. cit., pp. 53-54).  
 
It is extremely unclear, however, how Roush can hope to justify this assertion. 
Change can itself surely be intelligibly understood as part of the inductive base for 
an inference, so long as it is systematic or regular in some way. For instance, 
human beings have attempted to devise perpetual-motion machines for centuries. 
And they have always attempted to incorporate the most advanced available 
technology in doing so – water wheels, clockwork, magnetism, electricity, etc. And 
yet they have never succeeded. Granted, there is now a well-confirmed physical 
law – the second law of thermodynamics – which states that such a device is 
impossible. But a large part of why we regard this law as “well-confirmed” is 
precisely because it is the result of an inductive generalisation from this abundant 
experience of failure! Analogously, suppose it is the case that, over the whole 
history of science, scientists have continually applied various methods to devise 
scientific theories, and these theories have consistently turned out to be false by 
the lights of later theories. So, although the details change, current scientists are in 
a very real sense simply doing what scientists have always done, and the 
pessimistic induction still bites.  
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Another objection to the PMI has been suggested by Lewis (2001). This objection 
has gained some prominence recently, with Magnus and Callender (2004) 
declaring that the sorry state of the PMI (and the NMA) was sufficient to provoke 
“ennui” about the entire scientific realism debate. Lewis’ argument makes use of 
the “base rate” reasoning discussed in section 2 above. He defines a “reliable test” 
as one where the rate of both “false positives” and “false negatives” is low. In the 
context of arguments for realism, such a test has only a small probability of judging 
a theory as true if it is in fact false, and vice versa. The core of his argument is then 
as follows: 
 
“[Laudan’s] claim is that ... theories which are successful but false ... 
outnumber ... theories which are successful and true ... But as we saw 
above, it would be a fallacy to conclude from this evidence alone that 
success is unreliable as a test for truth. If true theories are relatively rare, 
then it is only to be expected that false positives outnumber true positives, 
even if success is a reliable test for truth.” (Lewis, 2001, p. 376). 
 
So Lewis concedes that the majority of theories we infer to be true on the basis of 
their may well be false. The point, for him, is that this is perfectly compatible with 
this form of inference been extremely reliable or truth-tropic.  
 
But notice that this is substantially the scenario outlined under Howson’s base-rate 
argument against realism in the previous section! And for good reason – the 
realist’s primary goal is to demonstrate that that our best scientific theories are 
probably (approximately and/or partially) true. Suppose you are told (let us assume 
correctly) that you have a genuine talent for beating the odds when it comes to 
picking lottery tickets – instead of ten million-to-one, you typically face only million-
to-one odds. But this is hardly grounds for quitting your job on the basis of the 
ticket you currently hold. Similarly, it is surely cold comfort for the realist to be told 
that, although our most empirically successful theories are probably false, the 
probability of them being true is better than that for scientific theories in general. So 
Lewis’ argument doesn’t defeat the PMI. It does not, for that matter, make any 
41 
 
point that Laudan would find surprising or troubling, since the latter was concerned 
to argue against the claim that our best scientific theories actually are true.  
 
5. Partial realism and deflationary realism 
 
It seems, then, that both the NMA and the PMI have at least some force. Many 
proponents of realism have responded to this situation by seeking, in Worrall’s 
(1989a) words, to have the “best of both worlds”. They respect the force of the PMI 
by rejecting the “naive realist” position outlined above. But they respect the force of 
the NMA by seeking to be realists about parts of scientific theories. They do so by 
distinguishing between the elements of a theory “essential” or “inessential” for its 
empirical success, then arguing that only the latter are discarded in instances of 
theory change. There are several names for this strategy, including “preservative 
realism” (Chang, 2003), “selective confirmation” (Stanford, 2003a; 2003b; 2006), 
“localized realism” (Elsamahi, 2004) “selective scepticism” (Chakravartty, 2007; 
although he at times uses this term sufficiently broadly that it also includes 
constructive empiricism) and “selective realism” (Cei, 2009; Saatsi in Saatsi, et al., 
2009).  
 
My own characterisation of this strategy places more emphasis on theoretical 
continuity than these authors do. I therefore coin the new term “partial realism” 
(PR) to describe the following view:  
 
If a theory is empirically successful and some element of this theory is 
essential for that success, then we have good reason to believe (i) that this 
element accurately describes a corresponding feature of the world and (ii) 
that this element will be preserved in successor theories.  
 
PR is a relatively abstract position, and is intended to capture various more specific 
views that have been advocated in recent years. These views differ largely in how 
they characterise the key term “essential” in PR. The structural realist claims it is 
theoretical “structure” that is essential to prediction and is preserved in later 
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theories; Kitcher assigns this status to “working posits”; etc (see Chapter 3 for a 
detailed discussion of these alternatives). There are also serious debates to be had 
concerning the meaning of “empirical success” and “preserved”. The term 
“preserved” will be discussed later in this chapter, but the other vague terms 
require more detailed exposition, and so will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Whereas both naive and partial realists argue from the success of theories to their 
truth and thence to the continuity of science, it is also possible to construct a 
plausible argument in support of continuity as a thesis in its own right. A particular 
version of this thesis advocated here, and I have given it the name ‘deflationary 
realism’ (DR). It is defined as follows: 
 
If a theory is empirically successful and some element of this theory is 
essential for that success, then we have good reason to believe that this 
element to be preserved in successor theories. 
 
DR departs from PR only in that it omits the traditional realist commitment to truth. 
It should be emphasised again that this thesis is officially neutral on the soundness 
of the NMA and the (approximate and/or partial) truth of successful theories. In 
fact, there are several positive reasons for avoiding a commitment to these issues 
one way or the other. The most important is that, like many metaphysical issues, it 
is unclear what hinges upon a theory being true, as opposed to empirically 
adequate, etc. This issue is crystallised by the question “Is there some difference in 
how a realist and an anti-realist would do science?” There are both realists and 
anti-realists who think the answer to this question is a decisive “no”. Recall, for 
instance, the criticism of realism attributed to Fine in section 3, that it is utterly 
without empirical content and so ought not to be the subject of argument.   
 
Many realists and anti-realists will agree with Fine’s descriptive assessment, but 
disagree that it represents a criticism of realism. The dispute at hand is, for them, 
metaphysical but nevertheless interesting. No position will be stated here on 
whether purely metaphysical questions are indeed of philosophical interest. It will 
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be argued, however, that scientific realism is simply not a purely metaphysical 
position. The realist does have at least one practical commitment that the anti-
realist does not (or, at least, need not) have. Specifically, the realist is committed to 
the continuity of science, as demonstrated in section 2. It is the nature and 
soundness of this commitment that will animate discussion in the remainder of this 
thesis.  
 
It should be clear exactly what is “deflationary” about deflationary realism. In 
general, a deflationary view seeks to preserve the practical or functional 
dimensions of some concept, while avoiding the metaphysical commitments that 
often accompany philosophical views of it. For instance, while the traditional 
philosophical account of truth cashes out the concept as “correspondence with 
reality” or something similar, the deflationary view is much more interested in what 
ordinary speakers hope to accomplish when they use the term “truth”. Similarly, DR 
declines to draw any inferences about the nature of the mind-independent world, 
but is interested in how a ‘realist attitude’ to some part of a scientific theory may 
shape scientific practice. It should be noted, however, that although the focus 
throughout this thesis will be on the sort of scientific conservatism embodied in DR, 
it is not necessarily the case that this is the only such consequence of realism. A 
deflationary view is also not incompatible with more metaphysically ambitious 
positions. The more metaphysically inclined reader is therefore welcome to take 
the following arguments surrounding DR on their own terms, and supplement them 
with additional metaphysical commitments if she so desires. 
 
The realist may well wish to deny the deflationary realist the right to be called a 
“realist”, with or without the qualifier. She might argue that a commitment to the 
truth of theories is just what it is for any position to count as realist, and dropping 
this commitment results in anti-realism, whatever else is advocated or denied. This 
is a dispute over the proper use of a concept, rather than an argument over a 
philosophical thesis, and consequently intuitions over the proper resolution will 
diverge wildly. A similar dispute arises in relation to the deflationary account of 
truth, which many argue is not an account of truth at all. I favour the term 
 “deflationary realism” because, as argued briefly above, DR captures an extremely 
important commitment of the realist position. Yet no substantive point in this essay 
rests on whether DR is itself understood as 
would prefer, he or she is welcome to read “commitment to the continuity of 
science” in place of “deflationary realism” hereafter. 
 
As a way of outlining the arguments given in the remainder of this chapter, I will 
briefly sketch out some of the logical relationships between these views. Firstly, it 
is worth noticing that that NR logically entails PR, which in turn logically entails DR. 
The NMA provides an argument in favour of both NR and PR from the empirical 
success of particular theories. However, the NMA is blocked in respect of NR by 
the PMI, leaving it to support only PR. Separately, we might make an ‘optimistic 
induction’ from theoretical continuity (note, 
section 7). Finally, we might construct an “argument from continuity to truth” (ACT, 
see section 9) from DR to PR. 
 
Figure 1. The logical relationships between the various forms of realism discussed 
 
Some arguments have been given to the effect that PR is
position than NR. No arguments will be given, however, that aim to demonstrate 
the superiority of DR over PR (or vice versa). Rather, I will suggest that we merely 
entertain DR, as a means of providing insight into the debate between sci
realism and anti-realism. The investigation of DR offers several advantages over 
the investigation of more metaphysically inflationary forms of realism.  Firstly, since 
both NR and PR are committed to DR, simple logic states that a refutation of th
latter also counts as a refutation of both of the former, although the converse is not 
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true. This is a major point of appeal for DR: it gives us a wedge into the 
realism/anti-realism debate. And, since it is not committed either way on the most 
contentious metaphysical questions, the business end of this wedge is relatively 
sharp. Secondly, because DR makes no metaphysical claims, it is in principle as 
acceptable to the anti-realist empiricist as it is to the realist. Thirdly, DR expresses 
one of the key practical commitments of scientific realism. Therefore, even if they 
differ on metaphysical questions, the empiricist who is willing to accept DR has 
much more in common with the realist than either of them may realise. 
 
6. What elements are preserved? 
 
One may well wonder how a commitment to the continuity of science can be 
described as a “practical commitment”. The answer to this is that the thesis of the 
continuity of science underpins an important methodological standard, namely use 
of the “general correspondence principle”. This states that “... any acceptable new 
theory L should account for the success of its predecessor S by ‘degenerating’ into 
that theory under those conditions under which S has been well confirmed by tests” 
(Post, 1971, p. 228).  
 
Applied consistently, the general correspondence principle serves as a significant 
constraint on scientific theorising. Indeed, Post recommends that we “consign to 
the wastepaper basket” any prospective successor theory L which fails to explain 
the success of S. The rationale for this, presumably (Post never states it explicitly), 
is that pursuing this new theory any further is virtually guaranteed to be a waste of 
a scientist’s time and resources. Put more positively, a commitment to the principle 
can help to limit the seemingly limitless field of options. 
 
Post’s view is, in general, extremely friendly to the partial or deflationary realist, as 
he also attempts to distinguish essential from inessential parts of a theory. He 
suggests that we can distinguish the parts of a theory that are well-confirmed 
(designated S*) by carefully examining “vertical” and “horizontal” divisions within it. 
The vertical divisions distinguish those parts of a theory which are successful in 
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their intended empirical domain from those that are not. His own example is the 
phlogiston theory of chemistry, which he argues effectively accounted for patterns 
in chemical reactivity, and yet was totally inadequate as an explanation of colour 
differences between substances.  
 
The “horizontal” divisions within a theory correspond to progressively more general 
or abstract statements comprising the “higher” levels, with “[t]he well-confirmed 
part of a theory extend[ing] only up to a certain level” (op. cit., p. 229). The lower-
level parts which are well-confirmed provide most of the empirical content of the 
theory, whereas the higher-level parts “interpret” the empirical regularities. The 
“patterns”, particularly classifications, at the lower levels tend to survive scientific 
revolutions, whereas interpretations at the higher levels tend not to. Post further 
elaborates this idea with the aid of an analogy. He, like Kuhn (1962/1996, esp. ch. 
9), compares a scientific revolution to a political revolution. However, unlike Kuhn, 
he emphasises that an unstable series of governments might be underpinned by a 
stable civil service which carries on without significant disruption. Analogously, 
Post claims that much of the workaday machinery of a scientific theory will be 
preserved over the course of a revolution.  
 
This general picture is certainly suggestive, and Post does back it up with some 
examples. However, these examples appeal simply to the reader’s intuitive 
judgement that elements have indeed been preserved across theory change. Post 
does not, in other words, give a precise general account of which elements of a 
theory are to be counted essential. Various more precise accounts of 
“essentialness” will be examined in Chapter 3, and I will offer my own views. 
However, the remainder of this section consists simply of a brief taxonomy of the 
different cases of theoretical elements being preserved, using mainly examples 
given by Post himself. At least five different kinds of cases are distinguishable, and 
these will be listed in order of (roughly) increasing abstraction of the theoretical 
elements preserved.  
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The least abstract sort of case is where predecessor theory S and successor 
theory L correspond in the predicted values for a particular set of measurable 
quantities. One example of this may be the predicted apparent positions of the 
planets in the Ptolemaic versus Copernican astronomical systems. Each system 
reproduces roughly the same data set, but even the basic models underpinning 
them differ quite significantly. As Post: “Astronomy ... has retained a core of 
kinematics observed in the heavens while attributing this to gods, holes in crystal 
spheres, or gravitating masses” Post, 1971), p. 238). 
 
The second sort of case involves the preservation of a low-level ‘empirical’ model 
from one theory to the next. This is more abstract than the previous kind of case, 
since what is preserved is not merely a particular set of results, but a general 
model with free parameters that may be fixed so as to provide predictions for a 
variety of particular cases. Post’s example in this category is the Balmer formula 
for predicting the frequencies of atomic spectra, which is found in both Bohr’s 
original quantum theory and in the later quantum electrodynamics. 
 
The third sort of case involves “mid-level” theoretical posits. One example, not 
mentioned by Post, is the general transverse wave equations for light. These are 
preserved from Fresnel’s theory to Maxwell’s theory, although they are interpreted 
first as describing perturbations in a mechanical ether and later as describing 
oscillations in a free-standing electromagnetic field (see Worrall, 1989a). It is worth 
noting, moreover, that some of the lower level consequences of these equations 
are also preserved, including Fresnel’s equations for refraction and reflection at the 
interface between two media. 
 
The fourth sort of case is what Post refers to as “inconsistent correspondence” (op. 
cit., p. 232). This sort of case is very similar to the second and third sorts described 
above, except that here the equation or pattern posited by S* is strictly inaccurate 
by lights of L, but approximately accurate under some intuitively reasonable limiting 
conditions. The venerable example, cited by Post, is that the equations of 
Newtonian classical mechanics are recoverable from Einstein’s relativistic 
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mechanics as the ratio v/c approaches zero, where v is the speed of the object we 
are considering and c is the speed of light in a vacuum. Of course, the speeds of 
actual objects are certainly not always near zero. And yet the circumstances in 
which classical mechanics have been observationally confirmed all involve objects 
moving at speeds which are very small relative to that of light, so the predictions of 
classical mechanics are quantitatively similar to those of relativistic mechanics.  
 
The fifth kind of case involves the preservation of some pattern of classification. 
Post gives two examples of this sort of case. The first, as already discussed, is the 
classification of chemical species by their degree of phlogistication (this particular 
case study will be examined in much greater detail in Chapter 5). The second 
involves the periodic system, whereby elements are arranged into groups with 
similar chemical reactivity, these properties recurring after regular intervals. When 
originally devised, the periodic law ordered elements by weight. However, in later 
versions, the elements are ordered by atomic number (a concept not available to 
the original framers of the system). The correlation between these two quantities is 
sufficiently close that the predicted patterns in chemical reactivity are, with a few 
interesting exceptions, preserved between system of ordering and the other. 
 
What is common to all these types of cases? As Post emphasises, in each case 
the successor theory L is intuitively able to “account for”, that is to say explain, why 
the earlier theory S was successful. The relationship between a later theory and an 
earlier one is however, according to the partial realist, stronger than that of mere 
explanation. This is for the simple reason that a theory which is largely true could 
quite satisfactorily explain the success of one which is entirely false except in 
respect of its observational consequences. But the partial realist claims that the 
essential elements of all empirically successful theories (at least approximately) 
accurately represent corresponding entities or processes in the mind-independent 
world. So two theories which are successful in respect of the same empirical 
phenomena must accurately represent the same entities, processes and/or 
properties. There are therefore two potential candidates for the type of relationship 
that, according to the partial realist, holds when the essential elements of a given 
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theory are “preserved” in its successor theories. One candidate is the relationship 
of co-reference. That is, corresponding elements or terms in the two theories may 
refer to the very same entity, process or property in the world. As indicated by the 
quotes from Putnam and Laudan above, this is historically the most popular 
candidate amongst realists. The other candidate is the relationship of structural 
correspondence, whereby there is no point-to-point relationship between particular 
posits in the successive theories, but rather a shared conception of how the 
theoretical posits are understood to relate to each other. Both of these candidates, 
and related options, are discussed in far more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
7. The optimistic induction 
 
Given suitably clear definitions of “empirical success”, “essential” and “preserved”, 
DR can be construed as simply an empirical claim about the history of science. 
Whether or not a theory is empirically successful can be interpreted in such a way 
that it depends only on the empirical consequences of the theory and whether 
those consequences are actually observed (at some point in time). What parts of a 
theory are essential can be determined by careful examination of the logical 
relations between its postulates, and the relations between these and the results of 
empirical observation. And whether some elements of a theory are preserved in its 
successor can, as discussed in the previous section, be established by a 
comparison of the logical structures of the theories in question. These claims are 
obviously somewhat sketchy, and demand considerable filling out. For instance, 
one might have serious doubts about whether the logical relations between the 
postulates of a theory are really so transparent to the historian of science.  A more 
adequate articulation of these claims will come in later chapters. For the moment, it 
is sufficient that there is nothing about any of these terms that is intrinsically 
dependent on some metaphysical notion.  
 
Since DR is an empirical claim about the history of science, deciding on its truth or 
falsity requires some critical examination of the history at issue. Such critical 
examination is, of course, already a stock-in-trade of the existing scientific realism 
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literature. The dominant approach in this literature to date is (speaking very 
broadly) “Popperian” (Popper, 1963/2002a; 1959/2002b), in that it is focused on 
putative counterexamples to DR. Anti-realists attempt to argue that there have 
been many episodes where the essential elements of empirically successful 
theories have not been preserved in successor theories. This, as argued above, is 
the substance of Laudan’s PMI. A reasonably comprehensive list of many of the 
putative counterexamples suggested so far in the literature can be found in 
Chapter 5.1. Realists are also focused on putative counterexamples to DR (as 
opposed to, say, confirming instances), albeit with the intention of showing they are 
not so problematic after all. This is Popperian precisely insofar as these putative 
counterexamples amount to “severe tests” for the realist’s hypothesis, and this 
hypothesis is “corroborated” to the extent that it passes these tests. This Popperian 
strategy could possibly be criticised in very general methodological terms, 
especially since this thesis partly addresses the very issue of theory confirmation 
(see Chapter 2). It will, however, be assumed that this strategy is broadly 
adequate. In the remainder of this section, the focus will be instead on how this 
strategy might be applied more consistently and rigorously and so amount 
cumulatively to an ‘optimistic induction’ in support of DR. Along the way, some 
arguments made by particular defenders of realism will also be criticised. 
  
One of the major questions that concerned Popper is what should be concluded if 
counterexamples to a hypothesis do, in fact, emerge. Popper himself allowed for 
two options. Firstly, one could discard the hypothesis. Alternatively, one could 
modify the hypothesis or one of its auxiliary assumptions in such a way that it is no 
longer falsified. However, he cautioned that, if sufficiently many such ad hoc 
modifications are accumulated, the entire system of hypotheses will be rendered 
unfalsifiable and hence trivial. Some of the key auxiliary “hypotheses” associated 
with DR are the definitions of the terms “empirically successful”, “essential” and 
“preserved”. Consequently, there are three broad cases where inappropriate 
definitions of these terms could render DR trivial.  
 
51 
 
 Firstly, the essential elements of theories could be picked out in such a way that 
they are always identical to those elements which we now happen to know were 
preserved in successor theories. Stanford (2003a, p. 914; 2006, pp. 166-168) and 
Newman (2010, pp. 416-417) argue that Psillos and Kitcher’s versions of partial 
realism fall into precisely this trap. As a pure exegetical matter, it is unclear 
whether this complaint is sustained; these authors can legitimately be read either 
way. The general point is that, for the thesis of DR to avoid triviality, “essential” 
should be defined in such a way that what parts of a theory are counted as 
essential does not depend upon this type of hindsight. This requirement, and the 
exegetical question, is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 3.3. 
 
The second sort of case is that where the terms “empirically successful” or 
“essential” are defined too narrowly. The consequence of this is that no actual 
examples satisfy them, and hence no counterexample is possible. This problem is 
not actually manifested in any version of partial realism advocated in the literature. 
The one area where it might be argued that partial realists succumb to it is when 
they rule out putative counterexamples as instances of “immature” science. In 
defining “mature” science, these authors do generally invoke a relatively strict 
criterion of empirical success, such as novel predictive success. This move is, 
however, not so extreme as to be illegitimate. The proposed definitions of success 
remain sufficiently wide to admit many cases and therefore many potential 
counterexamples. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, these definitions are 
generally motivated by priori concerns about what sort of empirical 
accomplishments legitimate application of the NMA, rather than the goal of 
excluding problematic cases as such (see e.g. Zahar, 1973; Worrall, 2002; 2006). 
The notion of empirical success is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 2. 
 
The third case is that where the notion of theoretical continuity or preservation is 
defined too broadly. One set of scientific realists who have seemingly fallen into 
this trap are those who think that the important kind of continuity in science is 
referential continuity, and accept a causal account of reference (see e.g. Hardin & 
Rosenberg, 1982). Under such an account, the reference of a term is simply 
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whichever actual entity the first person to coin the term was causally interacting 
with when she coined it. The problem with this sort of account, as pointed out by 
Laudan (1984), is that it seemingly makes it “too easy” for us to regard past 
theories as referring to entities posited by our existing empirically successful 
theories. Referential continuity approaches are discussed in more detail in Chapter 
3.2. 
 
Even a version of DR that avoids the various traps outlined above is not 
necessarily conclusively falsified by a single counterexample. For there is an 
additional auxiliary hypothesis involved, namely one which asserts that DR is to be 
understood as a universal claim, as opposed to a regularity which is merely 
satisfied most of the time. In the face of a single definitive counterexample, it is 
always possible to drop this assumption. Indeed, there is in fact no obvious a priori 
reason to construe DR as a perfectly general claim in the first place. This is true 
even for those whose commitment to it is motivated in the first instance by a 
commitment to (partial) scientific realism. The main argument for realism is the 
NMA, which rests on the intuition that we should disbelieve any explanation of an 
event which portrays it as simply a lucky accident (provided, of course, another 
explanation is available). And yet the proponent of this argument must accept that 
accidents do happen occasionally. The realist can therefore believe, without 
contradiction, both that empirical success gives a good reason to believe in the 
truth of a theory, and that successful theories will occasionally turn out to be false.  
The occasional counterexample is therefore not a falsifier to the realist’s general 
expectation of theoretical continuity.  
 
Some of the recent work by Saatsi and Vickers is extremely insightful when placed 
in the context of the present discussion. These authors accept at least a few 
counterexamples to DR, including Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory (Saatsi & Vickers, 
2010) and Bohr’s “old” quantum theory (Vickers, 2012). Focussing on Kirchhoff’s 
theory, they argue that certain false assumptions of Kirchhoff’s theory were 
essentially involved in deriving the accurate predictions of this theory. It is 
unimportant for present purposes whether this reading of the historical record is 
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correct2. What is interesting is that they attempt to show that this counterexample 
does not pose a general threat to realism.  
 
They do so by attempting to demonstrate that “the world in this specific respect is 
very kind to a human scientist who works her way upwards from the simplest 
assumptions” (Saatsi & Vickers, 2010, p. 43, emphasis in original). That is, they 
offer an account, from the modern perspective, of why the false assumptions 
nevertheless resulted in accurate predictions. Such an account potentially removes 
the threat to realism precisely because the NMA has as a premise that achieving 
empirical success with a false theory is highly unlikely. If it turns out that, under in 
certain circumstances, false assumptions are actually quite likely to result in 
empirical success, then this premise is violated. This certainly limits the 
applicability of the NMA. But it also eliminates the instances in question as 
potential counterexamples to the argument. The realist can still freely apply it in 
circumstances where prior investigation reveals that the crucial premise does hold. 
 
Saatsi and Vickers do, however, reject the following general argument for not 
interpreting individual counterexamples as refutations of scientific realism:  
 
“One might assume that, given the vast literature on the realism debate, 
there cannot possibly be many other historical examples like Kirchhoff’s 
hiding in the woodwork. Hence, the suggestion is that perhaps in this case 
nature really has been unusually kind to us ... and Kirchhoff’s success from 
falsity is just a one-off.” (ibid., 2010, pp. 42-43) 
 
This is very similar to an argument given above, which hinges on the claim that the 
NMA does admit of occasional exceptions. They do not reject it on any a priori 
grounds, however, so much as by questioning the claim that the literature on 
realism is as comprehensive as advertised. As Saatsi remarks in an earlier paper: 
 
                                            
2
 Though note that Vickers (forthcoming), at least, now appears to concede that this example can 
be accounted for within the partial realist framework. See Chapter 3.9 for a further discussion of this 
case study. 
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“Most realist commentaries on historical theory-shifts focus on just one or 
two oft-repeated cases of potential reference invariance and ontological 
discontinuity. Most commentators have taken as their starting point 
Laudan’s infamous list which, Laudan alleged, could be “extended ad 
nauseam”. It seems that most of the ensuing literature has focused on 
tackling the cases explicitly mentioned by Laudan, and very few case-
studies have been sought beyond the list. ... Prima facie, the immense 
breadth of scientific enterprise over the past couple hundred years (say) 
bears promise of many more cases to be discussed in order to get a faithful 
overview of theory change in science.”  (Saatsi, 2009)  
 
Saatsi is certainly descriptively accurate on the state of the literature. Worrall states 
that “… some of Laudan’s examples remain to challenge the realist. Let’s 
concentrate on what seems to me (and to others) the sharpest such challenge: the 
ether of classical physics” (1989, p. 115). Psillos, also implicitly referring to 
Laudan’s work, promises that his discussion “… illustrates and strengthens the 
realist defence against the pessimistic induction by considering the two mature and 
genuinely successful theories alleged to have been characteristically false: the 
caloric theory of heat and nineteenth-century optical theories” (1999, p. xxiv). 
Kitcher (1993, pp. 140-149) and Chakravartty (Chakravartty, 2007, ch. 2) both also 
reference Laudan and yet again give the example of nineteenth-century theories of 
light pride of place in outlining their respective versions of partial realism.  
 
Saatsi’s complaint is quite naturally cast in Popperian terms, and so can provide 
some additional guidance for the strategy of providing an “optimistic induction” in 
support of DR. The point is that it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that each of the 
authors cited above is more concerned to illustrate the particular version of partial 
realism he favours, rather than subjecting it to severe testing. After all, the basic 
treatment of the Fresnel example has already been established by Worrall (1989a) 
and Worrall traces his analysis back as far as Poincaré (1905/1952). In each 
author’s theory, the ether itself is discarded as inessential, and Fresnel’s wave 
equations for light are preserved, although the rationale differs slightly in each 
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case. There is, of course, nothing wrong with using a neat, well-known example to 
illustrate the basic logical apparatus of some hypothesis. But to actually provide 
evidence for a hypothesis like DR, an investigator must seek out additional putative 
counterexamples.  
 
Saatsi levels another, related, complaint in the same paper: 
 
“Like so many other problems in philosophy, the question of realism has 
been posed in extremely general terms at the outset, and considerations 
such as the Miracles argument have been put forward in the hope to secure 
realism about “all or most of mature science” in one fell swoop. I will now 
propose that the realism debate can progress by renouncing such extreme 
level of generality in its arguments and acknowledging the heterogeneity 
and the multifaceted nature of theoretical science, and by studying our 
epistemic commitments in a more piecemeal way.” (Saatsi, 2009) 
 
In other words, a successful test of DR in the context of one scientific discipline 
provides only relatively weak evidence that it is generally true. This is particularly a 
concern in light of the preponderance of examples from physics in the literature. 
The picture in molecular biology, for instance, may be quite different. So anyone 
who aspires to a successful optimistic induction in favour of DR must not only 
examine a large number of putative counterexamples, but also examine such 
cases in various scientific disciplines.  
 
The foregoing discussion in this section does not radically change the terms of the 
debate over scientific realism in the history of science. Scientific realists and anti-
realists still will (and should) clash over the interpretation of putative episodes of 
theoretical discontinuity. This discussion does, however, suggest some conditions 
by which this debate might be carried out more rigorously. Firstly, care should be 
taken to ensure that the key terms in DR are not defined in such a way that the 
position is empirically vacuous (or unfalsifiable!). This means, for instance, not 
picking out what is “essential” in some older theory by reference to what we 
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already know has been preserved in successor theories. Secondly, realists should 
make some effort to pick out new putative counterexamples and examine them in 
detail. This is because, providing a “severe test” for some hypothesis involves 
examining circumstances where the outcome of the test is not already known to be 
favourable. Thirdly, realists should make more effort to examine examples in more 
varied scientific contexts.  
  
8. Deflationary realism and constructive empiricisim 
 
I focus particularly on van Fraassen’s (1980) “constructive empiricism”, since this is 
probably the most currently influential brand of empiricism. Van Fraassen agrees 
with the semantic claim of scientific realism, that scientific theories ought to be 
understood as making literal claims about the world. However, he rejects the no-
miracles argument and generally claims that we can never know one way or the 
other whether propositions concerning unobservable entities are true. The main 
aim of science is therefore, in his view, to account for the observable features of 
the world. To accept a theory is merely to believe that it is “empirically adequate”, 
i.e. accurately describes observable phenomena, past and present.  
 
In van Fraassen’s introductory description of his position, he makes the following 
remark: 
 
“... [A]cceptance [of a theory] involves not only belief but a certain 
commitment. Even for those of us who are not working scientists, the 
acceptance involves a commitment to confront any future phenomena by 
means of the conceptual resources of this theory.” (op. cit., p. 12) 
 
I interpret “a commitment to confront any future phenomena by means of the 
conceptual resources of this theory” as a commitment to something like the 
continuity of science (or at least the bit of science in question). This seems to 
suggest that, under van Fraassen’s view, a scientist who accepts a given theory S 
will endorse some proposed successor theory L only if it preserves some essential 
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elements of S that make this predecessor theory successful. It seems, in other 
words, that van Fraassen endorses DR!  
 
This interpretation is at least complicated, however, by a remark which follows 
shortly after the passage quoted above:  
 
“This is a preliminary sketch of the pragmatic dimension of theory 
acceptance.” (op. cit., p. 12, emphasis in original) 
 
The notion of a “pragmatic” commitment can be interpreted in at least two different 
ways3. On the one hand, the pragmatic grounds for a commitment to theoretical 
continuity might emerge from facts about how scientists actually think. On the other 
hand, this commitment might emerge from principled arguments about how 
scientists ought to theorise. DR is compatible with only the latter interpretation.  It is 
unclear from The Scientific Image which of these interpretations van Fraassen 
intends, and I shall not attempt to resolve the exegetical question here. For current 
purposes, it is sufficient that the latter interpretation, and thus DR, is compatible 
with constructive empiricism. In the remainder of this section, these different 
interpretations will be spelled out in somewhat more detail. It will then be 
demonstrated that the constructive empiricist can in principle accept the optimistic 
induction outlined in the previous section.  
 
First, if only to provide a point of contrast, it is worth spelling out the interpretation 
under which van Fraassen’s pragmatic commitment emerges from a claim about 
human psychology. Suppose it is the case that a scientist’s acceptance of a theory 
involves a certain reconfiguration of her intellectual apparatus such that it would 
generally be easier for her to work with the concepts of that theory in future. If this 
is the case, a scientist may be well-advised to use the concepts of the theory she 
has already accepted in future theorising. It does not follow from this claim, 
however, that the conceptual resources of the current theory will be any more 
successful in confronting future phenomena than those of any other actual or 
                                            
3
 My thanks to Anjan Chakravartty and Eleanor Knox for pointing this out to me. 
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hypothetical competitor theory. A different scientist, who has accepted a different 
theory, might be well-advised to use the concepts native to that theory. This 
reading of constructive empiricism suggests a world where a large variety of 
theories, each employing different concepts, will be empirically adequate for any 
given class of phenomena. Acceptance of a theory does not therefore give any 
general reason to prefer successor theories that are substantially continuous with 
it. Given acceptance of a theory by some group of scientists, however, they will 
quite legitimately favour such theories by a kind of intellectual ‘inertia’. 
 
Under the second reading of van Fraassen’s claim, a commitment to the 
conceptual resources of a given theory is motivated by some argument suggesting 
that these conceptual resources will generally be more helpful than any others that 
are available. One form such an argument may take is a purely ‘local’ inductive 
inference – if the theory is currently more empirically successful than its 
competitors, then it might be expected that the conceptual resources of this theory 
would continue to give empirical success. Although this argument does not make 
any realist appeal to the truth of the theories concerned, it is still susceptible to the 
pessimistic meta-induction however. The aim of the PMI is precisely to show that 
we cannot in general expect the concepts of a successful theory to continue to 
produce success.  
 
As argued previously in this chapter, however, the pessimistic induction might be 
replaced by an optimistic induction over the history of science if the focus is placed 
more narrowly on the “essential” elements of empirically successful theories. This 
optimistic induction gives us reason to believe that some of the conceptual 
resources of current theories are likely to underpin whatever theories happen to be 
empirically successful in the future. And, since scientists will generally want new 
theories that are empirically successful, a justified expectation that certain 
concepts of a current theory are likely to be preserved gives these scientists a very 
good pragmatic reason for using these concepts in trying to devise the theory’s 
successor.  
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It is worth repeating what was noted at the beginning of the previous section, 
namely that DR is a purely empirical claim about the history of science. The 
optimistic induction in support of DR, moreover, makes no appeal to unobservable 
entities or any other metaphysically contentious issues. It simply aims to show that 
a general empirical claim is supported by a particular class of empirical evidence 
(i.e. case studies from the history of science). Thus neither DR nor the optimistic 
induction is incompatible with the principles that the constructive empiricist already 
accepts. Thus, if the optimistic induction is sound, the constructive empiricist 
should accept DR. 
 
This is all rather abstract, however. One relatively concrete way we might make DR 
more palatable for the constructive empiricist is by thinking of it as a 
methodological generalisation. There are many of these, of the form “When 
scientists in situation A use methodology B, they tend to derive a successful 
hypothesis”. Some examples of methodologies that can be substituted for B 
include “Write down the Hamiltonian” or “Identify a protein interaction”. However, 
since DR is very broad in scope, more appropriate analogies may be along the 
lines of “Write an equation that expresses an important relation” or “Look for a 
mechanism”. DR can be expressed in these terms as “Be conservative (in a 
particular way)”. Each of these methodological rules is supported by some 
inductive base, that is, a series of occasions upon which acting in the 
recommended way did in fact yield good results. So DR is thus far on equal terms 
with any other rule (provided that the inductive base gestured towards in section 7 
does, in fact, exist). Thus the constructive empiricist could, and perhaps should, 
accept DR.  
 
9. The argument from continuity to truth 
 
DR is, on its own, simply a ‘brute’ empirical regularity; a general statement to be 
tested against some class of evidence. But the realist could argue that it is simply 
unscientific to posit a brute regularity without making any attempt to explain it. And, 
moreover, she could argue that one should in general believe the best available 
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explanation of the regularity observed. To forestall a possible objection, it should 
be emphasised that there is no obvious distinction in this respect between 
regularities in history as it does for those of, say, physical systems.  For instance, if 
we accept IBE as a valid form of inference in general, and if the best explanation 
we have the regular cycle of financial ‘boom and bust’ is that people are disposed 
to accumulate debt when economic prospects are good, and to save when 
prospects are poor, then we have good reason to believe that this mechanism in 
fact operates. Supposing now that there is substantial theoretical continuity in the 
history of science, and that the best explanation for this is that empirically 
successful theories are usually at least approximately true then we ought, by the 
same form of reasoning, to believe that the theories in question are approximately 
true.  
 
It is worth pointing out that this is argument is distinct from the NMA, although both 
are instances of IBE (see the discussion in section 2). Whereas the “retail” version 
of the NMA makes the inference from the success of theories considered 
individually to their (approximate) truth, the proposed argument would infer from 
the continuity of theories in some historical sequence to the truth of all the theories 
in this sequence. This has some intuitive appeal, as it seems very implausible that 
there would be substantial continuity between two theories chosen at random. It is 
more plausible that the theories are similar to each because both accurately 
describe some independent external state of affairs. Call this the “argument from 
continuity to truth” (ACT). It can be formalised as follows: 
 
ACT 
P1: There is substantial theoretical continuity between theories S and L, both of 
which are empirically successful 
P2:  We should believe the best (“loveliest”) of the available explanations for the 
theoretical continuity between S and L 
P3:  There are exactly two available explanations for this theoretical continuity: 
(a) that S and L are both (approximately and/or partially) true in respect of 
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those features where there is continuity between them; and (b) that the 
continuity is merely result of an unlikely coincidence (a “miracle”) 
P4: Positing the occurrence of an unlikely coincidence is never the best 
explanation if any other options are available 
C: Therefore, we should believe that both S and L are (approximately and/or 
partially) true in respect of those features where there is continuity between 
them.  
 
As with the NMA, no substantive points advocated in this thesis depend on the 
soundness of the ACT. However, since it is a novel argument, it is worth providing 
some critical analysis of it. My approach is to modify responses to the NMA so that 
they stand as plausible objections against the ACT. All the general arguments 
against the validity of IBE as a mode of reasoning discussed in section 2 apply 
here without modification, and so these will not be discussed these.  
 
The first argument to consider against the ACT is a version of the base-rate 
argument. Suppose there is an older and a newer theory in a given domain, both of 
which have been extremely successful. Moreover, it is clear that there are 
substantially similarities between them. There are two scenarios where this 
outcome may arise: the theories are both (approximately) true; and the theories are 
both false in the same way. As before, the simple fact that both theories are 
successful increases the probability that they are true, but we cannot conclude that 
they are likely to be true without knowing what proportion of the class is composed 
of cases involving false theories. One possible rejoinder to this is to point out that, 
in contrast to the case with the (retail) NMA, there are now two theories involved. If 
a false theory is unlikely to be successful, surely it is astronomically unlikely that 
two theories which are false and similar to each other could both be successful?  
 
This rejoinder is considerably weakened, however, by conjoining the base-rate 
argument with a selectionist argument. As described above, substantial continuity 
between successful scientific theories can be explained by postulating that these 
theories are latching onto some stable unobservable features of the world. But it 
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can also be explained by postulating that these theories were designed to be 
substantially similar in certain respects. It has generally been the case that the 
scientists who designed a theory to account for some domain of phenomena were 
aware of (or, indeed, intimately familiar with) the existing theories in that domain. It 
seems quite plausible, then, that they might deliberately incorporate some of the 
features of the old theory into the new. There are several motivations that could 
underlie this conservatism. For instance, if some effort has been made to render 
tractable a set of mathematical equations found in the old theory, there may be a 
strong incentive to preserve the same formalism in the new theory. It may even be 
the case (in fact, I suspect that it frequently is the case) that the scientists involved 
tacitly endorse some version of DR and are therefore motivated specifically to be 
conservative.  
 
It should be clear how the base-rate and selectionist arguments together constitute 
a difficult problem for the ACT. The first suggests the possibility that there are 
explanations for theoretical continuity between two successful theories other than 
their truth. And the selection argument picks out a particular explanation that is 
relatively plausible. It is prima facie highly unlikely that two false theories could be 
both empirically successful and very similar to each other by lucky coincidence; 
this, surely, would be a miracle. But all that the current scenario requires is that a 
single false theory be successful. Selection then ensures that the other theory is 
similar to it and, because they will be false “in the same way”, that this other theory 
will also be empirically successful.  
 
For the main thesis of this paper, the chapter and the responses to it are by-the-by, 
though they may be of some interest to the partial realist. Before concluding this 
section, however, it is worth pointing out that the argument around selection also 
poses a potential difficulty for DR itself. Recall that the argument for DR is a form of 
“optimistic induction”. Positive instances for this induction are those cases where 
the elements essential for the predictive success of a given theory are also found 
in subsequent successful theories in the same domain. If, in a large proportion of 
these cases, the scientists involved in constructing the later theories are 
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specifically trying to achieve theoretical continuity, then this induction becomes 
considerably more limited in scope. One cannot legitimately argue from such an 
inductive base in favour of the general claim that there will always (or typically) be 
theoretical continuity in science, but only that there will be such continuity where 
scientists are trying to achieve it. But one of the major motivations for arguing in 
favour of DR is that this thesis provides a justification for methodological 
conservatism. And such a circumscribed version of the thesis, although it justifies 
the inference that conservative theories are unlikely to be a waste of time, does not 
weigh against non-conservative theorising. The issue of selection, if indeed it is 
widespread in the history of science, may therefore render DR considerably less 
interesting and useful.  
 
For the defender of DR, there are at least two possible responses to this problem. 
The first response is to notice that the selection argument inherits from the base 
rate argument the presupposition that many different scientific theories could 
potentially be successful in a given scientific domain. The argument fails if this 
presupposition is defeated. Putting this another way, the fact that a scientist came 
to the new theory by working from the old theory would not be a substantial blow 
against either DR or the ACT if the new theory was one of only a very small 
number that had any chance of being successful anyway. It is, however, difficult to 
see how to make convincing the claim that the ‘population’ of potentially successful 
theories is small. The most prominent a priori argument that addresses the 
question is the argument for the underdetermination of theory by evidence, which 
purports to demonstrate precisely the opposite conclusion. The prospects of a 
posteriori arguments would also appear to be poor. Suppose even that in all actual 
cases only a small number of theories have been proposed as potential 
successors to the existing successful theory in some domain, and of these a large 
proportion have been substantially continuous with the older theory. This evidence 
cannot defeat the presupposition that there is a large population of logically 
possible theories that could potentially have been successful. Moreover, appealing 
to this evidence simply begs the question, as a proponent of the selection 
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argument would presumably argue that a large proportion of actually proposed 
theories match our criterion precisely because of selection.  
 
The second response to the problem draws on Lipton’s decisive response to the 
original version of selectionist argument against the NMA, both of which were 
discussed in section 3 of this chapter. Recall that the major weakness with the 
original version of the selectionist argument is that it is unable to account for cases 
where a theory predicts qualitatively novel phenomena. This is for the very simple 
reason that selection is intrinsically a backward-looking procedure – selection 
cannot account for a theory’s empirically adequacy in respect of phenomena that 
were not known when the theory was accepted by the relevant scientists. Similarly, 
to defeat the selectionist argument against the ACT, cases must be highlighted 
where these is theoretical continuity that cannot be accounted for by selection. 
These cases will never be as watertight as those of novel empirical prediction.  The 
proposition that a scientist selected a theory specifically for its ability to explain 
particular phenomena can be ruled out definitively in cases where these 
phenomena have not yet been observed. It is, on the other hand, impossible to rule 
out entirely the proposition that a scientist has crafted a successor theory in such a 
way that it preserves elements of an earlier theory. Nevertheless, there are cases 
where this is historically implausible as an account of how a theory was developed.  
 
To illustrate this, I will briefly examine a historical example where DR is apparently 
sustained, but there is no evidence of selection. The example is Maxwell’s 
reformulation of the wave theory of light (the historical details are provided by 
Mahon (2003, ch. 7). Around 1819, Fresnel defended a wave theory of light and, 
motivated by the results of polarization experiments, postulated that it consists of a 
transverse wave propagating in an elastic solid “ether” which pervades space (see 
Worrall, 1989b; Fresnel’s theory is also discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.3). 
Around 1862, Maxwell was concerned with a problem that is, on the face of it, 
entirely different to Fresnel’s, namely that of accounting for electrical and magnetic 
phenomena. At this time, these were already understood to be related, for example 
by the phenomenon of electromagnetic induction. Maxwell constructed a 
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mechanical model whereby space is filled with spinning “cells” or “vortices”. 
Magnetic lines of force are constituted by these cells lining up along their spin 
axes, and electric currents occur in a conducting material when tiny electric 
charges are passed from one cell to the next. To account for the electrical 
properties of insulating materials, Maxwell postulated that the cells are elastic and 
that an electric field is constituted by the distortion of these cells across a region of 
space. This model satisfactorily accounted for the electromagnetic phenomena of 
immediate interest. But a secondary consequence of this model is that the 
postulated medium has the right mechanical properties (notably elasticity) to fulfil 
the role of Fresnel’s ether in sustaining the propagation of transverse waves. And, 
when Maxwell carried out the relevant calculation with empirically measured values 
for the electromagnetic and electrostatic units of charge, he predicted the 
occurrence of waves with very nearly the same velocity as the measured value for 
light. The electromagnetic theory of light which grew out of this insight rapidly 
became dominant in optics. And this theory had substantial continuities with 
Fresnel’s earlier theory, not least the postulate that light is constituted by a 
transverse wave. Yet it is difficult to argue, in light of the history sketched above, 
that the electromagnetic theory was selected precisely because of these 
continuities. The new theory emerged from an investigation of electricity and 
magnetism, both of which are prima facie quite distinct from optical phenomena.  
 
To generalise from this case study, it seems that far greater emphasis should be 
placed on those cases where scientists have ‘unintentionally’ adopted, or even 
been ‘forced into’ using, the theoretical concepts of the predecessor theory. This 
more limited inductive base might then be used to construct an argument for the 
stronger form of DR. The appeal of this response is that it apparently circumvents 
the problem of selection in a single stroke. It is not at all clear, however, how 
typical the Maxwell case is. The strategy of limiting our inductive base to cases 
where selection is absent may therefore be unfeasible. I do, however, take this to 
be an open empirical question for the historian of science. The issue of selection 
will not be addressed in the majority of the case studies examined in the remainder 
of this thesis, where the aim is merely to assess the simple version of DR against 
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various putative counterexamples. It will, however, be discussed briefly in 
connection with the phlogiston theory of chemistry, in Chapter 5.6. 
 
10. Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, I have critically analysed the most prominent arguments 
respectively for and against scientific realism, namely the NMA and the PMI. Given 
the conclusion that the PMI is sound, what I have termed “naive realism” is 
untenable. However, one or other version of “partial realism” may avoid this 
problem by circumventing the PMI’s claim that “radical discontinuity” is 
characteristic of theory change in science.  
 
I have proposed “deflationary realism” as offering a new perspective on the 
scientific realism debate. DR is, in essence, a direct commitment to theoretical 
continuity in science, one that can be defended or attacked on its own terms. The 
advantage of DR is that it is simultaneously weak enough to avoid irresolvable 
metaphysical disputes yet strong enough to have interesting consequences. It is 
weak because it claims simply that there is an empirical regularity in the history of 
science, namely a certain sort of continuity between predictively successful 
theories that have existed in the same scientific domain. It is not, however, 
committed to any particular explanation of this regularity. DR is strong because, if 
this regularity can be held to obtain between our existing best theories and their 
putative successors, it justifies a methodological commitment to conservatism in 
scientific theorising. Moreover, because DR is entailed by PR, a refutation of the 
former is also a refutation of the latter.  
 
DR can be supported by a sort of “optimistic induction” over the history of science. I 
have claimed that the most promising approach to such an induction is essentially 
falsificationist. That is, both realists and anti-realists are well-advised to focus on 
those historical cases that prima facie fail to satisfy DR, though realists would 
typically do so in the hope that these cases turn out not to be counterexamples 
after all. For the falsificationist strategy to be effective, however, two broad 
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conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, DR must be formulated in way that is 
falsifiable. So, for instance, the criterion for which theories are empirically 
successful should not be so narrow that no actual cases satisfy it. Secondly, DR 
must be subjected to severe tests. That is, we should not focus only on particular 
cases or scientific sub-disciplines where there is already good reason to believe 
DR is satisfied. We should also avoid cases where there is evidence that the 
scientists involved specifically intended the successor theory to be substantially 
similar to its predecessor.  
 
I have argued that the constructive empiricist could in principle accept DR and 
indeed, under a certain reading of van Fraassen, is already committed to it. Finally, 
I examined an argument (the ACT) that the partial realist might use to resist the 
deflationary tendencies of DR. This argument maintains that a historical pattern of 
continuity between scientific theories demands an explanation, and that the best 
explanation is the approximate truth of the theories concerned. Although I am 
officially neutral on metaphysical questions, and so do not wish to deny this 
argument to realists, I have nevertheless shown that the anti-realist has some very 
convincing responses to it. DR therefore stands as a defensible position in its own 
right.  
 
In the following two chapters, I will focus on disambiguating some of the vague key 
terms found in the definition of partial realism and thus that of deflationary realism, 
namely “empirical success” and “essential”. It is worth noting that I will attempt to 
give definitions of these terms from a partial realist perspective. For instance, I will 
offer a definition of empirical success such that a theory satisfying this definition 
might be regarded as likely to be (approximately) true under the NMA. Adopting 
this perspective is not strictly necessary if our aim is simply to articulate 
deflationary realism as a standalone position, one that may be defended by an 
optimistic induction. For this purpose, any definitions that ensure the overall 
falsifiability of the position will be sufficient, as discussed in section 7 above. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile, at least in the first instance, retaining the connection 
between our present discussion and the larger realist debate. This ensures that 
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any putative refutation of DR is also a refutation of PR. It also means that, if either 
the NMA or the ACT are judged to be viable arguments, that the version of DR 
defended here can simply be ‘re-inflated’ to yield a corresponding version of PR.  
 
The discussion in the following two chapters is, in sum, intended to result in 
defensible versions of both DR and PR. These first three chapters, then, comprise 
the ‘core’ position of the present thesis. In subsequent chapters, I then turn to 
addressing some of the consequences of the core position, and examine how well 
it accounts for particular putative counterexamples. In Chapter 4, I will address a 
key consequence of partial realism, namely the particular view of scientific 
rationality it entails. I will examine this view in the context of the long-running 
philosophical literature surrounding “scientific revolutions”. Finally, in Chapter 5, I 
will examine in detail some case studies that potentially cast doubt on deflationary, 
and thus partial, realism.  
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Chapter 2. Empirical success and theory confirmation 
 
1. Chapter overview 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give a defensible account of when a theory should be 
judged “empirically successful”. This is particularly relevant to a full understanding 
of partial realism and deflationary realism, since the term appears in each of their 
definitions. The major criterion I will adopt in assessing any proposed account of 
empirical success is that, supposing the NMA a valid form of argument, it should 
be plausible to infer the truth of a theory which enjoys empirical success under the 
proposed account. 
 
I begin, in section 2, with a brief general overview of the idea that a theory is more 
confirmed by novel prediction than by accommodation of empirical results. In this 
discussion, a distinction is made between logical and historical theories of 
confirmation. The most natural interpretations of the notion of novel prediction are 
historical in nature, and these are discussed in sections 3 - 5, culminating in a 
simple version of the “use-novelty” (UN) account. As these accounts are all subject 
to criticism under the criterion state above, however, more logical accounts of 
empirical success will come to be favoured.  
 
The focus of sections 6 and 7 is on accounts of confirmation which view novel 
prediction as simply a special case of a more general theory of confirmation. The 
“severe testing” account, and criticisms of it, are discussed in section 6. Some 
accounts that regard the ability of a theory to unify disparate empirical results as 
the primary theoretical virtue are discussed in section 7. These accounts regard 
predictive success as merely a secondary virtue, and hence are grouped under the 
heading of “weak predictivism” It is argued that these accounts, unlike the other 
accounts survey in the chapter, are broadly adequate to the NMA. 
 
Consequently, a specific “unification view” (UV) is developed in section 8. This is 
developed from Worrall’s writing on the UN account of predictive success, though 
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ultimately it is a version of weak predictivism. It asserts that a theory is confirmed 
(has “unifying power”) to the extent that it entails more verified empirical results 
than are required to construct it.  
 
Sections 9 and 10 are devoted to addressing some problems with the initial version 
of the UV proposed above, and consequently suggestion some modifications to it. 
Section 9 focuses on a key ambiguity in the idea of “constructing” a theory, and it is 
ultimately argued that a much more expansive definition of this term than that 
found in section 8 is required. Although the initial definition of the UV emphasises 
the number of empirical results entailed by a theory, the thesis in section 10 is that 
deductive entailment of results is neither necessary nor sufficient for a theory to 
count as unifying. The chapter is summarised in section 11. 
 
2. Predictivism 
 
For the purposes of the NMA, “empirical success” is frequently cashed out by 
reference to the notion of “novel prediction”. This fits well with the common view 
amongst philosophers of science that, ceteris paribus, a theory is better confirmed 
by the prediction of some novel phenomenon than it would be by the 
“accommodation” of the same phenomenon after it has already been observed. 
Call this view, following Maher (1988; 1990) “predictivism”.  
 
Predictivism has a long provenance in science and philosophy of science. 
Musgrave (1974) cites the example of Thales (circa 600 BCE) being dubbed one of 
the “Seven Sages” on the strength of being able to predict an eclipse. However, 
the debate between predictivism and anti-predictivism in something resembling its 
present form first takes place between Whewell and Mill. Whewell writes: 
 
“The hypothesis which we accept ought to explain phenomena which we 
have observed. But they ought to do more than this: our hypotheses ought 
to foretel [sic] phenomena which have not yet been observed... Because the 
rule prevails, it includes all cases; and will determine them all, if we can only 
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calculate its real consequences. Hence it will predict the results of new 
combinations... And that it does this with certainty and correctness, is one 
mode in which the hypothesis is to be verified as right and useful.” 
(Whewell, 1840/1847, pp. 62-63, emphasis in original) 
 
And later, more explicitly, he writes: 
 
“Such a coincidence of untried facts with speculative assertions cannot be 
the work of chance, but implies some large portion of truth in the principles 
on which the reasoning is founded... The prediction of results, even of the 
same kind as those which have been observed, in new cases, is a proof of 
real success in our inductive processes” (Whewell, 1858/1968, p. 152) 
 
Notice here that Whewell, in claiming that “such a coincidence ... cannot be the 
work of chance” is appealing to the very same intuition underlying the NMA. In this 
chapter I shall, following Whewell, adopt the realist assumption that the empirical 
success of a theory can, via the NMA, be good grounds for believing that it is true. 
Given this assumption, our task is to find an account of novel prediction, or 
empirical success more generally, which suffices to render empirically successful 
theories well-confirmed under the NMA. The NMA, in other words, gives us a basic 
condition of adequacy for any account of empirical success.  
 
Before diving into detailed analysis of the various accounts on offer, it is worth 
making a distinction, following Musgrave (1974), between logical and historical 
theories of confirmation. Under a logical approach, the degree to which a theory is 
confirmed by a piece of evidence depends entirely on the logical relationship 
between the two. In the simplest case, the theory deductively entails the evidence. 
Under a historical approach, the degree of confirmation depends at least partially 
on details of the historical situation in which the theory was proposed. It may 
therefore be relevant whether the theory was proposed before or after a particular 
observation was made, and/or what phenomena the theorist(s) who proposed the 
theory intended to account for.  
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3. Temporal novelty 
 
Predictivism can be thought of as according special epistemic weight to 
unexpectedness. Recall that the NMA posits two potential explanations for the 
empirical success of a particular theory: either the theory is true, or a lucky 
coincidence (“miracle”) has occurred. And (provided no other explanations are 
tenable), the explanation of truth is favoured precisely to the extent that a 
coincidence is unlikely. If a theory predicts some phenomenon which is already 
considered likely to occur on the basis of background knowledge, however, the 
agreement between theory and phenomenon is not at all unlikely.  
 
This intuitive argument can be neatly formalised with reference to the Bayesian 
updating formula. This asserts that the correct assignment of subjective probability 
to a hypothesis (H) upon the observation of some new piece of evidence (E) is 
given by the conditional probability of the hypothesis on the evidence, as assessed 
before the observation. This conditional probability, in turn, is given by Bayes’ 
theorem.  
 
 
 
Where:   
• Pnew(H) is the probability of the hypothesis after updating on the new 
evidence 
• p(H|E) is the probability of the hypothesis given some piece of empirical 
evidence (the ‘posterior probability’)  
• p (E|H) is the probability of the evidence assuming the hypothesis is true 
• p (H) is the probability assigned to the hypothesis without assuming that this 
evidence has been uncovered (the ‘prior probability’) 
• p (E) is the probability of the evidence without assuming that the hypothesis 
is true (i.e. the ‘background’ probability of the evidence) 
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In the simplest case, the evidence is entailed by the hypothesis, so the term p(E|H) 
is unity and so can be eliminated from the right-hand-side of the equation. The 
prior probability p(H), i.e. the degree to which we believe the hypothesis before 
encountering the evidence, is obviously not affected by the evidence itself, and so 
can be treated as a constant. In this case the degree to which we change our belief 
in the hypothesis – i.e. the ratio between p(H|E) and p(H) – depends only on p(E). 
The less likely the evidence without the assumption that H is true, the higher the 
posterior probability assigned to the hypothesis if E is in fact observed. That is, the 
more unexpected the evidence that the evidence entailed by the hypothesis is on 
background knowledge, the more that this evidence serves to confirm this 
hypothesis.  
 
This brings us to the temporal account of novelty prediction. This account defines 
novelty simply as a phenomenon hitherto unknown to science. A theory makes a 
successful novel prediction, therefore, simply in case it entails (or renders 
probable) some phenomenon that has not been observed before, but which is 
indeed observed when the appropriate experiment or systematic observation is 
conducted. From the perspective of natural language, this account certainly gives 
the most obvious interpretation of “novelty”. One thing that should be emphasised, 
however, is that this account accords far greater importance to the observation of 
qualitatively new phenomena, as opposed to additional observations of 
phenomena which the theory is already known to account for.  
 
A paradigm case of novel prediction – the Fresnel-Poisson ‘white spot’ (Worrall, 
1989a; 1989b) – illustrates the intuitive appeal of the temporal view. In the early 
nineteenth-century, the science of optics was divided between proponents of the 
particle and wave theories of light. Since interference is a phenomenon found only 
in waves, the most compelling point in favour of the wave theory was the existence 
of diffraction experiments, such as the two-slit experiment carried out by Young in 
1803, which appeared to show interference effects in light. In 1818, Fresnel 
submitted a treatise for a prize competition announced by the French Academy on 
the subject of diffraction phenomena. In this work, he introduced a version of the 
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wave theory which made mathematically precise the concept of interference and 
so produced quantitatively precise predictions for the results of diffraction 
experiments. He could predict, for instance, the banding pattern around the edge of 
the shadow cast by a straightedge from a point source. Poisson, one of the judges 
on the prize committee, and a vociferous opponent of the wave theory, determined 
that Fresnel’s theory predicted that the shadow cast by an opaque circular disc 
illuminated by a point light source would have at its centre a region that was as 
intensely illuminated as it would be if there was no disc present (a “white spot”). 
This consequence, while intuitively implausible, was nevertheless confirmed 
experimentally by Arago, another member of the committee. So what was intended 
as a reductio of the theory emerged as a striking piece of evidence in its favour. 
And, claims the temporal account, because this observation was so unexpected, it 
confirmed the theory more than the successful treatment of known diffraction 
phenomena. 
 
Intuitive as this is, there are however several problems with the temporal account. 
The first stems from the claim that to count as “novel”, an observation must be 
hitherto not “known to science”. But this is extremely ambiguous. As Musgrave 
puts it: 
 
“Does a statement become 'known to science' when some scientist first 
thinks of it? – or when he first writes it down? – or when it is first published? 
– or perhaps when it is abstracted in a leading journal?” (Musgrave, 1974), 
pp. 8-9) 
 
He goes on, however, to dismiss the problem: 
 
“Often it will not matter how we answer, for a very loose dating will suffice. 
And where it does matter, historians are quite used to settling such 
questions.” (ibid., p. 9) 
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In other words, it will usually be possible to establish at least whether prediction or 
observation came first, although not necessarily by how much time.  
 
This response, however, seems to miss the point. The problem, surely, is that, 
even where the historical facts of the matter are settled, it is sometimes unclear 
whether some phenomenon should be counted as known to science for the 
purposes of deciding whether a theory is confirmed. This point can be made more 
sharply by considering a further wrinkle in the case of the Fresnel-Poisson white 
spot. As a matter of historical fact, this phenomenon was observed about a century 
prior to Fresnel’s submission to the French Academy, and these observations were 
reported in widely-circulated scientific journals (Delisle, 1715; Maraldi, 1723; 
Worrall, 1989b). It just so happens that none of the prize committee, or Fresnel 
himself, was aware of these results. The question for the advocate of the temporal 
account, then, is whether this new piece of information should alter the extent to 
which we view Fresnel’s theory as confirmed. 
 
This question poses a dilemma for a proponent of the temporal view. On the one 
horn of the dilemma, the fact that the white spot had been observed prior to 
Fresnel’s articulation of his theory could lead us to regard the theory as less 
confirmed. This seems like a strange conclusion, however. What if, for instance, 
instead of being recorded in French scientific journals in the eighteenth century, the 
Fresnel-Poisson spot had been observed by Aztec astronomers in the sixteenth 
century, shortly before they all died of diseases introduced by Europeans? It would 
surely be absurd to claim that Fresnel’s theory should be considered less 
confirmed if an experiment that was so temporally, culturally and geographically 
distant from his own work suddenly came to light. Intuitively, there must surely be 
some causal connection between the prior observation and the theory for the 
former to count against the latter’s predictive powers. A strict interpretation of the 
temporal account therefore seems unsatisfactory.  
 
On the other horn of the dilemma, we could accept that the degree of confirmation 
of the theory is not at all diminished by the earlier observation of the white spot. 
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Taken more broadly, this interpretation seems to suggest that the degree of 
confirmation depends on whether the predicted phenomenon was known to the 
actual scientist(s) who made the prediction, as opposed to “science” generally. 
This is perhaps the most sensible interpretation of the temporal account in any 
case. It certainly fits very naturally with the Bayesian framework discussed above, 
since the latter is most meaningfully applied to understanding belief revision in a 
particular agent, albeit often with many idealisations. And, as shown above, it can 
easily rationalise a scientist’s regarding as confirmed theories which predict 
consequences that are surprising to her. But this interpretation now seems too 
historical to be plausible as a general account of theoretical confirmation. Why 
should we regard a theory as better-confirmed just because it made predictions 
that were surprising to Fresnel, Poisson, et al.? Or, more formally, there does not 
appear to be an obvious logical connection between the subjective degree of 
confirmation that an individual (let us assume rationally) attributes to a theory from 
her own epistemic perspective, and the degree to which later scientists or 
philosophers of science should regard that theory as confirmed. This distinction 
between a particular scientist’s subjective reasons for regarding a theory as 
confirmed and some more ‘objective’ account will become more prominent in later 
sections, and so will be discussed in more detail there.  
 
Another major objection to the temporal account is due to Worrall (1989b, p. 144), 
who argues that, as a matter of historical fact, temporal novelty did not play a very 
significant role in scientists’ decision-making around the white spot case. Worrall 
notes that the judges of the French Academy prize committee paid comparatively 
little attention to the novel phenomenon of the white spot. Instead, they focused the 
majority of their attention on Fresnel’s successful treatment of already known 
straight-edge diffraction phenomena. Moreover, Poisson realised that Fresnel’s 
theory would also give predictions for the case of a disc with a circular aperture in 
the middle illuminated from a point source. Yet no member of the prize committee 
actually bothered even to carry out the detailed calculation! It was left to Fresnel, 
after he had been awarded the prize, to perform the calculation and confirm it 
experimentally. So the prize committee did not consider it worth their while to follow 
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up on the prospect of a second, possibly equally counterintuitive, prediction. These 
two examples suggest that the cream of the French physics establishment did not 
consider temporal novelty a matter of great importance in deciding whether or not 
to accept a new theory.  
 
This particular historical example illustrates a more general problem for the 
temporal account. This is effectively articulated by Glymour (1980) in his 
discussion of the problem of “old evidence” for Bayesian confirmation theory. If 
some piece of evidence is widely accepted as a piece of background knowledge, 
the prior probability of the evidence in the Bayesian formula is unity. The posterior 
probability of the hypothesis is then just the same as the prior probability. So not 
only do temporally novel observations not confirm as much as novel predictions; 
they don’t provide any confirmation at all! But this is manifestly contrary to actual 
scientific reasoning and practice (hence the problem of old evidence). When a 
promising new theory or hypothesis is introduced, at least part of the reason 
scientists typically cite for believing it is that it adequately explains existing 
phenomena.  
 
There are some clear examples of theories being accepted on the basis of “old 
evidence”. Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the universe, for instance, was largely 
supported by astronomical data that had been recorded over a period of centuries 
before he did his crucial work. Glymour illustrates his own argument by reference 
to Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR). One of the major pieces of 
evidence cited in favour of GTR at the time it was proposed is that it deals 
satisfactorily with the anomalous (under the Newtonian theory) precession in the 
perihelion of the planet Mercury. This phenomenon, however, was first observed in 
the mid-nineteenth century – more than sixty years before the publication of GTR. 
Finally, the problem of old evidence is also manifest in the Fresnel example – both 
the Bayesian view and the simple intuitive appeal to ‘unexpectedness’ fail to 
account for the judges’ endorsement of Fresnel’s theory on the basis of its 
successful treatment of known diffraction phenomena. It is reasonable to conclude, 
then, that the temporal account fails to recover the actual reasoning of scientists.  
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It is worth making explicit the intuition underlying all the objections raised against 
the temporal account above (variants of the following argument are made by 
various authors, including for instance Musgrave (1974) and Leplin (1997, esp. ch. 
2). This intuition is that it seems entirely arbitrary whether or not a particular 
phenomenon is observed before or after the postulation of some theory. The 
degree to which a piece of evidence supports a theory should depend on some 
sort of logical or epistemic relationship between the two. Granted, it is sometimes 
the case that scientists only think to perform an experiment because they wish to 
test a theory which predicts a particular result from it. It is also certainly true that 
scientists can only begin to use a piece of evidence to argue in favour of a theory 
after that evidence has become known. But these relationships are, as it were, 
‘accidental’. A difference in the temporal order between the appearance of the 
evidence and that of the theory lacks any intrinsic epistemic import. When 
scientists and philosophers of science judge that an observational result which is 
well-known can nevertheless provide support to some newly-proposed theory, they 
perceive a relationship between the two which is epistemically significant. In the 
follow sections, I will therefore survey some accounts of novel prediction which 
purport to establish this type of epistemic significance.  
 
4. Theoretical novelty 
 
One possible way of providing a principled logical or epistemic distinction between 
novel and non-novel observational results is to emphasise novelty at the time a 
theory is proposed relative to the existing theoretical background, rather than 
relative to the phenomena that are already known. One proponent of such an 
account is Musgrave:  
 
“The basic question is not so much ‘Does evidence e confirm hypothesis h?’ 
but rather ‘Does evidence e support h1 more than h2?’. This suggests that in 
assessing the evidential support of a new theory we should compare it, not 
with ‘background knowledge’ in general, but with the old theory which it 
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challenges... According to this view, a new theory is independently testable 
(or predicts a ‘novel fact’) if it predicts something which is not also predicted 
by its background theory.” (Musgrave, 1974, pp. 15-16) 
 
Leplin advocates a similar position. He states two conditions for “the prediction of 
an observational result O to be novel for a theory T”, namely: 
 
“Independence Condition: There is a minimally adequate reconstruction of 
the reasoning leading to T that does not cite any qualitative generalization of 
O.  
 
Uniqueness Condition: There is some qualitative generalization of O that T 
explains and predicts, and of which, at the time that T first does so, no 
alternative theory provides a viable reason to expect instances.” (Leplin, 
1997, p. 77) 
 
By the “qualitative generalization of O”, Leplin means the general phenomenon of 
which particular observational result O is an instance. The Independence Condition 
requires that the observational result in question not be essentially involved in the 
construction of the theory which entails it. This is very similar to the use-novelty 
condition which, since it is the focus of the following section, will not be examined 
any further here.  
 
Considering the Uniqueness Condition by itself, however, gives a view that is very 
similar to Musgrave’s. Both views regard the prediction of an observational result 
by a theory as novel only if it predicts some phenomenon that all existing rival 
theories either forbid, or are silent upon. There are cases where this ‘theoretical 
novelty’ view coincides with temporal novelty. However, it can also be the case that 
phenomena which are not predicted by the old theory are already known, and are 
now predicted by the new theory. The new theory is confirmed by this ‘old 
evidence’ simply because it predicts them while its rival forbids them. The 
Musgrave/Leplin account is therefore more successful than the temporal novelty 
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approach at recovering the judgements of the scientists involved in episodes of 
theory change.  
 
This account does not satisfy the basic adequacy condition for an account of 
empirical success, however, because theories that are successful under this 
account will not generally be well-confirmed under the NMA. This is for the simple 
reason that this approach also introduces an irreducible element of historical 
contingency. With the temporal novelty approach, the degree to which a theory is 
confirmed by an observational result depends on the epistemically irrelevant 
question of whether the result came before or after the theory was proposed. 
Under the theoretical novelty account, the degree to which an observational result 
confirms a theory depends on what other rival theories have been proposed at the 
first moment when the empirical result is known. And this is surely also a result of 
historical ‘accident’ to some degree.   
 
In response to this, Musgrave and Leplin might well argue that of course the 
degree to which we believe a theory ought to depend on what other theories are 
present. This response is accurate, but beside the point.  Recall that we want 
criteria for which cases of predictive success give good reason to believe that the 
theory (or parts thereof) responsible for these successes is (are) true4. These 
criteria must be stronger than those for cases where a piece of evidence merely 
gives reasons to prefer a theory over some competitor, or to accept it 
pragmatically. Having reasons to regard a theory as true is, of course, also to have 
reasons to prefer it over a competitor and to accept it pragmatically. But the 
converse does not follow. It is entirely sensible to accept, and scientists frequently 
do accept, theories on the grounds of empirical adequacy, mathematical 
tractability, etc. without forming a commitment one way or another regarding their 
truth. 
 
                                            
4
 Our account of novel prediction could, of course, also allow for lesser degrees of confirmation. But 
it must allow such a strong degree of confirmation in at least some cases to be compatible with the 
NMA. 
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It is not at all clear how one could use the theoretical novelty account to argue for 
the truth of a theory under the NMA. It is, after all, possible for a theory to shine in 
comparison to its competitors simply because those competitors are grossly 
inadequate. Ptolemy’s model of the universe, for instance, is highly confirmed 
relative to a cosmology in which the earth is flat and the planets are capricious 
gods. More generally, the opponent of the NMA can always happily concede that 
some theories are more empirically successful than others, while maintaining that 
none of them is successful enough to warrant inference to its truth. To avoid this 
response, the NMA therefore demands an absolute, rather than a merely 
comparative, account of empirical success. 
 
Such an absolute account cannot depend on any of the contingent historical 
factors that give rise to the problems described above. The simplest, though not 
necessarily the only, way to avoid such dependence is to require that any 
proposed account characterise a two-place relation between the theory and the 
phenomena it predicts. Such a relation, perforce, makes no reference to the 
particular times at which the phenomenon was discovered or the theory was first 
proposed, to the presence or absence of competitor theories, or even to the (non-) 
existence of other phenomena. Interestingly, Leplin, in an exposition of his account 
earlier in the same book cited above, advocates a “relational requirement” for any 
account of novel prediction, which states that “Novelty is a binary relation between 
[an empirical result] and [a theory]” (op. cit., p. 63). As pointed out by Ladyman, 
however, the independence and uniqueness conditions together entail that “a 
result being novel for a theory seems to be a relation between a theory, a result, 
the provenance of the theory, and all the other theories around at the time since 
the latter are required not to offer explanations of the result” (Ladyman, 1999 p. 
183). So Leplin’s fully-developed account of novel prediction is clearly inconsistent 
with a desideratum he himself proposed! In any case, for the reasons cited above, 
although Leplin’s particular view of novel prediction is unsatisfactory, his relation 
requirement, or at least the motivation behind it, is well-taken. 
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If confirmation is a binary relation between observational result and theory, then 
the inference from the result to the truth of the theory will remain intact whatever 
new theories emerge. It is also is extremely likely to remain (at least approximately 
and/or partially) intact whatever new evidence emerges5. At first blush, these 
consequences would seem to provide a kind of reductio argument against any 
account of novel prediction satisfying the requirement that confirmation be a binary 
relation. Surely all theories, no matter how successful, will very probably be totally 
overturned by later scientific activity! But this just a restatement of the conclusion of 
the PMI, and is just what the NMA denies. Some reasons for believing a theory – 
including the fact that it predicts novel phenomena, according to the realist authors 
under discussion – are so decisive that it should be viewed as extremely likely that 
the theory (or at least the parts of it essential for its predictive success) will not be 
overturned. It would, so to be speak, be a “miracle” if the theory later turned out to 
be false. This is not, of course, to say that the NMA is necessarily successful. Even 
under the more careful partial realist reading, it may well be the case that theories 
which enjoy novel predictive success turn out to be radically false. The narrower 
point is that is that any account of confirmation that is adequate for the NMA, 
whether or not the NMA is successful, must satisfy Leplin’s relational requirement 
and so be insensitive to later scientific developments in the manner described.  
 
5. Use-novelty 
 
The so-called “heuristic” account of novel prediction is characterised by Zahar as 
follows: 
 
“A fact will be considered novel with respect to a given hypothesis if it did 
not belong to the problem-situation which governed the construction of the 
hypothesis” (Zahar, 1973, p. 103).  
 
Worrall, along similar lines, argues that:  
 
                                            
5
 Though not, of course, if the original observations of the phenomena prove to be erroneous. 
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“[I]n order to decide whether a particular empirical result supports or 
confirms or corroborates a particular theory the way in which that theory was 
developed or constructed needs to be known – more especially, it has to be 
checked whether or not that empirical result was itself involved in the 
construction of the theory” (Worrall, 1985, p. 301). 
 
The same basic idea is also, as pointed out above, invoked in Leplin’s 
Independence Condition. Recently, following Nickles (1987) and Mayo (1991), this 
view has been termed the “use-novelty” (UN) account, and I follow this terminology 
here. What each version of the UN account has in common is that it is irrelevant 
whether an empirical result predicted by a theory is observed before or after the 
theory is proposed, and that it also does not matter what other theories were being 
considered at the time of the observation. The result confirms the theory just in 
case it is predicted by the theory but the theory was not designed to have that 
result as a deductive consequence.  
 
Worrall (2000; 2002; 2006; 2010a; Scerri & Worrall, 2001) has given a more 
precise characterisation of the UN account via the notion of parameter-fixing. He 
argues that theory confirmation proceeds in two stages. The first stage can be 
thought of as a form of “deduction from the phenomena”. Consider a theory with a 
single free parameter. A parameter here is not necessarily to be understood as a 
numerical parameter, but more generally as a factor that may take various potential 
values and thereby partially determine the observational consequences of the 
theory. This theory’s relationship to some class of empirical results is such that, 
assuming it is true, the parameter can only have one possible value. As an 
example, consider Newton’s law of gravity, which states that the gravitational force 
(F) between two objects is given by: 
 
 
 
Where m1 and m2 are the objects’ respective masses, r is the distance between 
them, and G is a constant. From the perspective of this general law, the constant G 
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is a free parameter. The Michell-Cavendish experiment is the classic means of 
determining the value of G (Cavendish, 1798; McCormmach, 1998) 6. Without 
going into detail, the outcome of this experiment is a measurement for each of the 
terms in the above equation except G. Any given experimental result therefore 
corresponds to one and only one possible value of G. A specific version (i.e. with 
the free parameter now fixed) of the general gravitational theory is thereby 
deduced from the experimental result. It is this result that the specific version of the 
theory is “constructed” to accommodate. 
 
The deduction of a specific theory cannot provide confirmation for this general law, 
since it presupposes its truth. This, however, is the starting point for the second 
stage. The specific version of the theory deduced from the phenomena may entail 
some additional empirical consequences that turn out to be correct. For instance, 
once a value of G is determined by the Michell-Cavendish experiment, the 
specified theory correctly entails the precise quantitative results of various 
gravitational interactions. These additional empirical results count as UN predictive 
successes for the general theory, and so confirm it. Notice that it is sufficient but 
not necessary for use-novelty that these additional results be temporally novel with 
respect to the parameter-fixing step. The temporal novelty account therefore 
emerges as a special case of the UN account. 
 
There are several major objections to the UN account. One, by Harker, is relatively 
easily dealt with. The others are discussed in the following three sections. Harker 
favours a version of the theoretical novelty view. He claims that, in Worrall’s 
defence of the UN account, Worrall “appeal[s] to phenomena that [were] either 
anomalous or at least unexplained by rival theories” (Harker, 2008, p. 445). So all 
cases where a theory was predictively success under the UN criterion are 
simultaneously cases where the theory was successful under the theoretical 
novelty criterion. Harker then argues that it is the striking success of these theories 
                                            
6
 The version of gravitational theory Cavendish used did not actually include such a constant, and 
he published a figure for the density of the earth. The experiment however can be, and has been, 
used for this purpose. 
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over their rivals that really motivates the increased degree of confirmation we 
attribute to these theories.  
 
Harker’s objection is doubly mistaken. The first mistake was discussed in the 
previous section, in response to the theoretical novelty accounts of Musgrave and 
Leplin. Like these accounts, Harker’s objection fails to distinguish between a 
scientist in some particular epistemic situation having a reason to prefer a theory to 
a rival versus scientists in general having a reason to regard it as true. So Harker’s 
objection fails to address the main appeal of the UN account, namely its ability to 
pick out those cases where the NMA is potentially applicable. This leads on neatly 
to the second mistake in Harker’s objection. While it is certainly true that that 
Fresnel’s theory, for instance, is counted as predictively successful under both the 
UN and the theoretical novelty accounts, it is incorrect to state that the two 
accounts always agree about which theories are successful. There are several 
historical cases where the two diverge, and where the UN account more accurately 
captures the judgements of working scientists.  
 
First, consider the well-known example of the Copernican Revolution of the 
sixteenth century (see Chapter 4.4 for a detailed exposition of this case study). 
Copernicus’ heliocentric (or heliostatic) model famously (Kuhn, 1957) did not entail 
any apparent planetary motions which the Ptolemaic geocentric (or geostatic) 
system did not. Both accounted for the astronomical data available at the time with 
roughly the same degree of accuracy. So the Copernican model does not enjoy 
any theoretical novelty over the Ptolemaic one. How, then, to account for the fact 
that some scientists (notably Kepler and Galileo) adopted the new system 
immediately? For Worrall (1990), the answer is that several qualitative features of 
the data set, notably the stations and retrogressions of the planets, emerge 
naturally from the basic Copernican postulates, but have to be added in “by hand” 
to the Ptolemaic system. These phenomena, in other words, are use-novel in 
respect of the Copernican, but not the Ptolemaic, system. Thus, if Worrall’s 
reasoning is sound, this is at least one case where the theoretical novelty and UN 
accounts do not coincide and, in this case, the best scientists (immediately) and 
86 
 
the general scientific community (eventually) favoured the theory that was superior 
under the UN account.  
 
The Copernican Revolution represents a case where neither theory was 
theoretically novel, but one was use-novel. The divergence between the two 
accounts is further demonstrated by cases where none of the theories in 
competition was use-novel, but one was theoretically novel. One set of cases that 
satisfy this criterion are those where a theory has been modified in an ad hoc way 
to accommodate some recalcitrant empirical phenomenon. Since the newer 
version of the theory, by definition, accounts for an empirical phenomenon that the 
earlier version does not, it achieves theoretical novelty. Yet it is not at all clear that 
we should regard this newer theory as better-confirmed than the older one. This 
sort of example is, however, arguably somewhat unfair to Harker, as he explicitly 
advocates simplicity as an additional theoretical virtue, and the sort of ad hoc 
modification suggested in this example is very likely in violation of this virtue. 
Nevertheless, there is a difference in that Harker must cite simplicity as an 
additional desideratum, whereas the disapprobation of ad hoc manoeuvres is an 
integral part of the UN account (see sections 8 and 9 for an extensive discussion of 
empirical virtues of simplicity and unity). To conclude, therefore, Harker has not 
been able to show the superiority of the theoretical novelty over the UN account. 
Quite the contrary, where the two diverge, the UN account seems to account for 
the judgements of actual scientists more naturally.  
 
6. Severe testing 
 
Several authors, most notably Mayo (1991; 1996; 2008) and Howson (1984; 1990) 
have argued that the UN criterion of theory-confirmation is ultimately subordinate to 
a more fundamental criterion, that of having passed a severe test. Mayo takes 
inspiration from Popper’s idea that a theory is maximally corroborated by testing it 
in cases where it is prima facie likely to be refuted.  
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“A theory is tested not merely by applying it, or by trying it out, but by 
applying it to very special cases – cases for which it yields results different 
from those we should have expected without that theory, or in the light of 
other theories. In other words we try to select for our tests those crucial 
cases in which we should expect the theory to fail if it is not true.” (Popper, 
1963/2002a, p. 150) 
 
Mayo extends this idea, arguing that a hypothesis (h) should be regarded as well-
confirmed just in case it passes a severe test (T), where a severe test is defined as 
one in which “[t]here is a very high probability that test T would not yield ... a 
passing result, if h is false” (Mayo, 1991, p. 529). 
 
This requirement of severity can be cashed out more precisely with reference to 
Bayesian confirmation theory. As Howson puts it: 
 
“But the most important consequence of the Bayesian theory is the 
fundamental principle of all inductive inference: evidence supports a 
hypothesis h the more, the less it is explicable by a plausible alternative 
compared with its explicability by h.” (Howson, 1990, p. 226) 
 
To interpret this statement, recall the Bayesian updating formula already discussed 
in section 3: 
 
 
 
 
In many cases, the degree to which a hypothesis is confirmed by a particular piece 
of evidence (i.e. the degree to which p(H|E) is greater than p(H)) will depend 
crucially on the value of p(E). The more improbable the evidence E on the 
assumption that the hypothesis is false (i.e. that some plausible competing 
hypothesis is true), the greater the degree of confirmation that results from an 
observation of E.  
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These authors go on to argue that there are cases of hypotheses accommodating 
empirical observations in such a way that they do not satisfy the UN criterion, and 
that these instances of accommodation nevertheless represent “maximally severe” 
tests7: 
 
“Passing a Maximally Severe ... Test: h passes a maximally severe test with 
e iff there is no chance that the test yields such a passing result, if h is 
false.” (Mayo, 1991, p. 530). 
 
These hypotheses are, in other words, completely confirmed by the severity 
account, are accepted as confirmed by scientists and our own intuitive judgements, 
and yet are not at all confirmed under the UN account. 
 
The standard illustrative examples for this point are cases of statistical estimation 
or simple arithmetical calculation. An arithmetical example is developed by Mayo 
(1991). Consider a hypothesis, H, with a single free parameter x. It states: 
 
 H(x): The average SAT score of students in a particular class = x 
 
The appropriate value at which to fix this parameter is derived simply by adding up 
the scores of all the students and dividing by their number, i.e. by calculating the 
average. Say that the average is some particular value k. The following hypothesis 
is thus derived: 
 
 H(k): The average SAT score of students in a particular class = k 
 
The students’ actual results are used in deriving this specific hypothesis from the 
more general version, and so the use of this evidence to test the theory would 
                                            
7
 Mayo, in fact, also argues that there are cases of theories successfully predicting empirical 
observations in such a way that they satisfy the UN criterion and utterly failing to satisfy the severity 
criterion.  These cases have not, however, been taken up in the subsequent literature, and so I put 
them to the side here.  
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certainly not be use-novel. There is, however, no better test for hypothesis H(k) 
than simply recording the these results and making the relevant calculation. 
Because H(k) follows deductively from the evidence, there is no chance that it 
would pass this test if it were false. The test is therefore, according to Mayo, 
maximally severe.  
 
A statistical example is developed by Howson (1990). Consider, he suggests, an 
urn which contains white tickets and black tickets in some unknown proportion. 
Some number of tickets is drawn at random, resulting in a ratio r/k of black tickets 
to total tickets drawn. Now consider the following hypothesis about the proportion 
of black tickets in the population, p: 
 
 p = r/k ± ε 
 
This defines a confidence interval, where ε is an error term partially dependent on 
k. This hypothesis, Howson argues, is maximally confirmed by the very same data 
used to construct it.  
 
So there appear to be examples of maximally severe tests that do not satisfy the 
UN criterion. These examples, however, are easily dismissed as relatively trivial 
and/or unrepresentative of actual cases of scientific reasoning. Worrall, for 
instance, argues that:  
 
“In the deterministic case, we measure a parameter (or demonstrate that 
that parameter has a certain value); in the stochastic case we estimate a 
parameter…. [T]here seems to be in this particular case a very good reason 
why we do not talk of tests: despite Mayo’s claims, a test of a theory surely 
must have a possible outcome that is inconsistent with the theory— neither 
the SAT score process nor the confidence-interval technique could possibly 
refute the ‘theory’ that we end up with” (Worrall, 2006, p. 58, emphasis in 
original). 
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Worrall’s (2006; 2010b) more detailed interpretation of the SAT-type example is 
also instructive. Recall that his initial exposition of the UN account in the previous 
section postulates two distinct stages of confirmation. The first stage involves 
assuming some background or general theory is correct, then using empirical 
results to derive a particular version of this theory. In the second stage, this specific 
version is tested against empirical results that are not so used, and the general 
theory is confirmed just in case the theory passes these tests (i.e. it makes use-
novel predictions). Applying this framework, Worrall argues that the cases of 
measurement or estimation highlighted by Mayo et al. are instances of stage-one 
“deduction from the phenomena”. The ‘background theory’ in the SAT case is 
nothing more than a collection of mathematical truths. In cases of statistical 
estimation, there are generally some more substantive background assumptions 
about what type of statistical model is applicable to the case at hand. Estimation 
therefore involves deducing the value of a certain parameter in the model. But, 
importantly, these cases of estimation still only count as “severe tests” for the 
hypothesis that the parameter has this particular value. They do not serve at all to 
confirm the more general hypothesis that this sort of model is applicable. We 
normally do not notice this, however, because we regard the applicability of the 
relevant model as well-established (especially in the deterministic SAT-type case, 
where the ‘model’ is an analytic truth of mathematics).   
 
In response to this sort of worry, Mayo emphasises that the examples of simple 
measurement and statistical estimation are intended mainly to “set the mood” 
(Mayo, 1996, p. 272) for more realistic counterexamples. It is therefore worth 
examining an actual historical case study discussed repeatedly by Mayo (1991; 
1996; 2010), namely the famous test of Einstein’s theory of general theory of 
relativity (GTR) carried out in 1919 (the original report of this experiment is Dyson, 
Eddington, & Davidson, 1920). GTR predicts that rays of light will be gravitationally 
deflected by massive objects. On earth, this effect is most noticeable for stars 
whose positions are near to that of the sun in the sky, since light passing close to 
the mass of the sun will experience the gravitational effect relatively strongly. 
However, the light of these stars is normally not visible on earth due to the glare of 
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the sun. They can only be observed during a solar eclipse. The 1919 experiment 
involved capturing images on photographic plates of a particular set of stars both 
during an eclipse and then on another occasion at night, when the position of the 
sun was nowhere near that of the stars. The degree to which starlight is deflected 
by the sun could then be determined by comparing the relative positions of the 
stars on the photographic plates taken at night and during the eclipse.  
 
As reported by Dyson et al., the result of this experiment was a decisive victory for 
relativity. Of the three sets of plates collected, two were clearly compatible with the 
amount of deflection predicted by GTR, but not compatible with either the 
Newtonian theory of gravity (which predicts a smaller degree of deflection) or with 
the hypothesis that the light is not deflected at all. Of particular interest to Mayo, 
however, is the result of a third set of plates, taken at Sobral in northern Brazil, 
which appeared to suggest a degree of deflection inconsistent with GTR but 
consistent with the Newtonian hypothesis. Dyson et al., however, judged that the 
measurements from this set where untrustworthy, on the grounds that these 
images were visibly out of focus (describing them as “diffused”). They suggested 
that this alteration of the focus was probably due to “unequal expansion of the 
[telescope] mirror due to the sun’s heat” (ibid., p. 309). Mayo argues that this 
reasoning is manifestly a violation of the UN criterion, since the same piece of 
evidence, namely a particular set of images, both stands as a potential 
counterexample to Einstein’s hypothesis and is used to construct a modified 
version of the hypothesis (i.e. that this particular set of images is not trustworthy) 
which avoids the counterexample.  
 
Mayo also argues that this case does not appear to match the “deduction from the 
phenomena” schema.   
 
“[T]he data-analytic methods, well-known even in 1919, did not assume the 
underlying theory, GTR, nor is it correct to imagine arguing that, provided 
you accept GTR, then the mirror distortion due to the Sun’s heat explains 
why the 1919 Sobral eclipse results were in conflict with GTR’s predicted 
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deflection… GTR does not speak about mirror distortions… It was clear the 
plates, on which the purported GTR anomaly rested, were ruined; accepting 
GTR had nothing to do with it. Nor could one point to GTR’s enjoying more 
independent support than Newton[‘s theory of gravity] at the time – quite the 
opposite.” (Mayo, 2010, p. 160) 
 
In other words, it is not the case that the general version of GTR was regarded as 
well-confirmed, and the anomalous data served merely to derive a specific version 
of this theory that included mirror distortions. Rather, the same piece of evidence is 
used both to construct and confirm this specific version of the theory.  
 
Mayo’s interpretation of this case is seriously flawed. Firstly, it is not at all clear that 
“GTR does not speak about mirror distortions”. It is a commonplace of philosophy 
of science, following Duhem, that theories are not tested in isolation. An abstract 
theory only results in a concrete empirical prediction when conjoined with various 
auxiliary assumptions, including those related to the reliability of measuring 
instruments. And many of these may be tacit assumptions which are assessed on 
their own merits only when a prediction fails. It seems clear, therefore, that the 
overall theory or collection of theories being tested in the eclipse experiment does 
include the tacit assumption that the telescope mirrors are not distorted, and it is 
precisely this assumption which is challenged by the recalcitrant evidence. 
 
Even so, Mayo may argue, surely it is still the case that specific version of the 
theory derived by altering the assumption that the focusing mirrors are undistorted 
is both constructed and confirmed by the same piece of evidence? This argument 
rests on an elementary confusion. It is certainly true that there is only one “piece of 
evidence” under discussion – the questionable images. Nevertheless, there are 
clearly several distinct facts observable from this “piece of evidence”. One fact is 
that the measured relative positions of the stars are contrary to what would be 
expected under GTR. Another fact is that the image is “diffused”. If Dyson et al. 
had proposed the mirror distortion version of GTR simply on the basis that one set 
of images gave an answer divergent from the standard version of GTR, their 
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reasoning would, quite rightly, have been rejected. That the image displayed some 
independent evidence of being unreliable – i.e. being visibly out of focus – is 
crucial. These scientists’ background knowledge that this type of mirror tends 
become distorted by the sun’s heat, moreover, provided credibility to the 
hypothesis that distortion might occur under the circumstances of the experiment. 
So, applying a more fine-grained notion of a ‘unit’ of evidence, therefore, Mayo is 
incorrect to state that the same piece of evidence is used in both constructing and 
confirming a specific version of the theory.  
 
The specific counterexamples directed by proponents of the severity view against 
the UN account are thus refuted. There is also, however, a more general criticism 
of the severity view. Recall that the severity of a test is crucially dependent on the 
probability of the evidence on the assumption that some “plausible alternative” to 
the theory in question is true. But it might well be asked what, precisely, allows one 
to designate one or other alternative theory as “plausible”. On the one hand, if 
plausibility is relativised to a particular historical period, the severity account seems 
to degenerate into the theoretical novelty account. A well-confirmed theory is one 
which predicts phenomena that competing theories do not or, better, are unable to 
explain ‘in a natural way’ at all. But, under this interpretation, the severity account 
is now subject to the various criticisms directed at the theoretical novelty account in 
section 4. Specifically, it seems to depend on an ineliminable element of historical 
contingency. And historically contingent criteria tell us, at best, which theory is to 
be preferred in a particular epistemic circumstance. They cannot tell us which 
theories are likely to be true. 
 
 If, on the other hand, “plausibility” is to be judged by reference to ‘objective’ 
criteria, the severity account is in effect dependent on a more fundamental account 
of confirmation. After all, if it was readily apparent which theories are ‘objectively 
plausible’, we would not be worried about severe testing at all. In the following 
sections, I will argue that various accounts focused on the theoretical virtue of 
‘unifying power’, including later developments of the UN account, offer such an 
objective criterion. The notion of a severe test, while possibly still heuristically 
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useful in designing experiments and so on, is ultimately subordinate to these more 
general accounts of confirmation.  
 
7. Weak predictivism 
 
Musgrave’s distinction between logical and historical theories of confirmation was 
addressed in section 2. In subsequent sections, particularly section 4, it has been 
argued that historical theories of confirmation are inadequate for the NMA. 
Historical accounts can, at best, give grounds to prefer one of several competing 
theories, and so cannot give grounds for regarding any of these theories as likely 
to be true. In this section, following Hitchcock and Sober (2004), I introduce 
another distinction, between strong and weak predictivism. Strong predictivism 
claims that a theory’s prediction of some phenomenon is, by itself, reason to regard 
that theory as more confirmed than another theory which merely accommodates 
the same phenomenon. Weak predictivism, on the other hand, regards predictive 
success as merely a “symptom” that some other, more fundamental, epistemic 
virtue has been satisfied. This virtue could also be fulfilled in certain cases of post 
hoc accommodation. Just as our adequacy condition weighs in favour of logical 
accounts of empirical success, in this section it will be argued that it also weighs in 
favour of weak predictivism.  
 
Sober and Hitchcock argue that “overfitting” a body of evidence is a cardinal sin of 
theory construction. And they endorse weak predictivism on the grounds that 
successful prediction is a sign that a theory has avoided this cardinal sin. To 
illustrate this idea, Hitchcock and Sober (2004) use the example of a simple curve 
fitting problem. Suppose that the dots in Figure 2 represent a series of data points 
generated by some data-generating process. The aim of the exericse is to find a 
function that accurately describes the empirical data resulting from this process, 
past and future. For each proposed function, it is standard to characterise 
“goodness-of-fit” by the sum of the squares of the y-axis distance between each 
data point and the corresponding value of the function. Finding the best-fit function 
from some predefined class of functions is therefore often referred to as the 
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“method of least squares”. Notice, however, that it is always possible to find a 
function that fits any data set perfectly, so long as this function is sufficiently 
complex (i.e. has enough free parameters). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A function fitted to a data set 
 
Hitchcock and Sober argue that perfectly accommodating (“overfitting”) a particular 
data set in this way is almost always ill-advised. This is because most data sets 
that arise from real observations are “noisy”: the result of each measurement is 
largely determined by the underlying data-generating process, but various 
idiosyncratic factors such as measurement errors or processes other than the one 
of interest also contribute to the measured result. If a function perfectly 
accommodates every data point, then, a lot of what it is being accommodated are 
these idiosyncratic factors. But subsequent measurements of the same basic 
process will usually not be influenced by these factors, or at least not in a 
consistent way. So a function overfitted in this fashion will predict the values of 
these additional measurements less accurately than a simpler function would. 
 
It is worth emphasising that the assumptions underlying Hitchcock and Sober’s 
argument are not insubstantial. Given a set of empirical observations, it is not at all 
trivial to assert that there is a unified data-generating process responsible for it. 
Moreover, it is certainly not a prima facie truth that all real data sets are noisy. 
Nevertheless, these assumptions accurately characterise many cases in empirical 
science, and have the status of methodological generalisations. If a physicist is 
presented with a ‘black box’ whose interior is mysterious but which has quantifiable 
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inputs and outputs, these are typically the assumptions she will apply, at least in 
the first instance, as she attempts to characterise its behaviour.  
 
Avoiding overfitting, in this sort of case, really comes down to selecting the 
appropriate family of functions (called a “model”) for representing the data set. The 
linear functions together comprise one example of a model, as they can all be 
represented by the generalised formula “y = a + bx”, where x and y are variables 
representing data values and a and b are free parameters. Once the model is 
selected, the precise form of the function is completely determined by the existing 
data points, as the specific function is obtained by taking whichever parameter 
values give the closest fit. In general, model selection begins with a very broad 
class of functions, from which one particular model is chosen. For instance, many 
data sets can be fitted by a polynomial of sufficiently high degree, so the model 
selection step in these cases amounts to deciding which higher-order terms of an 
arbitrary polynomial to eliminate. 
 
Recall that the aim of this exercise is, given a particular data set, to find a function 
that will predict the values of not only the existing data points, but also those of 
additional data points resulting from the same underlying data-generating process 
(if one exists). One intuitive way to achieve this is by ‘directly testing’ the ability of 
various functions to achieve predictive success. In the context of a curve-fitting 
problem, this is carried out in a rigorous way by a technique called “cross-
validation”. This involves partitioning the given data set into two, at random, fitting 
various functions against the first partition (the “training set”) and then testing their 
predictive accuracy against the second partition (the “validation set”). This process 
can then be repeated for different random partitions of the data set, eventually 
yielding an aggregate cross-validation score for each type of function.  
 
However, assuming that there is indeed an inverse relationship between predictive 
power and overfitting, predictive power can also be improved by tweaking model 
selection specifically to avoid overfitting. Recall that to fit a given data set perfectly 
requires a model with a large number of free parameters. So, argue Hitchcock and 
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Sober, a function that is likely to be predictive can be chose by explicitly trading off 
between fit to the existing data and the number of free parameters. Under this sort 
of approach, each model under consideration is fitted against the entire given data 
set. It is then assigned a score (according to a certain “information criterion”) that 
increases with goodness of fit of the final fitted function and decreases with the 
number of free parameters it contains. 
 
There are many additional formal and statistical issues around model selection, but 
so far as the main thesis is concerned, the main point is that, if Hitchcock and 
Sober are correct, there is no intrinsic reason to prefer predictively successful 
models. The primary sin is overfitting, and this can be avoided either by testing a 
function’s predictive power, or by determining a score for it based on an 
information criterion. Extending this approach to scientific theories more generally, 
a theory can be confirmed either by novel predictive success, or by accurately 
accounting for a large amount of evidence without introducing many adjustable 
parameters. Hitchcock and Sober therefore advocate a form of weak predictivism. 
It should also be noted that Hitchcock and Sober’s approach is, under Musgrave’s 
classification, a logical theory of confirmation. For them, a theory’s degree of 
confirmation is primarily dependent on the amount of empirical data it accurately 
explains and its intrinsic simplicity (i.e. paucity of free parameters), neither of these 
factors being historically contingent.  
 
Interestingly, Hitchcock and Sober explicitly frame their position as a form 
instrumentalism or empiricism:   
 
“In the version of the problem that we will address, the goal of scientific 
theorizing is predictive accuracy. Thus our formulation of the problem is 
instrumentalist in character. There is a sense in which a theory whose 
predictions accord well with observation is 'approximately true', and we do want 
a theory that is approximately true in that sense. But we are not looking for a 
theory that is approximately true in any deeper sense. In particular, we do not 
care whether the theory we adopt correctly identifies the degree of the true 
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polynomial (for that matter, we do not care whether the true curve is a 
polynomial at all).” (Hitchcock & Sober, 2004, p. 10) 
 
Notice the parallel here with van Fraassen’s claim, discussed in Chapter 1.8, that 
the aim of science is to obtain theories that are approximately true only in respect 
of observable phenomena. Recall, however, the realist response to this sort of 
instrumentalism – that the ability of a theoretical abstraction to latch onto an 
empirical regularity is an achievement that demands an explanation. And the best 
explanation is simply that the theory is also true of unobservable phenomena (or, in 
the case discussed above, that the model correctly identifies the “true polynomial”). 
Hitchcock and Sober’s account therefore does not amount to an argument either 
for or against realism. It can be given either empiricist or realist interpretations, 
depending on whether we are prepared to accept the validity of inference to the 
best explanation as a pattern of argumentation. 
 
Several other authors have advocated a similar approach to Hitchcock and Sober. 
Lipton (2004, pp. 168-184) argues that a theory is more strongly supported if it 
successfully predicts some phenomenon than if it accommodates that 
phenomenon because with accommodation there is always the risk that the theory 
has been “fudged”. A fudged theory is one in which the felt need to accommodate 
some known phenomenon or phenomena has induced the theorist to forego 
theoretical virtues such as simplicity and independent testability. So Lipton in effect 
also advocates a form of weak predictivism, as he thinks that prediction is a sign 
that a theory is likely to have fulfilled certain more fundamental epistemic 
requirements.  
 
Maher (1988; 1993) has given an argument which purports to favour UN 
predictivism but, as argued by Lange (2001), in fact supports a form of weak 
predictivism. In support of his view, Maher offers a thought experiment, which I 
present in modified form here. Suppose that a coin will be tossed 100 times and 
the outcome, head or tails, recorded. An experimental subject will be asked to 
predict the outcome of the 100th toss. Now imagine two cases. In the first, the 
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subject observes the first 99 tosses, which give an apparently random sequence of 
heads and tails, then states that the final toss will be heads. This prediction turns 
out to be correct. In the second case, the subject announces after only 50 tosses a 
prediction for all the remaining tosses. This prediction, including that for the 100th 
toss, also turns out to be correct. Assume that the actual sequence of results is the 
same in each case.  
 
In both cases, the subject of the coin-tossing experiment has proposed a 
‘hypothesis’ correctly stating the outcome of the 100 coin tosses. Yet, intuitively, 
the hypothesis is more confirmed by success in the ambitious prediction than it is 
when it successfully predicts the result of only the last toss. This meagre 
prediction, after all, has a 50-50 chance of coming out correct simply by accident. 
Maher accounts for this intuitive judgement as follows: 
 
“Clearly the reason for our different attitude in the two situations is that the 
successful prediction is strong evidence that the subject has a reliable 
method of predicting coin tosses, while the successful accommodation 
provides no reason to think that the subject has a reliable method of 
predicting coin tosses.” (Maher, 1993), p. 330) 
 
So it is not that there is any intrinsic difference between the hypotheses (which is 
just as well, since they are, by assumption, identical in this thought experiment), 
but a difference in the method by which the hypothesis was derived in each case.  
 
Lange (2001) “tweaks” Maher’s argument by asking us to consider the case where 
the results of the coin tosses are not random, but rather follow some regular 
sequence, say alternating tails and heads. Now suppose we again have two cases, 
one where the subject accommodates most of the data, and one where she 
predicts a large portion of the data. Lange claims that the intuitive difference in 
confirmation between these two cases now disappears. What this shows, he 
argues, is that in Maher’s original case, it is the apparent lack of connection 
between the different cases subsumed by the hypothesis (i.e. the results of 
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independent, random coin tosses) that leads us to regard it as ill-confirmed. The 
hypothesis comprises an “arbitrary conjunction”. When the subject successfully 
predicts the results of a “random” sequence, we infer that she has uncovered some 
regularity underlying these results, perhaps one we have simply not noticed. When 
the subject merely accommodates these results, however, we have no reason to 
doubt that she has simply lumped them together into an arbitrary conjunction. In 
the case where the pattern is ‘obvious’, in contrast, there is no such difference, as 
we infer that both the predictor and the accommodator have discovered it.  
 
So, according to Lange, the fundamental epistemic vice is arbitrary conjunction. 
Accommodation is sign that a theory has potentially been constructed in this way 
because of the method by which scientists typically go about constructing theories: 
 
“[An arbitrary conjunction] is unlikely to be formulated until after a great 
many of its cases have already been checked [i.e. accommodated]. That is 
because a few examined cases do not suffice to lead scientists to formulate 
that particular hypothesis... This association makes it appear that 
predictions are somehow intrinsically superior to accommodations, when in 
fact that an observation was predicted rather than accommodated does not 
make that observation better evidence for the hypothesis.” (ibid., p. 577) 
 
Lange’s account, however, surely requires an explanation of what is so bad about 
arbitrary conjunctions. In providing this explanation, Lange quotes Goodman: 
 
“Consider the heterogeneous conjunction:  
 
8497 is a prime number and the other side of the moon is flat and Elizabeth 
the First was crowned on a Tuesday.  
 
To show that any one of the three component statements is true is to 
support the conjunction... But support of this kind is not confirmation; for 
establishment of one component endows the whole statement with no 
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credibility that is transmitted to other component statements.” (Goodman, 
1983, pp. 68-69) 
 
This is suggestive, but still not definitive. Both Lange and Goodman seem in fact to 
be tacitly appealing to the theoretical virtue of simplicity or ‘unity’. In a unified 
theory, there are some basic principles which account for much of the seemingly 
unrelated empirical data. In theories constructed by arbitrary conjunction, there are 
no such basic principles. This is why confirmation of one part of the theory does 
not confirm the theory as a whole; there is no principle by which confirmation might 
be “transmitted”.  
 
Goodman and Lange are, of course, not alone in the intuition that the ability to 
unify diverse phenomena is one of the basic, or the basic, epistemic virtue that a 
scientific theory can possess. Whewell, for instance, argues that the “best 
established theories [are those where] inductions from classes of facts altogether 
different have ... jumped together” (Whewell, 1858/1968, p. 153, emphasis in 
original). More recently, Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981; 1989) have argued 
that scientific explanation should be understood as essentially involving unification. 
I shall not here attempt to defend the primacy of unifying power as a theoretical 
virtue (although I discuss this idea further in section 8 of this chapter and in 
Chapter 4). For now, simply note that this idea is intuitively not implausible, and 
that it animates the various forms of weak predictivism surveyed here.  
 
Harker also implicitly appeals to the virtue of unifying power. He criticises the UN 
account as follows: 
 
What is significant about verified forecasts, aside from their being explained 
by only one theory, is not that those data weren’t used, but that no additional 
assumptions were required for the explanations of those data. The 
successful theory enjoys increased explanatory strength without any loss of 
theoretical simplicity.” (Harker, 2008, p. 447, emphasis in original) 
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Notice how similar Harker’s approach is to the sort of weak predictivism advocated 
by Hitchcock and Sober. Whereas Harker discusses a trade-off between 
explanatory strength and simplicity, Hitchcock and Sober argue that a theoretical 
model should achieve some optimal balance between goodness of fit and the 
number of free parameters it contains. In both cases, the central concern is that the 
complexity of the theory be appropriately ‘matched’ to the complexity of the data 
set it is to explain. 
 
In this and the previous section, I have surveyed some of the forms of weak 
predictivism on offer. The basic claim of weak predictivism, recall, is that prediction 
is not intrinsically superior to accommodation as grounds for accepting a theory, 
but that it frequently gives good evidence that some more fundamental epistemic 
desideratum has been satisfied. But there are various different, albeit interrelated, 
proposals on what this fundamental epistemic requirement is. Mayo and Howson 
(see section 6) think that a theory is most highly confirmed by a certain sort of 
accomplishment, namely passing a severe test. Making a use-novel prediction 
sometimes counts as passing a severe test but, they claim, not all severe tests are 
novel predictions. Hitchcock and Sober claim that the degree to which a theory is 
confirmed is fundamentally dependent on how it is (or, more precisely, is not) 
constructed; i.e. it must have been fitted to the data, but not overfitted. Lange and 
Lipton think that the fundamental epistemic virtue is intrinsic to the theory or, at 
least, to some combination of it internal structure and its empirical consequences 
(think, for instance, of “independent testability”). Harker splits the difference, 
arguing that the fundamental epistemic virtues consist of both intrinsic features 
(such as unity) and accomplishments (such as accounting for phenomena that rival 
theories cannot).  
 
The judgement that a theory has passed a severe test, or that it is more empirically 
successful than a rival theories, will, as I have argued previously, always depend 
on what other background or rival theories are present. This historical contingency 
results means that, while the accomplishment model of confirmation may be able 
to determine which of a set of rival theories is to be preferred, it will never give us 
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good grounds to believe that a given theory (or part thereof) is true. It is thus 
inadequate the aim that has been set out. 
 
The construction and intrinsic features views are, it seems, two sides of the same 
coin. To claim that a building, say, has certain features is just the same as claiming 
that it has been constructed or modified in a certain way. And, having discarded 
accomplishment versions of weak predictivism, all the remaining versions appear 
to be animated by the same underlying logic. Lange argues that arbitrary 
conjunctions are to be avoided. Hitchcock and Sober claim that a theory is likely to 
be successful just in case it achieves the optimum balance between goodness of fit 
and number of free parameter. Harker argues that a theory must maintain the 
optimum balance between explanatory strength and simplicity. Although they 
express it differently, all these different models of weak predictivism regard unifying 
power as the fundamental epistemic virtue. 
 
A form of weak predictivism that emphasises unifying power may seem to 
represent a challenge to theories of novel prediction generally, and the UN account 
specifically. In the following section, however, I shall argue that a very reasonable 
development of the UN account due to Worrall is in fact committed to a kind of 
unification view. Using Worrall’s version of the UN account, I shall also show how 
the theoretical virtue of unifying power may be applied in a theory of confirmation 
and how such a theory may be adequate to the NMA.  
 
8. The unification view 
 
A common objection to the UN account is the so-called “twin paradox”, variations 
of which are discussed by Hitchcock and Sober (2004), Lipton (2004, ch. 10) and 
Musgrave (1974). Returning to the example discussed in section 5, suppose that a 
pair of twins, A and B, are both independently working on Newton’s theory of 
gravity. Twin B carries out a Cavendish-type experiment, E1, and uses the 
measured result to fix G at a particular value, say k1. The specific theory thus 
derived now accounts not only for the result of E1 but also correctly predicts the 
104 
 
result of another experiment, E2. Twin A takes measurements for both E1 and E2 
and uses both results to fix G = k1. A does not predict the result of any additional 
experiments. Since B makes a successful UN prediction and A makes none, it 
seems we must conclude that the theory is better confirmed for B than it is for A, 
even though each has adopted the same theory and has the same evidence for 
this theory. Not only is the conclusion absurd on its face, it also renders 
indeterminate to what extent the realist should now view the theory as likely to be 
true. The reason this paradox is possible is that focussing on which of the empirical 
results a given scientist uses introduces an irreducible element of historical 
contingency. So the UN account, at least as initially formulated, is also susceptible 
to the objection which had led us to reject the temporal and theoretical novelty 
accounts.  
 
Worrall denies that this imagined situation is paradoxical, arguing instead that 
“scientist B has shown, what A simply subjectively failed to recognise, that the 
theory is supported” by the measurement not used in fixing the parameter
 
(Worrall, 
2006, p. 54, emphasis in original). The twin paradox has bite only on a common-
sense reading of the term “use” as implying intent. For instance, I use a hammer 
only if I intend to hit a nail, but not if I accidentally drop it onto the nail. By analogy, 
the suggestion is that a scientist uses a result in designing the theory if and only if 
she intends that the theory be able to account for it. And it seems plausible that a 
scientist like A could intend to account for both results when setting the parameter, 
and so use them both. However, according to Worrall, this is a mistaken reading of 
“use” under his version of the UN account. It is simply a logical feature of the 
general theory that one and only one experimental measurement is required to fix 
the single free parameter G to obtain the appropriate specific theory. The theory is 
thus equally well confirmed in either circumstance.  
 
Worrall’s goes on to consider the situation where, as before, the specific theory 
correctly entails observational consequences E1 and E2. However, twin A now 
derives the specific theory from the general theory using E1 and the specific theory 
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then predicts E2; whereas twin B uses E2 and predicts E1. Worrall’s response is as 
follows: 
 
“These may be strictly different accounts but they are surely equivalent 
modulo any genuine interest that we would have in making confirmation 
judgments: each of A and B has shown that the general theory needs to fill 
in one parameter value on the basis of one piece of data, thus producing a 
specific theory that gains genuine empirical success from the other piece of 
data (at least—there may of course be other results that the specific theory 
also correctly predicts). So each scientist shows that there is, so to speak, 
one unit of genuine, unconditional, general-theory-involving data...” (ibid, p. 
55) 
 
So it makes no sense to talk about a circumstance in which one observational 
result is used and the other predicted, and another in which the opposite holds. 
Rather a theory is confirmed to the extent that it entails verified empirical content 
greater than that needed to fix all its free parameters.  
 
In responding to the twin paradox and similar cases, Worrall has moved decisively 
away from defining “novelty” in terms of what is used. Instead, he defines it in 
terms of what is logically required, or what needs to be used. Although Worrall still 
uses the term “use-novelty” to describe his view, it is therefore a very different 
notion of novel prediction to that employed by Zahar and Leplin, and much closer 
to the types of weak predictivism – advocated, as discussed above, by Hitchcock, 
Sober, Harker, Lange, Lipton, and others – which emphasise the unifying power of 
a theory. The idea of ensuring that the verified empirical content of the theory 
exceeds that needed to fix free parameters is very similar to Harker’s later idea that 
there is an optimal balance between explanatory strength and simplicity, for 
instance. So, to avoid confusion, I shall not refer to Worrall’s account as a form of 
the UN account, but describe it as a version of the “unification view” (UV). For 
clarity, the particular version of the UV that follows from Worrall’s UN account can 
be restated, as follows: 
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A theory is confirmed just in case, and to the extent that, it entails verified 
empirical content greater than that needed to fix all its free parameters. 
(UV1) 
 
As further complications are discussed in the following two sections of this chapter, 
this definition will be amended somewhat. However, for current purposes it gives a 
good general idea of what is being proposed.  
  
It is worth emphasising again how the UV differs from the simple UN account that 
appears to be expressed by Zahar (1973). The latter relativizes the degree to 
which an empirical result confirms a theory to the actual historical fact of whether 
that result was used in constructing the theory. It is, to use Ladyman’s (1999) 
words, concerned with the “provenance of the theory”. The UV, in contrast, is not 
concerned with which particular empirical results are used in constructing the 
theory, only with whether the theory entails more results than are required to 
construct it. Thus, although it is not obvious in his earlier writing, at least the later 
Worrall endorses a form weak predictivism. The UV does not give any special 
status to novel prediction as such, under any natural interpretation of the word 
“novel”.   
 
The UV, then, is a non-historical account of confirmation. Does it satisfy Leplin’s 
relation requirement, that confirmation be a two-place relation between theory and 
empirical evidence? Worrall claims that: 
 
“... the ‘heuristic’ view I advocate ... make[s] confirmation a three-, rather 
than two-place relation. But, although describable in a loose way as making 
confirmation dependent on background knowledge, in fact this account 
makes confirmation (or rather both kinds of confirmation) depend on 
evidence e, specific theory T´, and the underlying general theory T.” 
(Worrall, 2006, pp. 55-56) 
 
107 
 
Since theories T and T´ are both characterised in abstract logical terms (say as 
sets of propositions), there is nothing in this account of confirmation that is 
historically contingent or indexed to a particular time. So UV satisfies the 
motivation behind the relation requirement, if not the exact version of it articulated 
by Leplin. Moreover, notice that given a general theory T and the set of evidence 
by which it is considered confirmed under the UV, it is always possible to derive the 
specific theory T´. So Worrall’s three-place relation can be reduced, without loss of 
information, to a two-place relation between general theory T and the body of 
evidence. 
 
Under the UV, the degree of confirmation of a theory depends only on the intrinsic 
logical structure of the theory itself and the verified empirical consequences it 
entails. This means that UV is easily able to account for confirmation due to “old 
evidence”. For instance, the anomalous precession of Mercury’s perihelion can 
provide support to general relativity, since it is part of a larger pool of empirical 
results which the theory accurately entails. Notice also that UV confirmation is in no 
way diminished if the theory in question is abandoned in favour of superior 
alternatives, or indeed if other predictions of the theory turn out to be radically 
false. As Worrall puts it: “Fresnel’s wave theory of diffraction was, is, and forever 
shall be, confirmed ... by the ‘white spot’ result—this result follows from that wave 
theory of diffraction and gives support to the whole wave programme” (ibid, p 56).  
Indeed, by the same logic, a long-obsolete theory can be confirmed even by 
entirely new observations made in the present. So the UV is not only able to deal 
with old evidence, but also provides a particular perspective on ‘new evidence’. 
 
This retroactive confirmation of obsolete theories may seem like a counterintuitive 
consequence of the UV. It is precisely what is desired, however, by the scientific 
realist. She wants to be a realist about at least certain parts of Fresnel’s wave 
theory, since the theory is undoubtedly a successful one. Of course, it would be 
preferable for this account of novel prediction, via the NMA, to confirm only certain 
parts of the theory (and for these parts to be retained in successor theories). How 
we ought to distinguish “essential” from “inessential” parts of a theory is a question 
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that will be tackled in Chapter 3. For current purposes, it is sufficient to notice that, 
relative to our current purposes of providing an account of confirmation adequate 
to the NMA, this consequence of the UV is a definite point in its favour.  
 
Moreover, the intuition that unification provides powerful confirmation for theories is 
just the same intuition that underlies the NMA (this argument is also made briefly 
by Worrall (2011). The NMA is motivated by the idea that certain paradigm cases 
of prediction demand a special explanation, and then seeks to provide an 
explanation in terms of the truth of the scientific theories involved. But notice that 
we don’t in general demand a special explanation for just any case of “prediction”. 
It is entirely unremarkable if someone accurately forecasts when the train will arrive 
if they catch the same one every day, for example. What is really remarkable about 
the paradigm cases is that those making the predictions have so little to go on; 
they certainly cannot ‘read off’ the correct result from some robust base of 
experience. What is ‘miraculous’ about such cases, in other words, is how much 
verified empirical content these theories generate compared to the amount that has 
to be ‘fed in’ (in the form of results used to fix free parameters). The NMA, in other 
words, is motivated by the intuition that there is something epistemically special 
about successful unification. Again, I should be clear that this is not necessarily to 
state categorically that the NMA is a valid form of argument, but only to argue that, 
if we accept the NMA, then the UV is the appropriate criterion of theoretical 
success. 
 
It has been argued that the UV is most suited to the realist’s aim of determining 
which theories (or parts thereof) we should believe to be true. This view defines 
empirical success in terms of the ‘excess’ verified empirical content entailed by the 
theory when all its free parameters have been fixed at the appropriate values. In 
the remaining substantive sections of this chapter, several assumptions implicit in 
this definition will be challenged, and a somewhat modified version of the view 
proposed as a result. The first assumption, addressed in section 9, is that 
constructing a theory is simply a matter of fixing the values of free parameters in a 
given general theory. This ignores the epistemically relevant question of how this 
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general theory was derived in the first place. The second assumption, addressed in 
section 10, is that, to be empirically successful, a theory must deductively entail 
empirical results. The final version of UV proposed in section 10 incorporates a 
broader conception of how a theory may “give rise to” verified empirical results.  
 
9. Theoretical unity and theoretical simplicity 
 
According the UV, a theory is confirmed to the extent that it displays “unifying 
power”. Intuitively, a unifying theory is one which captures many empirical 
regularities and yet is itself “simple”. This notion of simplicity has, in the previous 
sections been cashed out more rigorously via the idea of free parameters, with the 
consequence that a theory with relatively many free parameters is referred to as 
“complex” and one with relatively few as “simple”. Under this schema, a theory is 
unifying, and so should be considered confirmed, to the extent that it captures 
more empirical regularities than are required to fix its free parameters. In this 
section, it will be argued that cashing out the idea of simplicity, and thus of unifying 
power, by reference to free parameters is not generally correct. Or, at least, it is not 
correct if the number of free parameters is understood as something that can be 
determined by simple inspection of a theory. Instead, I will advocate a second 
version of the UV, which states that: 
 
 A theory is confirmed just in case, and to the extent that, it entails more 
verified empirical content than that required to construct it (where the notion 
of “constructing” a theory is more general than that of fixing the free 
parameters that are evident from a simple inspection of the theory). (UV2) 
 
Sober has, with the following argument, very effectively problematised the 
purported inverse relation between the simplicity of a theory and the number of free 
parameters it contains. He asks us to consider two models, one linear and one 
parabolic: 
 
(LIN)  y = a + bx  
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(PAR) y = a + bx + cx2 
 
and then introduces a puzzle: 
 
“Once values for these parameters are specified, a unique straight line and 
a unique parabola are obtained. Notice that (LIN) is simpler than (PAR) if 
simplicity is calculated by counting adjustable parameters. However, if 
simplicity involves paucity of assumptions, the opposite conclusion follows. 
(LIN) is equivalent to the conjunction of (PAR) and the further assumption 
that c=0. Since (LIN) is a special case of (PAR), (LIN) says more, not less” 
(Sober, 2001, p. 17) 8.  
 
Recall the earlier argument that what is “miraculous” about the paradigm cases of 
novel prediction is that the theory concerned uses only a relatively small number of 
empirical observations to yield a large number of predictions. What this puzzle 
highlights is that the face-value complexity of a theory, as ascertained by the 
number of free parameters it contains, can be misleading about the amount of 
verified empirical information that needs to be ‘fed in’ to generate predictions. The 
background assumptions of the theory embody significant empirical knowledge that 
has been used at an earlier stage of theorising.  
 
This idea is illustrated by returning to the example of curve-fitting. Taking a 
somewhat more general perspective than that taken in section 7, a curve fitting 
problem can be considered in three stages (following Forster, 1988b, p. 67). First, 
one must select which empirical variables are to be taken as systematically related. 
In the relatively simple case where only two variables are considered, the putative 
relationship between them is typically represented as a collection of paired values 
on a two-dimensional scatter plot. In the second stage, as described in section 7, 
one selects a model that will be used to represent the general form of this 
relationship. In the third stage, the model formula is “fitted” to the data set to arrive 
                                            
8
 A version of this argument is also found in Popper (1959/2002b, appendix *viii). 
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at a specific function that ‘best’ represents the relationship between the variables. 
Note that the distinction between these three steps is primarily conceptual, and 
there may be considerable overlap between them in practice. For instance, model 
selection often involves an algorithm which fits each of the models under 
consideration to the data set.  
 
Before a scientist begins a curve fitting procedure, she has a data set, but has not 
yet used any information from it. She thus has no warrant to believe any particular 
hypothesis about which variables are related to which. Each step in the curve fitting 
procedure uses information from the data set to obtain a more specific claim about 
the underlying data-generating process. But there is always some flexibility in 
whether information should be used in an earlier or a later step. Consider, for 
instance, the case where it is assumed that the data can be represented by a 
polynomial. As in Sober’s example, higher-order polynomial terms can be 
eliminated explicitly during the model-selection step. Alternatively, a higher-order 
polynomial can be selected as the model, with the higher-order terms then 
‘eliminated’ when this model is fitted to the data because the fitting algorithm sets 
their coefficients to a negligible value. However one goes about the procedure, 
there is in general a trade-off between using empirical data at an earlier or at a 
later stage. Or, to put it in Sober’s terms, between making an assumption or 
leaving a free parameter. It is worth making the obvious point, however, that while 
empirical information can be used either to inform the assumptions of the model or 
to fix free parameters, there is no free lunch. The basic architecture of the problem 
will determine the minimum amount of verified empirical content required to obtain 
a function that makes successful predictions.  
 
To solve Sober’s puzzle, and the more general concern about theoretical simplicity, 
a broader picture of the amount of confirmed empirical content used in constructing 
a theory is required. According to this broader picture, a simpler (and potentially 
more unifying) theory is just one in which less empirical content has been used in 
constructing it.  This empirical content can be used to fix free parameters, or it can 
be used to craft theoretical assumptions. Theoretical assumptions, however, can in 
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general be understood as parameters that were fixed at an earlier stage of the 
construction process. For instance, that a linear function is the appropriate model 
for fitting a particular data set is an assumption from the perspective of a fitting 
algorithm, but represents one potential value of a free parameter in the model 
selection procedure. When one ‘counts’ how many empirical results are required to 
construct a theory, one therefore needs to count not only the number of free 
parameters it contains, but also how many previously fixed parameters are 
embodied as assumptions in the structure of the theory. By direct analogy to the 
curve fitting example, assessing the complexity of a given scientific theory requires 
us to understand how the theory is derivable from some more general class of 
theories by “deduction from the phenomena”, given a set of accepted empirical 
results.  
 
Curve fitting is an extremely well-defined problem. The broader class of functions 
from which a preferred curve is to be selected is well characterised, as are the 
steps by which one might progressively narrow down the reasonable options until a 
single curve is obtained. Moreover, tools such as information criteria allow one to 
assess explicitly the degree of unifying power possessed by a fitted mathematical 
function relative to some data set. For a more qualitative theory, however, the 
broader class of theories is not nearly so well characterised. And, while one can 
make intuitive judgements about which theories are more or less unifying, there are 
no formal tools even remotely analogous to information criteria. So, having defined 
a more general conception of theoretical unifying power, I shall in the following 
paragraphs outline some more rigorous principles by which it might be applied to 
more qualitative theories. 
 
Intuitively, a unifying theory is one for which “you get out more than you put in”. 
That is, it entails more verified empirical information than is used in constructing it. 
The amount of empirical information entailed by a theory is, however, generally 
more obvious than the amount used in constructing it. So the problem at hand is 
largely one of assessing the latter quantity. As a starting point, consider the 
difference in theoretical complexity between a general theory and a more specific 
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theory that is derived from it. In going from the former to the latter, some quantum 
of empirical information must be used to set a free parameter. So it is reasonable 
to conclude that the latter is more complex than the former by an amount that is 
directly related to the minimum of confirmed empirical content that is required for 
this derivation. And the specific theory is more unifying than the general just in 
case this amount is smaller than the amount of additional confirmed empirical 
content that is entailed.  
 
As an example, consider Fresnel’s later wave theory of light. Fresnel’s earlier 
theory claims that light obeys certain general wave equations. Although Fresnel 
assumed that these waves were longitudinal, the general equations are in fact 
silent on the question of whether they are longitudinal or transverse (i.e. whether 
the oscillation of the medium is oriented to the axis of propagation of the wave, or 
perpendicular to it). However, a question on which a theory is silent is also a tacit 
free parameter. Given the results of interference experiments with beams of 
polarised light (conducted with Arago), Fresnel modified his theory to claim that 
light is comprised of transverse waves (see Worrall, 1990 for a discussion of this 
episode). Because additional empirical information has been used in constructing 
it, the specific later theory is more complex than the general earlier theory. It is also 
more unifying, however, as the expense in theoretical complexity is small relative 
to the increase in verified empirical content.  
 
So it is relatively straightforward to compare the complexity, and thus the unifying 
power, of two theories which are related by a single application of deduction from 
the phenomena. There remain two significant challenges, however. Firstly, nothing 
that has been proposed so far gives any idea of we might compare theories which 
are not so closely related. And this, of course, is main problem facing actual 
scientists in the context of theory choice. The second challenge is that, as argued 
above, the NMA demands an absolute or objective account of empirical success. 
Even supposing that it is possible to compare very different theories, it does not 
necessarily follow that a theory which is superior under this comparison can 
legitimately be regarded as (approximately and/or partially) true. Notice, however, 
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that both problems are solved if the second is solved – being able to place all 
theories on an absolute scale of empirical success means, a fortiori, that any two 
can be compared. This, therefore, is the problem to which we now turn.  
 
The notion of an absolute account of empirical success is quite plausible in the 
curve fitting case.  This is because this process can, at least potentially, get started 
without any information about what the final fitted function would look like. The 
general ‘theory’ in effect is that some model will fit the data. This ‘theory’ is so 
general that it requires no empirical information at all for its construction, thus 
establishing a ‘zero point’ for the subsequent construction. Given a clearly-defined 
data set, the process then proceeds, via a precise set of algorithms, to a final fitted 
function. If it is assumed that each step in the algorithm results in an increase in 
unifying power, starting from zero means that the end point is guaranteed to be 
empirically successful by some absolute standard. By analogy, determining the 
empirical success of some theory on the UV would seem to require showing how it 
is derivable by a series of well-defined steps, each of which increases unifying 
power, from a theory so general it effectively says nothing at all9.  
 
Before continuing with this line of thought, however, it is worth considering a few 
objections and alternatives. One possible alternative is that an absolute standard of 
unifying power might be defined by reference to particular cases assumed to be 
paradigmatically successful. For instance, one might say that any theory which is 
roughly comparable to (or more empirically successful than) Fresnel’s counts as 
unifying; and any roughly comparable to Ptolemy’s is not unifying. A major difficulty 
with this approach is that comparing paradigm theories to those outside their 
immediate theoretical ‘neighbourhood’ immediately suggests the proverbial 
comparison of apples and oranges. The transverse and general wave theories of 
light are comparable just because it is clear how to go from one to the other in the 
abstract hierarchy of theories of which they are both members. The same is not 
                                            
9
 Notice I assume throughout that a theory which does not use any empirical information also 
cannot generate any significant empirical success. This assumption is based on the more basic 
assumption that it is impossible (or highly unlikely) simply to ‘guess’ the form of a predictively 
successful theory without empirical guidance. In many cases of successful theorising, this empirical 
guidance may of course be tacit or informal, but it is still present.  
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true with respect to, say, the wave theory of light and Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
A further difficulty is that, even insofar as it is possible compare the empirical 
success of theories to paradigm cases, the anti-realist surely will not grant that 
these paradigm cases are (even approximately and/or partially) true. So for the 
whole enterprise to get off the ground, one must in any case provide additional 
arguments to show that the paradigm cases are sufficiently unifying by some 
absolute standard that the inference to their truth is warranted.  
 
Another alternative is suggested by Worrall. Responding to an idea related to that 
described above, he writes: 
 
“The whole idea of reconstructing our knowledge from bottom up ... is surely 
a chimera. Surely these justificatory trees grow back into the mists of time to 
the emergence of homo sapiens and beyond.” (Worrall, 2010a, p. 748) 
 
And goes on to state that: 
 
“It is ... stunning predictive successes that give at least a large part of the 
credence to the premises from which demonstrative inductions begin—not 
some stepwise demonstration drifting back into the mists of time.” (ibid., p. 
749) 
 
So (Worrall argues), we do not, and can never have, sufficiently detailed access to 
the hierarchy of ever-more-general theories to show how any given particular 
theory is derived. The project of providing an absolute measure of empirical 
success is therefore doomed. Moreover, it is not even necessary, because the 
achievement of (UN) predictive success, plus the NMA, is sufficient for regarding a 
theory as confirmed. 
 
Although similar positions have been discussed above, it is worth emphasising that 
Worrall’s positive account of theory confirmation is no longer tenable. All the views 
of empirical success surveyed in this chapter, except for the UV, understand 
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empirical success as an ‘event’ or ‘achievement’. Under the simple UN account, for 
instance, a theory is confirmed by the event of observing a phenomenon that has 
not been used in the construction of that theory, but is entailed by it. Under the UV, 
in contrast, empirical success is a ‘static’ relation that exists between a theory and 
a body of verified empirical content. Several reasons for rejecting the event model 
have already been articulated in this chapter. Another reason, which arises from 
the picture of theoretical complexity outlined above, is that it cannot distinguish 
between a theory that is empirically successful and one that has simply becomes 
less unsuccessful. To give a simple example, imagine a ‘model’ of a two-
dimensional data set which consists of a series of vectors specifying the difference 
in coordinates between each data point and that following it. This ‘theory’ is 
manifestly empirically unsuccessful, since for a data set with n points, it has n-1 
assumptions. Moreover, it does not correctly entail the coordinates of even a single 
data point, since the vectors by themselves do not give any information about any 
actual coordinates. Feed into the model values for a single data point, however, 
and it will immediately spit out all the remaining values! Under the UN account, this 
is an amazing success for the theory – only a single data point was used to 
accurately predict the values for the entire set. Under the UV account, it is clear 
that, while the addition of a single data point clearly improved the empirical 
success of the theory, it has only improved it to zero – the total set of empirical 
results used in constructing the theory is exactly the same as the set entailed by 
theory. The theory as a whole is thus not empirically successful by any sensible 
(that is to say, absolute) measure.  
 
What this example demonstrates is that a general theory cannot be treated as a 
‘black box’. To assess its empirical success against a body of evidence, it is 
necessary to know not only whether it was empirically successful ‘at the margin’, 
but how much empirical content was used in constructing it. But the same 
argument will then go for the general theory from which it was constructed, and so 
on. Otherwise, it could be the case, unbeknownst to us, that any theory in this 
chain in fact embodies far more assumptions than is commonly supposed, and so 
renders empirically unsuccessful any theory that is derived from it.  
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Of course, it might be argued that this is a mere ‘philosopher’s concern’. It is 
obvious that current and past theories considered to be successful are not 
gerrymandered monstrosities like the model described above. The assumptions of 
these theories are typically written down clearly and explicitly, and from this we can 
plainly see that they are usually few in number and general in scope. I share this 
intuition. But it cannot simply be assumed. Although those assumptions are usually 
lexically simple, they are often the consequence of much hard-won empirical 
knowledge. Moreover, a theory may embody large amounts of tacit empirical 
knowledge which is not explicitly stated in its assumptions. These tacit 
assumptions may include, for instance, basic systems of classification or 
assumptions about causality.  
 
Worrall’s negative argument against absolute views of empirical success is that the 
required reconstruction of our theoretical knowledge is simply untenable. In 
response to this, it is worth reiterating that, since the UV demands a ‘timeless’ 
logical relation between theory and phenomena, what is required is a ‘rational 
reconstruction’ of the hierarchy. The historical details, where they are available, will 
obviously assist in this reconstruction, but are not necessary for it.  
 
To illustrate this point, here follows a brief rational construction of the derivation of 
Fresnel’s theory. It has already been shown that both the longitudinal and 
transverse wave theories are instances of the nonspecific wave theory. The wave 
theory in turn is an instance of a more general theory, which also includes particle 
theories as instances. This general theory claims that light is an entity emitted (or 
possibly reflected) from the objects of visual perception and is propagated through 
space at a finite speed before being received by our eyes or other measuring 
instruments (this is thus generally termed the “reception theory”). As discussed in 
section 3, it is the results of inference experiments that direct us towards accepting 
the particular instance of this theory in which the entity propagated through space 
is a wave. The reception view of light can be contrasted with the view, popular in 
ancient times up until the early modern period, that the carrier of visual perception 
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is emitted in the first instance from the eyes and gives rise to visual experience 
when it strikes objects (Ronchi, 1957, pp. 24-29). The ‘crucial experiments’ that 
settle the issue in favour of the reception view are the first successful 
measurements of a finite speed of light, beginning in 1676 (Romer & Cohen, 1940). 
This is because the view that the carrier of visual perception emerges from the 
eyes requires that the propagation of this carrier be instantaneous, to 
accommodate the known phenomenon that distant objects are perceived the 
instant we look towards them. Both the reception and emission theories are in turn 
more specific instances of Euclid’s theory that, all else equal, light consists of 
“rays” which travel in straight lines, except where they suffer refraction or reflection 
at the interface between different materials. Because it travels in straight lines, 
under this theory light is susceptible to geometrical treatment (Clegg, 2008, pp. 20-
21). One unifying hypothesis found in simple ray optics is Snell’s law, which 
systematically relates the angle of an incident ray of light to that of a refracted ray 
across a wide variety of circumstances.  
 
This reconstruction is intended to provide a sketch of what would be required to 
assess the predictive success of Fresnel’s theory. It is admittedly incomplete in two 
important respects. Firstly, it refers only to theories that have actually been 
considered at various points in history. These historical theories, however, are 
intended merely as representatives of a more inclusive logical hierarchy. Consider, 
for instance the view that a beam of light originates at a point midway between the 
observer and observed object and travels in both directions to connect the two. 
Although this is undoubtedly a strange theory, it is a perfectly sound instantiation of 
ray optics alongside the reception theory. The broader point is that a free 
parameter in a general theory may have many possible values, and some of these 
may correspond to specific theories that have not actually been advocated by 
anyone. A complete reconstruction would consider the full range of possible 
parameter values, and show how empirical information can be used to eliminate all 
but one. Certain theories, incidentally, are rejected out of hand as “strange” 
because they conflict with empirical results that are too basic to be mentioned in 
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scientists’ explicit arguments. Empirical information is nevertheless involved in 
excluding certain logically possible values of the relevant parameters.  
 
The reconstruction is also incomplete in that it does not terminate at a totally 
content-free theory. This is largely because it is limited to views that we are 
inclined to think of as “scientific theories”. But as the reconstruction proceeds up 
the hierarchy of abstraction, it will eventually reach views that are so obvious to us 
that they do not seem to merit the term. For instance, geometric optics is an 
instance of the more general view that all the diverse phenomena we group under 
the term “light” are, in fact, instances of a single phenomenon that can be 
described by a fixed set of laws. This sort of statement is analogous to the 
statement of which variables are systematically related to each other in the curve 
fitting case. It seems prima facie very plausible that the theoretical hierarchy in 
each case will terminate with this sort of very basic classification schema. Anything 
more general represents a refusal to classify the world into types at all, and thus to 
make any scientific inference. Notice, moreover, that even such a simple system of 
classification is undoubtedly successful under the UV. We practice science precise 
because we doubt that the world is merely a blooming, buzzing confusion, and 
believe that there is an underlying unity to the phenomena. And we accept theories 
precisely to the extent that they are able to capture this unity.  
 
Before concluding this section, it is worth remarking briefly on the logical 
relationship between general and specific theories in a particular hierarchy. Since 
the specific theory is derived by fixing the value of a parameter that is free in the 
general theory, we can think of the former as resulting from conjoining an 
additional premise to the latter. The specific theory thus logically implies the 
general. However, in just the same way that the addition of premises to a set does 
not invalidate the deduction of any results from that set, each particular theory 
inherits all the empirical consequences of the more general theory of which it is an 
instance. This is a striking and possibly counterintuitive result, since many of the 
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empirical consequences of earlier and consequently more general10 theories have 
subsequently been refuted. As discussed in Chapter 1, avoid the pessimistic 
induction requires an account of which elements of theories are “essential” to their 
empirical success. The realist, therefore, will wish to add this some account of 
essentialness to the picture presented in this section. The notion of essentialness 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
10. Deductive entailment and confirmation 
  
In the previous sections, a unifying theory has been described as one that 
deductively entails some sufficiently broad set of verified empirical consequences. 
This focus on entailment is a convenient philosopher’s shorthand, and gives a 
good general idea of what is being proposed. However, for a theory to count as 
unifying, it is in fact neither sufficient nor necessary that it deductively entail 
empirical results.  
 
Firstly, deductive entailment is not sufficient. A good illustrative example of this 
point is provided by (Vickers, forthcoming) in his discussion of Velikovsky’s (1950) 
Worlds in Collision. In this book, Velikovsky proposes an extremely convoluted 
history of the solar system which purports to explain, among other things, the 
supposed occurrence of events described in the Bible. Virtually no serious 
scientists, at the time of initial publication or since, have accorded any credibility to 
Velikovsky’s theory. Nevertheless, this theory did produce some predictions that 
were temporally novel and did in fact turn out to be accurate. For instance, on 
Velikovsky’s account, the planet Venus has only recently had a stable orbit. Before 
this, it moved extensively around the solar system, and specifically passed 
extremely close to the sun. Because of this, the surface of Venus is hotter than that 
of earth. That the surface of Venus is hot was, like many of Velikovsky’s claims, 
contrary to mainstream scientific opinion at the time. Nevertheless, Velikovsky 
turned out to be correct, and mainstream scientists wrong on this particular point 
                                            
10Earlier theories are usually more general in the sense that they consist of fewer theoretical 
assumptions. Their domain of application, of course, is usually narrower than later theories.  
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(although the scientific explanation for the surface temperature of Venus of course 
differs from Velikovsky’s). So a direct deductive consequence of Velikovsky’s 
theory was novel, surprising by the standards of contemporary science, and in fact 
empirically accurate. 
 
Nevertheless, as Vickers argues, this successful novel prediction does not 
necessarily serve to confirm Velikovsky’s theory to any great degree. Firstly, the 
theory made many novel predictions, and that about the surface temperature of 
Venus is one of only a small number that turned out to be true. The no-miracles 
argument does not give any grounds for regarding novel prediction as a special 
source of confirmation for the theory in this sort of case because the alternative 
explanation, that a lucky coincidence has occurred, is in fact quite plausible. It is, in 
other words, not surprising at all if some predictions of a false theory turn out to be 
true with such a ‘scattershot’ approach.  
 
Thus far, this chapter has largely addressed the subject of accurate empirical 
predictions, and how these might serve to confirm a theory. Before analysing the 
Velikovsky example any further, therefore, it is worth making some more general 
remarks about inaccurate predictions, and how these might disconfirm a theory. 
Notice that most accounts of predictive success discussed in this chapter, including 
the temporal and UN accounts, focus specifically on the relation between a 
particular empirical result and the theory. This sort of account therefore includes by 
default the sort of predictive success exemplified by the Velikovsky case as a 
confirming instance for the theory. However, each of these criteria draws its 
strength from the no-miracles argument with the result that this sort of case can 
therefore be excluded by returning to first principles. This is exactly the approach 
that Vickers takes. In contrast to these accounts, the UV of empirical success 
invokes a ‘global’ criterion. In particular, a theory is confirmed under the UV just in 
case it is simple relative to the entire body of verified empirical consequences it 
entails. Therefore, unlike with more ‘local’ criteria, such as the temporal account, 
there is no need to resort to first principles to exclude the Velikovsky case under 
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the UV. Velikovsky’s theory can be very easily dismissed simply by noting that it is 
both extraordinarily complex and has very few verified empirical consequences.  
 
Surveying cases of ‘empirical failure’ more broadly, however, it is clear that this 
simple response will not suffice in general11. Consider, for example, the proposition 
“All rabbits are white”. This proposition is intuitively not at all complex, and there 
are many instances where it is satisfied. This ‘theory’, in fact, entails many more 
verified empirical results than are required to construct it. However, there are many 
more instances where it is not satisfied than where it is. To what extent, then, is the 
theory disconfirmed by the observation of a single brown rabbit? The simple 
response that the theory is straightforwardly refuted is not satisfactory. In line with 
the partial realist thesis articulated in this thesis, one might still want to make room 
for the claim that the theory ‘latches onto’ some genuine regularity, albeit 
imperfectly. It might, in other words, be approximately accurate, accurate under 
certain circumstances, accurate as a limiting case of a more general theory, etc.  
 
The question then is how one might distinguish hypotheses that are genuinely, if 
imperfectly, empirically successful from those that are merely lucky. The intuitive 
response is that a theory can still be considered successful if it does not make 
‘excessively many’ false predictions. The problem with this response, of course, is 
how to define ‘excessive’. In the general spirit of the UV, here follows a tentative 
suggestion. The thing to notice about the Velikovsky case is not merely that it is 
complex, but that correcting its many empirical failures would require the addition 
of many (additional) ad hoc posits, thus increasing its complexity even further. 
Thus, even if the theory could avoid refutation, it would sacrifice any empirical 
success in doing so. The theory is not empirically successful overall because, 
again speaking intuitively, its empirical failures ‘overwhelm’ its empirical successes. 
Generalising from this point, the empirical success of a theory which makes some 
inaccurate predictions can be assessed by, first, determining what ad hoc 
hypotheses would need to be added to the theory to save it from refutation. If the 
theory modified in this way is still empirically successful under the UV account, 
                                            
11
 This point has been pressed on me my Orri Steffanson,. 
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especially if the ad hoc modifications imply new empirical consequences which turn 
out to be accurate, the unmodified theory should also be counted as successful. 
Otherwise, not. Call this the “prospective success criterion”.  
 
This suggestion is admittedly rather rough, but it draws at least intuitive support 
from a line of thought that arises in both Kuhn (1962/1996) and Lakatos (1968). 
Both authors emphasise that scientists do not necessarily (or even frequently) 
abandon a theory/paradigm/research programme which encounters apparent 
falsifiers. This is because they have confidence that the theory will eventually be 
able to deal with these problems in due course. This confidence is, presumably, 
partly underpinned by a sort of induction from the ability of the theory to 
successfully accommodate similar cases in the past. However, it is plausible that 
scientists also employ something like the prospective success criterion. They 
acknowledge that the theory faces potential falsifiers but judge that, whatever 
modifications to the theory turn out to be necessary in defeating these falsifiers, 
they won’t be sufficient to undermine its empirical success.  
 
Thus concludes one line of criticism against Velikovsky’s theory. The general 
suggestion emerging from this criticism is that, for a theory to count as confirmed 
under the UV, it cannot entail an “excessive” number of falsified empirical results. A 
separate criticism of Velikovsky’s theory offered by Vickers is that the prediction of 
the surface temperature of Venus is “vague”. As Vickers points out, just about any 
temperature hotter than that of Earth would probably be counted as satisfying the 
description “hot”. So it was in fact not very unlikely for this prediction to come out 
correct simply by chance. Any attempt to offer the truth of the theory as the best 
explanation of the accuracy of the prediction is thereby blocked. Vickers therefore 
suggests as a general rule that a theory be counted as predictively successful only 
if the predictions it makes are sufficiently “impressive”. Or, as Popper would put it, 
a theory must “stick its neck out”!  
 
That a theory deductively entails verified empirical results is therefore not sufficient 
for it to be confirmed under the UV. It cannot entail too many falsified results 
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alongside the verified ones, and it cannot entail the verified results too vaguely. 
However, it is also not necessary that a theory entail verified results to be regarded 
as confirmed. There are also occasions where a theory is confirmed by merely 
‘suggesting’ or ‘inspiring’ certain empirical results. This claim is supported by 
detailed arguments in Chapter 3.10, in direct opposition to arguments made by 
Vickers and Cartwright. Therefore only a brief argument for this claim is given, as 
follows.  
 
Note that, from the perspective of pure logic, there is nothing epistemically 
distinctive about a relationship of deductive entailment between theory and 
empirical result. Inferring the truth of the theory from the truth of the empirical result 
is always, strictly speaking, an instance of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. 
However, it has been accepted (at least for the sake of argument) that it is 
permissible on certain occasions to infer that a theory is true because that is the 
best explanation of the fact that it gives rise to true empirical predictions. But 
adopting this sort of explanatory reasoning does not imply any a priori stance on 
what sort of “gives rise” relation is allowable. It is certainly extremely plausible that, 
all else being equal, the existence of a deductive relationship makes the 
explanatory argument stronger. But there could nevertheless be various 
circumstances in which the existence of a somewhat ‘weaker’ relation between 
theory and verified empirical result is sufficient to regard the former as confirmed. 
One example is where an abstract theory only “guides” the formation of a 
successful empirical model (see Chapter 3.4 for a detailed discussion of these 
cases), but does so for many such models. The unifying power of a hypothesis 
can, in other words, be regarded as the combination of at least two factors, namely 
the ‘breadth’ of the empirical results that follow from the hypothesis and the 
‘strength’ of the logical connection between the hypothesis and these results. 
 
Previously in this chapter, the criterion of unifying power has been characterised as 
a function simply of the number of verified empirical results which a theory entails 
and the complexity of this theory. In this section, it has been argued that several 
other factors must be taken into consideration before a theory can be regarded as 
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confirmed. The first is how many falsified empirical results it gives rise to. The 
second is the precision with which these results are predicted. The third is the 
‘strength’ of the logical connection between theory and results. Putting all this 
together gives a new version of the UV, as follows: 
  
A theory is confirmed just in case, and to the extent that, it gives rise to 
more verified empirical content than that required to construct it, does so 
with precision, and does not give rise to excessive falsified content. (UV3) 
 
Where “give rise” is intended to indicate that relations that are logically weaker than 
deductive entailment can be included, and “excessive” should be understood in the 
context of prospective success criterion proposed above.  
 
As suggested above, there may be some trade-off between the various factors 
involved in this definition – a theory that, with only very ‘natural’ assumptions and 
boundary conditions, deductively entails a small number of accurate predictions 
may be just as empirically successful as one which very loosely ‘guides’ the 
construction of many empirically accurate models. There will be no attempt to give 
anything resembling an exact or comprehensive treatment of these trade-offs in 
this thesis. I concede immediately that there will therefore be many cases of 
theories where it is simply unclear whether or not a theory is sufficiently empirically 
successful under UV3 to warrant a realist attitude towards it. There will also, 
however, be cases that fall relatively clearly on one side or the other. Hopefully the 
ambiguous cases will in fact comprise a small minority of episodes in the history of 
science. In any case, the examples presented below belong to the subset 
(however small or large it turns out to be) of relatively clear cases. Or so it will be 
argued.  
 
11. Chapter summary 
 
I have argued that the NMA demands an account of empirical success which 
satisfies the intuition that successful theories (or at least the parts of these theories 
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responsible for their success) are true. One popular candidate for such an account 
holds that empirical success should be understood as novel predictive success. 
There are, however, competing notions of how “novel prediction” should be 
interpreted, including the temporal, theoretical and use-novelty accounts. I argue 
that all of these accounts, because they claim that what theories should be counted 
as empirically successful depends on historically contingent factors, are not 
adequate to the NMA.  
 
I have also examined various forms of weak predictivism, which claim that 
predictive success is not intrinsically a reason to prefer a theory, but merely 
indicates that some more fundamental epistemic virtue has been satisfied. The 
severe testing approach, advocated by Howson and especially by Mayo, is a form 
of weak predictivism which, I have argued, also falls prey to the concern about 
historical contingency. However, the type of weak predictivism which holds that 
theoretical unifying power is the fundamental theoretical virtue is considerably 
more promising.  
 
In fact, I argue that Worrall, on paper an advocate of the use-novelty view, is in fact 
committed to a particular variant of the theoretical unification idea. I have in 
consequence dubbed a position derived from his account the unification view (UV), 
and argued that the UV adequately captures the intuition underlying the NMA. The 
UV is concisely captured by the slogan: A theory is empirically successful just in 
case it entails more empirical content than that required to construct it.  
 
When referring to the empirical content required to construct a theory, we do not 
mean simply that required to fix whatever free parameters are evident on a face-
value inspection of the theory. The general framework of the theory embodies 
substantive assumptions, and establishing these assumptions also involves 
empirical information. Judging that a theory is empirically successful on an 
absolute scale therefore involves quantifying, via rational reconstruction, the 
empirical content required to construct it “from nothing”.  
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Finally, I have demonstrated that a relationship of deductive entailment between 
theory and empirical results is neither sufficient nor necessary for the theory to 
count as confirmed under the general principles of the UV. I have therefore 
proposed a more general characterisation of the UV. This states that a theory is 
confirmed just in case, and to the extent that, it gives rise to more verified empirical 
content than that required to construct it, does so with precision, and does not give 
rise to excessive falsified content.  
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Chapter 3. What parts of scientific theories are “essential”? 
 
1. Chapter overview 
 
Several specific forms of partial realism have been proposed in the literature, 
including “entity realism” (Hacking, 1983; Cartwright, 1983), “phenomenological 
realism” (Cartwright, 1999a, 2009; Cartwright et al., 1995; Shomar, 1998; 2008), 
“structural realism” (Worrall, 1989a, 2007), the “working posits” idea (Kitcher, 
1993), the “divide et impera” strategy (Psillos, 1999), “Ramsey-sentence realism” 
(Cruse & Papineau, 2002), and “semi-realism” (Chakravartty, 1998, 2007). 
Although there are many points of commonality and difference between them, 
these positions differ most substantially in how they define the vague term 
“essential” in the definition of partial realism. The aim of this chapter is to produce a 
satisfactory definition of “essentialness” and thus give an account of what parts of 
scientific theories we ought to be realists about (if we are to be realists at all). 
 
I begin, in section 2, by examining the direct reference theory of meaning. This has 
been applied as account of essentialness in its own right, but is more commonly 
employed as part of a hybrid “causal-descriptive” account. It is argued that a pure 
direct reference account is manifestly unsatisfactory for partial realism and that, in 
a hybrid account, only the descriptive component substantially contributes to 
picking out essential elements.  
 
Section 3 compares retrospective and prospective approaches to essentialness. 
The former apply knowledge of current theories to pick out the essential elements 
of past theories, whereas the latter do not. It is argued that, while not totally trivial 
(as some have argued), retrospective approaches are decidedly less interesting 
than prospective approaches.  
 
Sections 4-6 provide detailed examinations of several of the particular accounts of 
essentialness that have been proposed in the literature, namely entity realism, 
phenomenological realism, structural realism and semi-realism. Ramsey-sentence 
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realism, it is shown, is best understood as a form of structural realism. It is argued 
in section 7 that the workings posits strategy and the divide et impera move are 
sufficiently similar that they can be treated as a single position. Hence the term 
“working posits” is used throughout to refer to both accounts. This position is 
examined at some length, in sections 7-9, in large part because the notion of a 
“working posit” is so open to interpretation. Section 9 is focused on a particularly 
sophisticated interpretation of the general position advanced by Vickers. 
 
The account of essentialness advocated in this thesis has not yet been seen in the 
literature, and is articulated and defended in section 10 of this chapter. The basic 
idea behind it is that the criterion of unifying power developed in Chapter 2 ought to 
be applied to parts of theories, rather than theories as a whole. The chapter is 
summarised in section 11. 
 
2. Direct reference approaches 
 
One of the primary concerns motivating referential approaches is the theoretical 
incommensurability thesis raised by, among others, Kuhn (1962/1996)) and 
Feyerabend (1975/1993). The concern here is that the meaning of a term is 
dependent on the larger theory in which it is embedded. So the term “mass”, for 
instance, has one meaning in Newton’s theory, where it is described as a stable 
property of objects, and a very different meaning in Einstein’s theory, where it is 
understood to be dependent on how a given object has been accelerated. The 
incommensurability thesis can be framed as a problem for scientific realism along 
the lines of the pessimistic induction. This is because it implies that successful past 
theories fail to accurately represent the world by the light of our current best 
theories.  Even if these past theories use some of the same theoretical terms 
present in current theories, the entities designated by these terms do not refer to 
any entities which actually exist.  
 
Referential approaches attempt to overcome this objection by appealing to the 
direct reference account of meaning proposed by Putnam (1975b, 1978) and 
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Kripke (1980). Under this account, the meaning of a term is identified with its actual 
referent, rather than the properties associated with it by some theoretical 
description. For instance, the meaning of a natural kind term such as “electron” is 
none other than the actual natural kind which is the extension of the term at the 
time it is first used, if there is any such extension. The “stereotypes” associated 
with this entity (i.e. the properties ascribed to it) may differ between theories, but 
referential continuity is retained between theories, so long as the usage of the term 
in the new theory is derived from the initial usage. That is, although Rutherford, 
Bohr and Schrödinger, for instance, may have had different theories of electrons, 
they were all attempting to describe the same underlying entity.  
 
Significantly, if there is a dispute about the proper reference of some term, the 
direct reference account enjoins us to examine what particular entity the person or 
people who dubbed the term were actually causally interacting with at the time they 
dubbed it. This is the point of the celebrated “twin earth” thought experiment 
(Putnam, 1973, 1975b). Suppose that there is a planet – twin earth – on which 
there is a substance which resembles water in all outward aspects, but is actually 
completely chemical distinct from the substance H2O. Suppose, furthermore, that a 
human being from earth travels to this planet and there encountered this 
substance. Because she is completely unable to distinguish it from regular earth 
water, the traveller refers to this new substance as “water”. She is, according to 
Putnam’s account, simply mistaken in the use of this term (although 
understandably). The correct reference of the term “water” is still the particular 
natural kind with which English-speakers were acquainted when they coined the 
term, namely that with the chemical formula H2O.  
 
Importantly, the reference of a term is fixed by this sort of causal association even 
if the association between those who initially use the term and the corresponding 
referent is mediated by a substantially false description. For instance, late 
nineteenth-century scientists who began to acquire systematic evidence for the 
existence of atoms may have understood them as indivisible particles. Yet, 
although it is now believed that atoms are divisible under certain circumstances, 
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the direct reference theory holds that these scientists were indeed referring to the 
same underlying natural kind as we are today.  
 
This notion of letting reference follow causal interaction is the basis for a certain 
realist strategy for picking out the essential parts of theories. Here, for instance, 
Hardin and Rosenberg discuss the posit of a luminiferous ether in Fresnel’s wave 
theory of light: 
 
“Looking back across the range of theories from Fresnel to Einstein, we see 
a constant causal role being played in all of them; that causal role we now 
ascribe to the electromagnetic field. One permissible strategy of realists is to 
let reference follow causal role. It seems not unreasonable, then, for realists 
to say that ‘ether’ referred to the electromagnetic field all along.” (Hardin & 
Rosenberg, 1982, pp. 613-614) 
 
And here is Kitcher’s somewhat more detailed argument along the same lines: 
 
“Consider two hypotheses about the mode of reference of Fresnel's term 
'light wave,' or, more exactly, about the tokens of that term that figure in his 
solutions to problems of interference and diffraction. 
 
HR. Fresnel's dominant intention is to talk about light, and the wavelike 
propagation of light, however that is constituted. He has, of course, a false 
belief about the medium of propagation. But, since his primary aim is to 
discuss light and its wavelike qualities, his tokens of 'light wave' in the 
solutions of the diffraction and interference problems genuinely refer to 
electromagnetic waves of high frequency. 
 
HN. Fresnel's references are explicitly fixed through the descriptions he 
gives at the beginning of the memoir in characterizing the wave theory of 
light and in introducing the wave equation. Tokens of 'light wave' that occur 
later in the memoir – for example in the solutions to the problems of 
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diffraction – thus have their references fixed by the description "the 
oscillations of the molecules of the ether." Since there is no ether, they fail to 
refer… 
 
There is a lot to be said for HR. The sole function of the ether in the 
prizewinning memoir—and throughout most of Fresnel's writings—is to 
answer to the felt need for a medium in which light waves propagate. 
Fresnel typically makes no detailed claims about the nature of this medium. 
Why, then, should we give priority to a description making reference to an 
entity about which Fresnel would surely have admitted his almost total 
ignorance, rather than seeing his dominant intention as that of talking about 
the wavelike features of light, however they happen to be realized?” 
(Kitcher, 1993, pp. 146-147, emphasis in original) 
 
Similar views are also discussed sympathetically by Devitt (1984), Cummiskey 
(1992), Psillos (1994), and Niiniluoto (1999, pp. 120-132).  
 
So a theoretical term introduced to explain the appearance of a certain 
phenomenon then refers to whatever entity or entities are actually causally 
responsible for that phenomenon (and hence for the introduction of the term). The 
basic difficulty with this sort of account, as pointed out by Laudan (1984), is that 
practically any two theories which attempt to explain a common set of phenomena 
will therefore refer to the same set of entities. For example, Aristotle’s notion of 
“natural place”, Descartes’ particle “vortices” and Newton’s “action at a distance” all 
play the causal role of accounting for gravitational action. So, if we were to cash 
out the notion of “preservation” in terms of similarity of causal role, virtually any two 
theories in the same domain would trivially satisfy the preservation requirement.  
 
Psillos (1999, ch. 12) acknowledges the force of this argument, and so argues that 
a simple causal theory of reference is not sufficient for the needs of scientific 
realism. Instead, he advocates a hybrid “causal descriptivism”, under which there is 
referential continuity between two theories just in case (i) they both posit entities 
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which fulfil the causal role of accounting for a given class of phenomena; and (ii) 
they ascribe some of the same properties to these entities, these properties giving 
rise to the relevant phenomena within the respective theoretical models. In his 
words: 
 
“... although there may well be nothing in the world which possesses all the 
attributes ascribed to an abandoned posit a, there may well be a current 
posit β to which are ascribed some (sometimes most) of the attributes 
ascribed to a, and which is also considered to be causally responsible for 
the same phenomena as a had been taken to produce. Should this situation 
occur, we may be willing to say that the term intended to refer to the 
abandoned posit a refers (or, at any rate, approximately refers) to the 
current posit β.” (Psillos, 1999, p. 284) 
 
While this is certainly a sensible corrective to the naive causal view – even the 
realist Worrall (1989a) describes Hardin and Rosenberg’s treatment as “far-
fetched” – a few additional remarks are in order. The crucial point, which was made 
by Laudan, is that the first condition of Psillos’ account will be satisfied by many or 
most of the examples of interest. All of the work, therefore, in distinguishing cases 
that do and do not satisfy this account will be done by the second condition. The 
notion of referential continuity thus becomes, by itself, insubstantial. Those who are 
so inclined are, of course, perfectly entitled to claim that theoretical terms which 
exhibit the right sort of descriptive continuity also possess referential continuity. But 
those who are otherwise inclined are also entitled to ignore the concept of 
referential continuity altogether. All the substantial debates about whether or not a 
given posit is to be regarded as essential will take place at the level of descriptive 
continuity. And the notion of descriptive continuity will be cashed out by an account 
along the lines of structural realism, Psillos’ divide et impera strategy, etc. The 
remainder of this chapter is therefore concerned with determining which, if any, 
descriptive account along these lines is satisfactory. 
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3. Retrospective versus prospective accounts of essentialness 
 
In the previous section, it was argued that ‘pure’ referential approaches are 
insubstantial or vacuous. That is, they are satisfied by just about any two theories 
that attempt to account for the same empirical phenomena. To avoid vacuousness, 
it was argued that an acceptable account of essentialness must focus on the 
properties or relations attributed to the posited entities by a theory. However, 
before considering any particular account of essentialness along these lines, it is 
worth examining another, more general, accusation of vacuousness that has been 
levelled against partial realism. The most detailed version of this accusation is due 
to Stanford. He argues that Psillos’ and Kitcher’s versions of partial realism are 
ultimately trivial because they make only retrospective judgements about which 
elements of a theory are responsible for its successes:  
 
“... [O]ne and the same present theory is used both as the standard to which 
components of a past theory must correspond in order to be judged true and 
to decide which of that theory's features or components enabled it to be 
successful. With this strategy of analysis, an impressive retrospective 
convergence between judgments of the sources of a past theory's success 
and the things it "got right" about the world is virtually guaranteed: It is the 
very fact that some features of a past theory survive in our present account 
of nature that leads the realist both to regard them as true and to believe 
that they were the sources of the rejected theory's success or 
effectiveness.” (Stanford, 2003b, p. 914) 
 
This argument is repeated by Stanford in his (2006, pp. 166-168) and a similar 
complaint is levelled by Newman (2010, pp. 416-417). The crucial issue is that an 
“essential” element of theory is defined simply as “that which we now happen to 
know was preserved in successor theories”.  
 
There are three distinct questions that arise from Stanford’s argument. The first is 
purely exegetical, namely whether Psillos and Kitcher (and the various other 
135 
 
authors implicitly included in this criticism) are in fact making purely retrospective 
judgements of essentialness. The second question is whether or not this 
manoeuvre of retrospective judgement does in fact render partial realism a totally 
trivial position. Suppose that the strong form of Stanford’s objection can be 
avoided, and that backwards-looking partial realism is not trivial. In this case, a 
third question is whether there might be other reasons for avoiding retrospective 
judgements of essentialness.  
 
Regarding the first question, there certainly are certain respects in which Psillos 
and Kitcher can reasonably be interpreted as offering retrospective accounts be. 
Both authors appeal to a causal theory of reference to designate which theoretical 
elements are preserved in episodes of theory change (as discussed in section 2). 
And, since judgements about the extension of a given theoretical term are 
generally made from the vantage point of our current theoretical ontology, these 
judgements are inherently backward-looking. Both accounts, however, also have a 
descriptive dimension, and they in fact both advocate variations of the “working 
posits” view (see sections 7-9 of this chapter). Although it will depend on which 
particular definition of a working posit is proposed, this kind of view can, in 
principle, be applied equally well retrospectively and prospectively. Moreover, as 
demonstrated in section 7, neither of them think of themselves as offering a 
retrospective account.  
 
The second question is whether all accounts of essentialness which rely on 
examining past theories in the light of current theories are indeed trivial or 
insubstantial. To put this another way, is it in fact “virtually guaranteed” that these 
accounts will judge as essential precisely those posits of past theories which 
happen to be preserved in current theories? The answer provided here is that 
these accounts are not trivial, because they are not interested simply in whether 
claims regarded as true by current theories are, as a matter of brute fact endorsed 
by past theories, but whether the truth of these claims explains the success of 
these past theories. 
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A good way into this issue is by returning to Post’s generalized correspondence 
principle: “... [A]ny acceptable new theory L should account for the success of its 
predecessor S by ‘degenerating’ into that theory under those conditions under 
which S has been well confirmed by tests.” (Post, 1971, p. 228, emphasis added). 
While Post viewed this as a heuristic for eliminating potential new theories, 
suppose that we instead assume that some independent criterion of empirical 
success is overriding in judging whether or not a new theory is to be accepted. In 
this case, the correspondence principle can be understood as a device for 
identifying the essential elements of the past successful theory. First, we check 
whether the new theory can account for/explain the successes of the past theory. 
Then, if it can, we determine which elements of the past theory we appeal to in 
providing this explanation. These elements are, by this method of accounting, the 
“working posits” of the older theory.  
 
To avoid the charge of triviality, therefore, all that is required is the possible 
existence of an older theory whose success cannot be explained in terms of the 
categories offered by the newer theory. The mere fact that the older theory posits 
the existence of entities also posited by the newer theory is not sufficient to avoid a 
refutation of partial realism. For this sort of case to satisfy the variant of partial 
realism under discussion, the older theory must also attribute properties to these 
entities in such a way that it is clear, from the perspective of the newer theory, why 
it was empirically successful. Moreover, the ongoing debates around particular 
case studies seem to address exactly this question. For instance, one contentious 
issue in the debate around Fresnel’s wave theory of light is the extent to which the 
derivation of the important results of the theory appealed to the mechanical 
properties, such as elasticity, that were attributed to the luminiferous ether. And, if 
it is decided that these mechanical properties were “working posits” in this 
derivation, it is prima facie difficult to see how to account for the success of the 
theory, since current theories of light do not attribute any mechanical properties to 
the electromagnetic field. So, in answer to the second question, it seems that a 
backwards-looking variant of partial realism is not totally trivial.  
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The third question can be rephrased as: “Is a retrospective variant of partial realism 
importantly less interesting than a prospective variant?” The answer offered to this 
question here is “yes”. The generalized correspondence principle can be viewed as 
either a positive or a negative heuristic. Used as a negative heuristic, it tells us to 
discard any newly mooted theories which are unable to explain the successes of 
past theories. Used as a positive heuristic, on the other hand, it tells us which 
elements of the old theory ought to be used in the construction of any new theory. 
It seems clear that Post intended his correspondence principle as a negative 
heuristic. All realists, moreover, must accept at least this negative version of the 
principle. In the remainder of this section, however, it is argued that realists should 
also favour a positive heuristic and thus a prospective account of which theoretical 
elements are essential.  
 
One major argument for the positive heuristic is that the distinction between it and 
the negative heuristic is untenable in the first place. In the paradigmatic 
applications of the (negative version of the) correspondence principle, the newer 
theory is not simply required to replicate the brute empirical results of the older 
theory, but often relatively abstract theoretical elements. For instance, to use a 
common example, when Einstein formulated his special theory of relativity, he 
checked that his equations of motion approximately reduced to the equivalent 
Newtonian equations under low-velocity conditions. Note that this represents a 
belief on his part that the Newtonian equations would continue to accurately 
describe low-velocity scenarios in general, including an infinite number that had not 
yet been empirically observed by anyone. However, once it is accepted that certain 
higher-level theoretical posits should be counted as “successes” of the older theory 
and must be “accounted for” by the newer theory, then there is a need for some 
principles for deciding which of the many theoretical posits on offer count as 
successes. Einstein, for instance, judged (and rightly so) that Newton’s equations 
of motion were successful elements of the theory that ought to be preserved in 
some form in his newer theory, whereas Newton’s assumption of absolute space 
and time were not. So, to the extent that the realist accepts application of the 
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correspondence principle at all, she also tacitly accepts the application of forward-
looking criteria for which elements are essential to the success of a theory.  
 
Another argument for a prospective view of essentialness is simply that it is 
logically stronger than a retrospective view. The retrospective view has a certain 
built-in flexibility; it simply claims that we will somehow be able to account for the 
success of past scientific theories from the perspective of our current best theories. 
A prospective view, on the other hand, is perforce committed to some specific 
account of theoretical essentialness. On broadly Popperian grounds, prospective 
accounts therefore ought to be favoured in the first instance, simply because they 
are more falsifiable. This is not to claim that the partial realist cannot legitimately 
retain the “fall-back option” of a more modest retrospective account. But this is not 
an option that should be exercised until all hope for a prospective account is 
forlorn. And there is nothing to indicate that this is currently the case.  
 
A final argument for the positive heuristic (and so a prospective account of 
essentialness) is that scientists tacitly apply such a heuristic in any case. As 
mentioned, at least by the beginning of the twentieth-century, physicists had a 
reasonably good idea about which parts of Newton’s theory were worth keeping 
and which were not. And anyone with scientific training will have similar intuitions 
about their own field of expertise. We would, for instance, be hard-pressed to 
imagine a future science of chemistry which lacked the concept of chemical atoms; 
though there are many other concepts in chemistry to which our allegiance is 
considerably less secure. Because scientists already do employ a positive heuristic 
at least intuitively, and this is a significant force in scientific theorising, it is worth 
attempting to characterise it explicitly and rigorously. And it is also worth 
attempting, if possible, to defend (or attack) the heuristic so uncovered.  
 
The opponent of prospective judgements of essentialness will, however, surely 
argue that the line of thought sketched out above is too ambitious. This point is 
addressed particularly by Stanford in his response to reviewers of Exceeding our 
Grasp. He asks, firstly, if it is indeed possible to identify prospectively which 
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elements of theories are essential to their empirical successes, “... why did we (or 
the relevant scientific communities) ever believe more than those parts or aspects 
of past theories on which their empirical successes really depended?” (Stanford in 
Saatsi et al., 2009, p. 385) Secondly, in response to the observation that scientists 
themselves frequently make judgements concerning which parts of their theories 
are essential, he points out that scientists “are routinely mistaken in central cases” 
(ibid., p. 386, emphasis in original). Finally, we can make the additional objection 
that, if we were able in general to identify which elements of scientific theories are 
essential to their success without the benefit of hindsight, we could perform the 
same trick upon our best contemporary theories. And then we philosophers would 
be able to do the hard work of science ourselves and simply say what the next, 
even more successful, theory will look like. Yet this seems deeply implausible (both 
Stanford and Saatsi make this point in Saatsi et al., 2009).  
 
These objections are mistaken on several counts. Taking the last objection first, it 
should be emphasised that the task is not to do the work of science, but rather to 
characterise, articulate in more rigorous logical terms and (if it turns out to be 
defensible) defend a practice which is already present in science. In this respect, 
the task at hand resembles that of philosophers working on confirmation theory, 
those attempting to understand the notion of causality, and so on. Of course, if 
some part of this philosophical commentary allows scientists to apply their existing 
methods more rigorously and so feeds back into practice, so much the better. But it 
is highly unlikely that the very general positive heuristic which articulated here will 
by itself improve upon the judgement of scientists who are deeply immersed in a 
particular theoretical framework and experimental or observational practice. 
 
It is also certainly not plausible to suggest that the mooted positive heuristic by 
itself would ever tell us what the improved successor to a given scientific theory will 
look like. In most of the cases examined in this literature, it is taken for granted that 
only a small proportion of the theoretical posits of even a highly successful theory 
will typically be viewed as essential to this success. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter 1.6, these posits will often be preserved only “approximately” in the 
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successor theory, and there is a variety of quite different cases that can reasonably 
be counted as instances of “approximate preservation”. So any sensible positive 
heuristic would leave some considerable scope for creative redevelopment of the 
essential posits. Finally, it is frequently the case that the phenomena successfully 
described by an older theory come to be viewed as special instances of a far larger 
class of phenomena described by a newer theory. So, although the positive 
heuristic requires that the essential posits of the older theory be (approximately) 
preserved in the newer theory, it does not specify anything about the larger 
‘superstructure’ that is erected around these posits to form the more general 
successor theory.  
 
Supposing that a prospective account of essentialness is tenable, Stanford 
professes puzzlement that scientists would ever believe in more than the essential 
parts of theories. In response to this, firstly, it is worth pointing out scientists’ 
judgements of which elements of a theory are essential to its empirical success will 
(and should!) depend on the actual empirical successes and failures the theory has 
accrued. For instance, as emphasised above, Einstein’s view of what was essential 
to Newton’s theory was a product of a particular time period. By the early twentieth 
century, it had become quite clear which elements of the overall Newtonian picture 
were broadly responsible for accurate results, which were inessential and which in 
fact largely led to inaccurate predictions. Any account of partial realism which 
attempted to anticipate scientists’ own empirically-informed judgements about what 
was essential to a theory’s success would certainly be an example of overreach, 
and any should consequently be rejected.  
 
Stanford’s other concern is that, even if we adopt the general policy of deferring to 
scientists’ own judgements, these judgements are often simply mistaken. This 
concern is mitigated by the point made above, that these judgements become 
steadily more trustworthy as more directly relevant empirical information is 
accumulated. But, Stanford might argue, this response surely predicts that 
scientists will be more cautious in their judgements of essentialness when the 
theory in question is still young and relatively few empirical data are on the table. In 
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fact the opposite often seems to be the case – witness the enthusiastic remarks (a 
beloved source of quotations for anti-realists) made in support of the luminiferous 
ether posit when Fresnel’s theory was young. Here, for instance, is James Clerk 
Maxwell: 
 
“Whatever difficulties we may have in forming a consistent idea of the 
constitution of the aether, there can be no doubt that the interplanetary and 
interstellar spaces are not empty, but are occupied by a material substance 
or body, which is certainly the largest, and probably the most uniform body 
of which we have any knowledge.” (Maxwell, 1878) 
 
Similarly, here is Helmholtz:  
 
“There can no longer be any doubt that light-waves consist of electric 
vibrations in the all -pervading ether, and that the latter possesses the 
properties of an insulator and a magnetic medium.” (von Helmholtz, 1899) 
 
Several additional examples along these lines are provided by (Cordero, 2011).  
 
Worrall (1990), however, points out that certain scientists in this period were more 
cautious. He provides a quote by Airy that is apparently just as triumphalist as 
those given above: 
 
“The Undulatory Theory of Optics is presented to the reader as having the 
same claims to his attention as the Theory of Gravitation: namely that it is 
certainly true. With the regard to the evidence for this theory; if the simplicity 
of a hypothesis; which explains with accuracy a vast variety of phenomena 
of the most complicated kind; can be considered a proof of its correctness; I 
believe there is no physical theory so firmly established as the theory in 
question.” (Airy, 1831/1842, pp. v-vi) 
 
This is followed, however, by:  
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“This character of certainty I conceive to belong only to what may be called 
the geometrical part of the theory: the hypothesis, namely, that light consists 
of undulations depending on transversal vibrations, and that these travel 
with certain velocities in different media according to the laws here 
explained. The mechanical part of the theory, as the suppositions relative to 
the constitution of the ether, the computation of the reflected and refracted 
rays, &c., though generally probable, I conceive to be far from certain.” (ibid, 
p. vi) 
 
This second quote is more in line with the sort of partial realism endorsed by 
modern scientific realists, and indeed by the structural realism advocated by 
Worrall himself.  
 
So some contemporary scientists made a full-fledged realist commitment to the 
existence of a luminiferous ether, whereas others were committed only to the (we 
now think) more defensible claim that light has certain “geometrical” properties. 
Maxwell and the other more metaphysically ambitious scientists held that an 
adequate theory must render intelligible the physical system in question, and that 
intelligibility is only conveyed by means of a mechanical model. Under such a 
criterion, the posit of a mechanical luminiferous ether is therefore essential to the 
empirical success of Fresnel’s theory simply because that success is unintelligible 
without it (see Cordero, 2011 for a more detailed discussion). Airy and other 
scientists in the metaphysically cautious camp, in contrast, applied some criterion 
of essentialness that that was more narrowly focused on the logical relationship 
between particular theoretical posits and the successful empirical predictions and 
explanations of the theory. Notice, incidentally, that Airy, at least, understands this 
logical relationship broadly along the lines of the unifying power criterion discussed 
in the previous chapter. As such, he anticipates the view of essentialness that will 
be advocated in the final sections of this chapter.  
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Stanford, surely, is correct that some scientists – including brilliant and influential 
scientists – are frequently mistaken about which elements of their contemporary 
theories will come to regarded as respectable by their successors. It is not clear, 
however, that this undermines the broader aim of establishing prospective criteria 
for which theoretical elements ought to be regarded as essential. The partial realist 
is not, after all, committed to the claim that scientists always get things right. On 
the contrary, it can only serve to further support a particular criterion of 
essentialness if history tells us both that scientists who have applied this criterion 
have tended to judge correctly regarding which theoretical elements are likely to be 
preserved and that those who failed to apply this criterion have tended to judge 
poorly. The mere fact that scientists have been mistaken therefore does not 
undermine the possibility for at least certain types of prospective accounts of 
essentialness.  
 
In this section, it has been argued that, while not trivial, a purely retrospective view 
of what is essential to the success of a scientific theory is uninteresting. And it is 
uninteresting not simply because we ought, in a Popperian mindset, to prefer 
strong theses until they are falsified. It is uninteresting because it fails to engage 
with a key feature of scientific practice, one that cries out for philosophical 
articulation. Accounts of essentialness that depend upon hindsight should therefore 
be rejected. Any satisfactory account must, instead, depend on ‘timeless’ factors 
such the internal logic of the theory itself and the empirical consequences that 
follow from it.  
 
4. Entity realism and phenomenological realism 
 
Entity realism was proposed by two leading lights of the “Stanford School” of 
philosophy of science, namely Hacking (1982; 1983; 1988; 1989) and Cartwright 
(1983, ch. 5). Their stated grounds for adopting this position, however, are distinct. 
Hacking rejects explanationist arguments for scientific realism and opts instead to 
pursue arguments that rely on the notion of intervention. His rationale for this is his 
acceptance of the argument that inference to the best explanation is simply circular 
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when applied to the truth of scientific theories (this argument is given in more detail 
by Laudan, 1981; and Fine, 1984; see also Chapter 1.3 of this thesis). As he 
explains his reasoning: 
 
“Realism and anti-realism scurry about, trying to latch on to something in the 
nature of representation that will vanquish the other. There is nothing there. 
That is why I turn from representing to intervening.” (Hacking, 1983, p. 145) 
 
Hacking’s interventionist account of scientific realism is built squarely upon the 
Kripke-Putnam causal theory of reference, discussed in section 2. However, he 
does not simply make the uninformative claim that a theoretical term refers to 
whichever entity the first user of the term in fact causally interacts with. Indeed, he 
is not concerned with mere causal interaction in itself. Rather, he thinks that we 
have good grounds for believing in the existence of an entity just in case we have a 
sufficient understanding of its causal powers to manipulate it for certain pragmatic 
ends. This criterion of realism is captured by his famous slogan: “[I]f you can spray 
them [electrons], then they are real” (ibid., p. 23). In more detail: 
 
“The “direct” proof of electrons and the like is our ability to manipulate them 
using well understood low-level causal properties. I do not of course claim that 
“reality” is constituted by human manipulability. We can, however, call 
something real, in the sense in which it matters to scientific realism, only when 
we understand quite well what its causal properties are. The best evidence for 
this kind of understanding is that we can set out, from scratch, to build 
machines that will work reliably, taking advantage of this or that causal nexus. 
Hence, engineering, not theorizing, is the proof of scientific realism about 
entities.” (Hacking, 1982, p. 86) 
 
There are two main objections to Hacking’s argument. These are not knock-down 
objections to entity realism as such, but rather show the need for some additional 
distinctions and arguments which Hacking unfortunately does not offer. The first 
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objection is that Hacking has not succeeded in eliminating all reliance on 
explanation (Reiner & Pierson, 1995; Resnik, 1994).  
 
“Laboratory skills do not give us access to otherwise unobservable entities, 
but only to certain observable interactions in the apparatus. Only by IBE can 
we come to believe that these observable signs indicate the presence of 
causal interactions, that these interactions are not artifacts, and that entities 
lie behind them. Moreover, only by an additional IBE can we take the 
evidence as warranting belief in the existence of exactly one kind of entity, 
rather than two kinds or a thousand kinds.” (Reiner & Pierson, 1995), p. 67) 
 
These authors do not commit either way on the applicability of inference to the best 
explanation in resolving these sorts of questions. What they do argue is that, if we 
accept Hacking’s arguments for entity realism, we have no principled grounds for 
rejecting similarly explanatory arguments for realism about other theoretical posits. 
 
The second, related, objection is that the successful manipulation of unobservable 
entities such as electrons surely presupposes more than just a naked assertion of 
their existence. As Psillos puts it: 
 
“... [I]f it is not admitted that some theoretical descriptions of the causal 
powers of the entity are correct, then the mere positing of the entity cannot 
produce any sound expectations about which phenomena are due if and 
when this entity is manipulated....” (Psillos, 1999, p. 248) 
 
In other words, to assert the existence of an entity, one must suppose the truth of 
at least those theoretical claims which give a basic description of how the given 
entity will behave within a certain type of experimental setup. This point is pre-
emptively conceded by Hacking, when he claims that we presuppose knowledge of 
“a modest number of home truths about electrons” (Hacking, 1983, p. 265) when 
we design scientific apparatus relying upon manipulation of these entities. Hacking 
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does not, however, give any sort of general account regarding which purported 
properties of entities are to be identified as the “home truths”.  
 
Cartwright’s argument for entity realism evades both of the objections given above 
(the differences between the two forms of entity realism are discussed by Clarke, 
2001). An exposition of her views therefore stands in place of a direct response to 
these objections. Cartwright proposes a form of argument she terms “inference to 
the most probable cause”, which is recognisably and explicitly a form of IBE. As 
such, she effectively concedes the point made by Reiner and Pierson. She does, 
however, explicitly draw a distinction between “causal explanation” and “theoretical 
explanation”: 
 
“What is special about explanation by theoretical entity is that it is causal 
explanation, and existence is an internal characteristic of causal claims. 
There is nothing similar for theoretical laws... God may tell you that 
Wollheim's paper is after mine, and that his paper is true. You have no 
doubts about either of those propositions. This signifies nothing about the 
truth of my paper. Similarly, God tells you that Schroedinger's equation 
provides a completely satisfactory derivation of the phenomenological law of 
radioactive decay. You have no doubt that the derivation is correct. But you 
still have no reason to believe in Schroedinger's equation. On the other 
hand, if God tells you ... that the ionization produced by the negative charge 
explains the track in the cloud chamber, then you do have reason, 
conclusive reason, to believe ... that there is an electron in the chamber.” 
(Cartwright, 1983, p. 93) 
 
So theoretical explanations still work as explanations if the more general law found 
in the explanans is false. In contrast, a causal explanation simply fails as an 
explanation if the posited entity does not exist. To be committed to a causal 
explanation is also to be committed to a certain existential assertion. This is, as it 
were, a ‘transcendental argument’ for drawing a distinction between causal and 
theoretical explanations. It starts from the assumption that we do have some 
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successful explanations, then reasons backwards to see what conditions must be 
in place in each case for this to be so.  
 
Cartwright also indirectly addresses the second objection to Hacking’s entity 
realism given above. She concedes the point that, if we do successfully manipulate 
entities and offer causal explanations, some of our theoretical assertions must be 
true. However, she thinks that there is a distinction between asserting that entities 
possess certain causal powers and asserting that they obey abstract theoretical 
laws. This connects to the titular thesis of her book, that the laws of physics “lie” 
(see especially the introduction and ch. 2 of this book). She does not claim that all 
the laws of physics are false. Rather, she distinguishes “phenomenological laws” 
from “fundamental laws”, and expresses a generalised scepticism about only the 
latter. A phenomenological law is one that attempts to describe some particular 
experimental situation, and Cartwright thinks that many such laws are essentially 
accurate. Causal explanation is respectable precisely because it is the type of 
explanation involved in descriptively accurate phenomenological laws. To predict 
and explain the behaviour of some particular system requires that we understand 
the relevant causal powers of the entities involved in that system. 
 
Fundamental laws, in contrast, attempt to explain a wide variety of particular 
phenomenological laws. These, however, do not accurately describe all, or even 
most, actual states of affairs in their purported domains. They can, on the one 
hand, be interpreted as accurate descriptions of a very limited number of 
situations: experiments conducted under tightly controlled conditions, for instance. 
On the other hand, they can be interpreted as “ceteris paribus laws”. Ceteris 
paribus laws tell us “which factors are explanatorily relevant” (ibid., p. 48), but they 
do not deductively predict what will happen; they will always be subject to 
exceptions or competing explanatory factors. So, insofar as they are taken as 
literal descriptions of events, fundamental laws are false.  
 
Before addressing criticisms of Cartwright’s version of entity realism, I will examine 
how it has evolved into so-called “phenomenological realism” in the work of 
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Cartwright and her students. In her more recent work, Cartwright has focussed 
more on models than on laws. In particular, she has endorsed the thesis that 
models represent and explain physical systems independently of theory 
(Cartwright, 1999a; 1999b; see also Morrison, 1998; 1999). This “autonomy” thesis 
ultimately depends on a thesis about how models are constructed. The “received 
view” of the relationship between theory and model supposes that a model of a 
particular physical system is the deductive consequence of some theory. In fact, 
this is only true of “theoretical models”. “Phenomenological models”, in contrast, 
are “built upwards” by attempting to fit the phenomena directly (a very similar view, 
although in slightly different terms, is also advocated by Cartwright (1983, ch. 8). 
And, argue Cartwright and Morrison, phenomenological rather than theoretical 
models are typical of successful scientific practice (this distinction is obviously 
connected to that between phenomenological and theoretical laws sketched 
above). The primary example used by Cartwright and her co-workers to illustrate 
this claim is the empirically extremely successful London model of 
superconductivity (Cartwright et al., 1995; Suarez, 1999). Cartwright et al. argue 
that there was no theoretical rationale for this model in the theory of 
electromagnetism. Rather, the model was “built upwards” specifically to 
accommodate the observed phenomenon that superconducting materials rapidly 
expel any externally applied magnetic field as they undergo the transition to 
superconductivity. Fundamental laws are not idle in this process, but their role is to 
provide heuristics which “guide” the formation of the phenomenological model.   
 
Although Cartwright ( 2009) has discussed it favourably, the main explicit advocate 
of “phenomenological realism” is Shomar (1998; 2008; 2009). Phenomenological 
realism endorses an instrumentalist attitude for abstract theory but realism for 
phenomenological models. As expressed by Shomar, the major motivation for this 
bifurcated position is as follows: “[Phenomenological] models are closely related to 
the empirical findings. Therefore, it is more probable that what they say about 
nature is correct” (Shomar, 2009, p. 324). Notice that the emphasis here is subtly 
different than that of Cartwright’s approach in How the Laws of Physics Lie. In this 
earlier work, we are enjoined to be realists about entities and their causal powers, 
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whereas now we are enjoined to accept the truth of certain (albeit low-level) 
theoretical propositions. I take it, however, that the crucial issues for the realist are 
that in both presentations (i) we are enjoined to accept the existence of entities 
which figure in successful phenomenological laws, and to accept attributions of 
causal powers to these entities; and (ii) the justification offered for accepting these 
propositions is that they are the best explanation of the success of these 
phenomenological laws. For simplicity, therefore, I will elide differences between 
the earlier and later views and simply refer to “phenomenological realism” in what 
follows.  
 
This brings us to some criticisms of phenomenological realism. One thing I should 
make clear is that more ambitious forms of scientific realism are committed to at 
least phenomenological realism. Shomar is certainly correct in saying that 
phenomenological models are more directly related to empirical findings than 
abstract fundamental laws. As such, if any part of a scientific theory can be inferred 
to accurately represent the world by way of explanationist arguments like the NMA, 
then surely phenomenological models are first in line. The question, however, is 
whether we can justify being realists only in respect of phenomenological models. 
Recall that Cartwright and colleagues give three distinct arguments for the claim 
that phenomenological laws/models enjoy a qualitatively distinct epistemic status 
compared to abstract or fundamental laws. The first is that phenomenological laws 
in general provide causal explanations, and that causal explanations require the 
truth of the explanans in a way that theoretical explanations do not. The second 
argument is that, whereas phenomenological laws often accurately describe actual 
experimental states of affairs, fundamental laws are generally false if interpreted as 
literal descriptions of events. The third argument is that, whereas 
phenomenological laws are constructed in such a way that they describe 
phenomena directly, fundamental laws are used much more loosely and 
heuristically to construct phenomenological laws or models. I will address these 
arguments in turn, although there will be some overlap between the responses. 
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Lipton ( 2004, p. 199) addresses himself to the first, ‘transcendental’, argument for 
distinguishing causal and theoretical explanations. Lipton agrees that a putative 
causal explanation is no explanation at all if the entity it posits does not exist. 
“Explain” in this context is, to use Ryle’s (1949) term, a success or achievement 
verb. The proper use of such a verb requires not only that some action is 
performed, but that this action achieves a specified end. To take another example, 
we cannot say a person knows some proposition unless that proposition is in fact 
true, though they could still believe it if it were false. So if “explain” in the context of 
a theoretical explanation is a success verb, a putative theoretical explanation fails 
to explain if some or all of the propositions in the explanans are false. This, it 
should be noted, is hardly a novel claim on Lipton’s part. One of the adequacy 
conditions in the venerable deductive-nomological account of explanation is that 
“[t]he sentences constituting the explanans must be true” (Hempel & Oppenheim, 
1948), p. 137). This is not to say that “explain” has to be understood as a success 
verb; it can also reasonably be interpreted as not requiring any achievement at all, 
along the lines of “belief”. Indeed, this is exactly how the anti-realist understands 
the term, for both causal and theoretical explanations. The point is that consistency 
would seem to demand that we go either one way, into full-fledged realism, or the 
other, into anti-realism. In this light, Cartwright’s transcendental argument seems 
like a rather unsatisfactory attempt to draw a distinction by mere fiat. 
  
This reasoning would seem to pose a problem for Cartwright. If Lipton is correct, 
then a successful explanation requires that the explanans be true. But Cartwright’s 
second argument, that fundamental laws are generally false, would then seem to 
imply that there are no genuine explanations that appeal to fundamental laws. 
Cartwright pre-empts this problem by removing herself from the deductive-
nomological framework of explanation. It is only when they are read as “covering 
laws” which are intended to deductively entail the existence of various phenomena 
that fundamental laws are false. However, they do a perfectly adequate job in 
“specifying which factors are explanatorily relevant”. In The Dappled World, 
Cartwright (1999b) extends this approach and makes it more explicit by arguing 
that fundamental laws tell us about the causal powers or “capacities” of various 
151 
 
entities in the world. Notice, then, that Cartwright’s second and third arguments 
offer two sides of the same coin. The second argument tells us what fundamental 
laws cannot (or at least do not) do, namely deductively entail phenomenological 
laws. They are not, in other words, covering laws. The third argument tells us what 
they can do, namely tell us enough about causal powers to be helpful in 
constructing phenomenological laws.  
 
One objection to this picture of the role of fundamental or high-level laws is simply 
that it is not generally true. Fundamental laws may be related to phenomenological 
models in various ways. Indeed, we can picture a graduated spectrum, where high-
level theory proceeds from more to less directly involved in the success of 
phenomenological predictions. At one end of the spectrum, a theoretical model that 
is deductively derived from the fundamental law (subject to the addition of ‘natural’ 
boundary conditions, auxiliary assumptions, etc) has the correct form to serve as a 
phenomenological model. Empirical measurement is required only to fix the values 
of free parameters left open in the theoretical derivation. In the middle of the 
spectrum are the cases discussed by Cartwright et al. Here both the form of the 
model and the value of the parameters are derived from the phenomena. 
Fundamental laws merely provide some helpful heuristics that “guide” this process. 
At the far end of the spectrum, the phenomena are sufficiently simple in structure 
that an appropriate model can be read directly from them. High-level theory, if it is 
involved at all in this sort of case, may serve merely to provide a post hoc 
‘explanation’ of the observed regularity.  
 
Cartwright et al. are illicitly attempting to base a general view of essentialness on a 
specific class of cases, including the London model, which lies in the ‘middle’ of the 
spectrum described above. Their view therefore fails to capture cases where 
theoretical models are empirically successful. For instance, an empirically accurate 
model of the white spot experiment in Fresnel’s wave theory is obtainable as a 
theoretical model from the abstract wave equations and a statement of the 
boundary conditions. These same wave equations, moreover, can be used to 
derive predictive models for various other cases. While the wave equations do not 
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represent particular experimental circumstances, they nevertheless deductively 
entail these representations. This is not to argue that the interpretation of the 
superconductivity case offered by Cartwright et al. is incorrect, merely that a 
satisfactory account of essentialness must be able to capture (at least) both types 
of case. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that if, following the Cartwright of The Dappled World, we 
interpret high-level theoretical posits as telling us about causal powers, then some 
sort of realist commitment in respect of these causal powers is not necessarily 
unwarranted even for cases such as the London model. Indeed, such a realist 
commitment may be warranted by the sort of “inference to the most probable 
cause” advocated by Cartwright in How the Laws of Physics Lie. The difference is 
that, in the earlier book, this form of reasoning was implicitly directed only at 
particular instances of causal interaction – the successful manipulation of a track in 
a cloud chamber licences an inference to the existence of a particular particle 
which causes the track. Now, in contrast, the successful application of a particular 
theoretical posit in constructing phenomenological models may be supposed to 
licence an inference to the existence of a particular type of causal interaction 
implied by this posit. Note, however, that even if this type of inference is warranted, 
it does not give us reason to believe the truth of propositions, along traditional 
realist lines. It rather gives us reason to believe in the existence of certain causal 
powers ‘associated with’ these propositions. But that may still be enough for 
Cartwright’s more metaphysically ambitious opponents.  
 
5. Structural realism 
 
There have been many advocates of structuralism in philosophy of science and 
epistemology over the years. There was a distinct burst of activity in this area in the 
early twentieth century, driven by the then-recent advances in physics towards 
relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and in formal logic.  Advocates of 
structuralism in this period, although they did not always describe themselves in 
these terms, included working physicists such as Poincaré (1905/1952), Duhem 
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(1906/1954) and Eddington (1939), as well as philosophers such as (Cassirer, 
1910/1953), Schlick (1918/1974), Russell (1919; 1927/1992) and Carnap 
(1928/1967). Recent historically focussed articles by Gower (2000), French (2003) 
and Frigg and Votsis (2011) provide additional details about these authors. 
Maxwell (1970a, 1970b) has more recently advocated structural realism, focussing 
particularly on a development of Russell’s view.  
 
It is worth noting, however, that the motivation of many (though not all) of these 
early structuralists differs quite distinctly from that of modern structural realists 
following Worrall. These structuralists draw a Kantian distinction between the world 
of phenomena or percepts and the objective world of “things in themselves”. 
Russell, for instance, understands his task quite explicitly as one of inferring 
something about the structure of this noumenal or objective world from the 
observed structure of the phenomenal world, on the assumption that the latter is 
causally dependent on the former. As such, he starts from an initially sceptical 
empiricist position, and then attempts to develop a more metaphysically ambitious 
structural realism. For this reason, Psillos (2001) dubs this the “upward path” to 
structural realism. In contrast, Worrall’s structural realism, like other forms of partial 
realism, is motivated in the first instance by the intrinsically metaphysically 
expansionary no-miracles argument, and his position is only weakened in response 
to counterarguments like the pessimistic meta-induction. Psillos therefore dubs this 
the “downward path” to structural realism.     
  
Despite the illustrious history of the upwards path to structural realism, in this 
section I shall focus on the recent presentation of the downward path due to 
Worrall (1989a; 1994; 2007; Worrall & Zahar, 2001), as this approach is currently 
more influential. This is no doubt due partly to Worrall’s (1989a; 1989b) detailed 
examination of Fresnel’s wave theory of light as a case study for scientific realism. 
Although this example was discussed briefly as a problem case for scientific 
realism by, for instance Laudan (1981), Worrall’s presentation is more detailed and 
clearly brings out the philosophically relevant features. As such, it has become 
standard to use this case study as an illustrative example for any novel variant of 
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partial realism. For simplicity and for ease of comparison between the various 
accounts, I will therefore continue to use this case study as the primary case study 
in the remainder of this chapter. The broad outlines of this case are given in 
Chapter 2.3. Here, however, I will give a few more details in order to illustrate 
precisely why this episode presents a challenge for the realist, before introducing 
Worrall’s structural realism in the context of his own response to the challenge. 
 
On Worrall’s interpretation, Fresnel’s achievements were two-fold. Firstly, he 
produced a mathematically rigorous wave theory of light which yielded quantitative 
predictions for diffraction phenomena. Most spectacularly, it predicted hitherto-
unobserved diffraction effects, such as the appearance of a “white spot” at the 
centre of a shadow cast by a circular disc. Secondly, along with Arago, Fresnel 
suggested that light was specifically a transverse, as opposed to longitudinal, 
wave. This formulation accounts for the selective transmission of light through 
polarising materials. It also resulted in the derivation of the so-called Fresnel 
equations, which accurately predict the amount of light that will be refracted or 
reflected at the interface of two media.  
 
This episode presents a prima facie problem for the realist because the 
propagation of a wave appeared, to Fresnel and all other contemporary wave 
theorists, to require the existence of some medium which permeates space – the 
“luminiferous ether”. Positing the existence of this substance, however, turned out 
to be quite incorrect from the perspective of later science; in the mature formulation 
of Maxwell’s theory, light is the manifestation of a “freestanding” electromagnetic 
wave. The standard partial realist response to this case, as established by Worrall, 
is to attempt to demonstrate that the appeal to a mechanical ether was in fact 
inessential to the theory’s success, but that the abstract wave equations (which 
were largely preserved in later theories) were essential. However, the specific 
rationale for this manoeuvre differs between the variants of partial realism, as will 
become evident from the remainder of this chapter.  
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Firstly, however, let us examine Worrall’s own response, which he derives from his 
own reading of Poincaré: 
 
“Although Fresnel was quite wrong about what oscillates, he was, from this 
later point of view, right, not just about the optical phenomena, but right also 
that these phenomena depend on the oscillations of something or other at 
right angles to the light. Thus if we restrict ourselves to the level of 
mathematical equations ... there is in fact complete continuity between 
Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories.” (Worrall, 1989a, pp. 118-119) 
 
We should, in other words, not be realists about the intrinsic character of the 
entities postulated by theory, but rather about the form of the relations between 
these entities.  
 
There are two immediate objections to this view. The first, due to Psillos (1995; 
1999) argues that structural realism simply collapses into a more expansive 
(though still partial) scientific realism. Psillos begins by calling into question the 
distinction Worrall seeks to draw between formulating the equations describing the 
behaviour of an entity and coming to an understanding of what the entity is. This 
distinction is, for Psillos, completely obscure, and is possibly equivalent to the 
justifiably discarded distinction between “form” and “substance” found in medieval 
metaphysics. He argues, in opposition to any such view, that to give a structural 
description of an entity is just the same as giving more information about what the 
“nature” of that entity. For instance, he argues that “mass” in Newtonian physics is 
understood as just that entity which, among other things, obeys the second law of 
motion. Moreover, Psillos points out, it is not only equations which are preserved 
across theory change. In fact, in the transition from Fresnel’s theory to Maxwell’s, 
there is also continuity in various “theoretical principles” such as the conservation 
of energy and the finiteness of the velocity of light waves. So it is not clear what is 
special about mathematical equations. Surely, Psillos suggests, it makes more 
sense to argue simply that Fresnel was right about some theoretical posits, and 
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wrong about others, without committing in advance to these being mathematical 
equations or some other kind of posit.     
 
The second, related, objection is as follows. If mathematical equations are the only 
thing capable of expressing the structure of a theory, then we have no grounds for 
realism about theories without any significant mathematical content (Gower, 2000, 
p. 74; Newman, 2004, pp. 1377-1378). This seems difficult to square with the 
undeniable predictive successes of, for instance, theories in modern molecular 
biology.  
 
These two objections together cast significant doubt on Worrall’s attempt in his 
initial presentation of structural realism to cash out the notion of “structure” by 
reference to mathematical equations specifically. These problems are avoided, 
however, by more recent presentations of structural realism which cash out 
“structure” in terms of relations between entities more generally. This is a major 
conclusion of Newman’s (2004) paper, in which he goes on to endorse the 
“Ramsey-sentence realism” approach due to Cruse and Papineau (2002; Cruse, 
2005; Papineau, 2010). Newman was apparently unaware, however, that Worrall 
(2007; Worrall & Zahar, 2001) himself had, by this time, also explicitly endorsed a 
Ramsey-sentence approach. In any case, this is the formulation of structural 
realism that will be discussed for the remainder of this section. 
 
Ramsey (1931) gives the recipe for formulating the Ramsey-sentence of a theory. 
In very general terms, a scientific theory attributes certain properties to a collection 
of observable and unobservable (theoretical) entities, and asserts that certain 
relations hold between these entities. We can therefore express a given theory as: 
T(t1, t2, ... tn; o1, o2, ... om), where T is a complex predicate expressing all the first-
order properties and relations, the ti are theoretical terms, and the oi are 
observational terms. To avoid referring to named theoretical entities, we now 
substitute all the theoretical terms in this expression with variables, and quantify 
over the variables to form the Ramsey-sentence: ∃u1∃u2... ∃unT(u1, u2, ... un; o1, o2, 
... om). This sentence claims that there are certain unobservable entities which are 
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related to each other and to named observable phenomena in a particular way, but 
is not committed on exactly what these entities are.  
 
Notice two things about this formulation of structural realism. Firstly, it is in perfect 
agreement with Psillos’ view on the relationship between “structure” and “nature” – 
the nature of a theoretical entity is specified exactly by the role it plays in the 
theory! Secondly, it is committed to an extreme descriptive account of reference, 
and so stands in direct opposition to the causal accounts discussed in section 2 
above. This commitment is explicitly defended by (Worrall, 2007, pp. 148-149). He 
argues that attempting to apply a causal theory of reference requires the 
nonsensical presupposition that we can “stand outside” our theories and directly 
observe how they match up with the world. Structural realism, in contrast, takes the 
view that our knowledge of the world is necessarily mediated by theory, and thus 
by description.  
 
With the “structure” of a theory cashed out more rigorously in terms of set-theoretic 
relations, the notion of structural continuity between two theories can now be 
formalised along the same lines. In set theory, a structure S is defined as an object 
consisting of a set of entities X and a set of relations between those entities Q. We 
thus write S = {X, Q}. A structure S is isomorphic to another structure T = {Y, R} 
just in case there is a one-to-one function f that maps every entity in the set X to an 
entity in Y in such a way that, for any ordered tuple of entities in X, call it (x1, x2, ... 
xn), satisfying the relation Q, there is a corresponding ordered tuple in Y, (f(x1), 
f(x2), ... f(xn)), satisfying the relation R, and vice versa. For instance, the set of 
natural numbers is isomorphic to the set of even natural numbers because we can 
define a one-to-one mapping (e.g. f(x) = 2x) so that a given relation that holds in 
the former (e.g. the greater-than ordering) has a corresponding relation that holds 
in the latter (also the greater-than ordering). To be a structural realist, then, is to 
claim that there exists an isomorphism between the set-theoretic characterisation 
of a successful scientific theory and the mind-independent world, and consequently 
that any future successful theory in this particular empirical domain will also be 
isomorphic to this theory. 
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I shall now address two major objections to this view. The first is generally referred 
to as the “Newman objection”, since it originates in Newman’s criticism of Russell’s 
(Russell, 1992)/1927) Analysis of Matter. The argument has been revived more 
recently by Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) in response to Maxwell’s revival of 
Russell’s approach. The argument and the responses to it have been very ably 
summarised recently by Ainsworth (2009) and I largely follow his treatment here. At 
the heart of Newman’s paper is the claim that: 
 
“Any collection of things can be organised so as to have the structure W 
[where W is any chosen structure], provided there are the right number of 
them. Hence the doctrine that only structure is known involves the doctrine 
that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact 
of existence, except (‘theoretically’) the number of constituting objects.” 
(Newman, 1928, p. 144, emphasis in original).  
 
In other words, inferring that the world must belong to a particular isomorphism 
class doesn’t tell us very much, since on any set with enough objects in it, we can 
define a set of relations so that the resulting structure satisfies the isomorphism. 
 
Some care should be taken in how this result is interpreted. Recall that a Ramsey-
sentence makes assertions involving both theoretical and observable terms. If the 
Newman objection is well-taken, the assertions involving theoretical terms are 
satisfied provided there are at least as many entities in the world as there are 
distinct theoretical terms. So to accept a Ramsey-sentence is just to accept the 
claims of a theory about observables, plus an effectively trivial claim about the 
number of things there are in the world. Structural realism is therefore in fact 
equivalent to empiricist anti-realism, along the lines of van Fraassen’s constructive 
empiricism (see Ketland, 2004 for a more formal and detailed version of this 
argument).  
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Several responses have been offered to this argument, but I shall focus on those 
due to Worrall and Zahar (Worrall, 2007; Worrall & Zahar, 2001; Zahar, 2004). One 
response is that, even if assertions expressed purely in the theoretical vocabulary 
are rendered trivial, sentences in the observational vocabulary are nevertheless 
extremely expressive: 
 
“Many sentences expressed in purely observational vocabulary should 
count, in any one’s book, as theoretical: one often cited example is the claim 
that there are unobservables – that is, individuals possessing no observable 
property.” (Worrall, 2007, p. 152) 
 
This response, however, surely misses the point. The question is whether the 
structural realist is able to distinguish her position from that of the constructive 
empiricist. And the latter will, I think, agree that claims which are not verifiable by 
direct observation but which are expressed in observational vocabulary are proper 
objects of scientific belief.  
 
A more convincing response is as follows:  
 
“...if we follow Quine’s dictum that ‘to be is to be quantified over’ (or, better: 
‘to be asserted to be is to be quantified over in a sentence that you assert’) 
then the Ramsey sentence of some theory T (S1,... Sn, O1,... Or) clearly 
asserts that the ‘natural kinds’ S1, ..., Sn (the extensions of the theoretical 
predicates S1, ... Sn in the initial theory T) exist in reality just as realists 
want to say. It is just that – as always – we fool ourselves if we think that we 
have any independent grip on what the S1, ..., Sn are aside from whatever it 
is that satisfy the Ramsey sentence (assuming that the theory whose 
Ramsey sentence we are considering is true).” (ibid., p. 152) 
 
The Ramsey-sentence, then, asserts more than just that there are a certain 
number of entities exist in the world, and that there are certain regularities 
expressible in observational vocabulary. It asserts that certain entities exist, and 
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that they act to structure the phenomenal world in a certain way. This suggestion, 
as it stands, is rather rudimentary and should be developed in more detail. But it is 
nevertheless clear how this formulation at least potentially satisfies the demand for 
a prospective account of essentialness. To say that there exists an entity which is 
related to various observable phenomena, and other theoretical entities, in a 
particular way is to imply that any empirically successful future theory will posit an 
entity which satisfies the same relations.  
 
There is, however, a relatively decisive criticism of structural realism. This is 
suggested by Chakravartty: 
 
“... current theories do not retain all of the structures described by their 
predecessors. But then not all structures are causally connected in 
appropriate ways to our practices of detection.” (Chakravartty, 2004, p. 164) 
 
and Stanford: 
 
“Francis Galton's ancestral law of inheritance, for instance, was the central 
mathematical formalism and the most predictively successful aspect (see 
below) of his "stirp" theory of inheritance... By present lights, it would be 
extremely misleading, if not outright mistaken, to say that even the 
mathematical structure expressed by Galton's Ancestral Law is preserved in 
contemporary genetics.” (Stanford, 2003a, pp. 570-571) 
 
So, if we are concerned with which theoretical elements are essential to the 
predictive success of the theory and preserved in successor theories, even the 
narrow equation-focussed version of structural realism is too inclusive. And this 
problem becomes even worse when we adopt the even more inclusive Ramsey-
sentence criterion. 
 
Returning to the Fresnel example, notice that when we start cashing out structure 
in terms of relations between entities generally there is no difference in kind 
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between Fresnel’s equations and the posit of a luminiferous ether. All the 
theoretical entities are asserted to participate in relations, and some of these 
relations include observables. In particular, the existence of a luminiferous ether 
means that an observer will measure a different speed of light depending on which 
direction she is travelling relative to it (the “ether wind” effect). The posit of a 
luminiferous ether, in other words, gives rise to additional empirical consequences, 
and these also follow from the Ramsey-sentence of a theory that includes this 
posit.  
 
The reasoning of structural realists appears to have been as follows. First, it is 
asserted that the distinction between mathematical formalism and other types of 
theoretical posit is co-extensive with that that between essential and inessential 
posits. Secondly, the emphasis of structural realism is now shifted from 
mathematical equations to relations more generally, under the assumption that the 
same distinctions between essential and inessential would be preserved. This 
reasoning can be challenged in both stages. The initial assertion is challenged by 
Stanford’s example given above. And the assumption underpinning the second 
stage is undermined by various additional counterexamples. The point of all this is 
not to claim that the luminiferous ether should be counted as essential. Rather, it is 
to point out that the most interesting difference between Fresnel’s equations and 
the luminiferous ether is surely not the mere fact that one is expressed in equations 
and the other is not. What is interesting is that, while the empirical consequences 
which follow from Fresnel’s equations are amply borne out by experiment, the 
empirical consequences attributable to the luminiferous ether simply fail to emerge 
(as in the famous Michelson-Morley experiment; discussed by Swenson, 1972).  
 
So, the form of structural realism presented thus far attempts to pick out what is 
essential to a theory’s predictive successes by isolating those theoretical posits 
which assert some structural relation to hold between observables. But it is silent 
on the seemingly obvious point that we must also determine which relations are 
actually confirmed to hold by some empirical evidence. When stated so baldly this 
approach is obviously perverse, and it is doubtful that this is what Worrall et al. 
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actually intend. We surely need to know just which of the empirical consequences 
of the theory are the empirical successes before we can determine which parts of 
the theory are required to achieve them. I therefore turn to versions of partial 
realism which pay more attention to how particular theoretical posits are related to 
particular empirical consequences. 
 
6. Semi-realism 
 
Chakravartty (Chakravartty, 1998; 2003; 2004; 2007) has argued that entity realism 
and structural realism mutually imply one another and so are equivalent. He 
suggests the term “semi-realism” for the overall view. In this section, I will briefly 
examine Chakravartty’s argument that the two views in question are equivalent, 
and investigate whether his arguments are able to overcome the problems with 
these views outlined above.  
 
Chakravartty gives a version of the argument, seen in section 4 above, that we 
cannot sensibly talk about picking out certain entities without at least describing 
some of their properties. His reaction to this argument, which parallels Cartwright’s 
distinction between causal and theoretical explanation, is as follows: 
 
“We infer entity existence on the basis of perceptions ground upon certain 
causal regularities having to do with interactions between objects. Let us 
define detection properties as those upon which the causal regularities of 
our detections depend, or in virtue of which those regularities are 
manifested. Auxiliary properties, then, are those associated with the object 
under consideration, but not essential (in the sense that we do not appeal to 
them) in establishing existence claims... Theories enumerate both detection 
and auxiliary properties of entities, but only the former are tied to perceptual 
experience.” (Chakravartty, 1998, pp. 394-395, emphasis in original) 
 
To pick out the detection properties of some posited theoretical entity, we must ask 
which properties are required to be instantiated in order for the observed 
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phenomenal regularities to occur. Chakravartty, like many other partial realists, 
illustrates this reasoning by reference to Fresnel’s equations. He argues that these 
equations “... demand some kind of influence, propagated rectilinearly and 
resolvable into two components, oscillating at right angles to one another and to 
the direction of propagation. The property or properties of light in virtue of which 
such influences are realized are detection properties.” (ibid., p. 396) 
 
Chakravartty also anticipates Worrall’s point, made in section 5, that structural 
realism is, by Quinean ontological reasoning, committed to the truth of existential 
claims about certain unobservable entities. So far, then, semi-realism seems just 
equivalent to the structural realism – it is committed to the existence of certain 
unobservable entities which act to produce certain well-confirmed regularities in the 
observable world. Chakravartty points out, however, that insofar as structural 
realism is committed to the existence of unobservable entities, it entails a sort of 
entity realism. It is unclear whether it entails Hacking’s entity realism, since the 
latter is also committed to the causal theory of reference, and Worrall’s version of 
structural realism is explicitly committed to a descriptivist theory of reference. But 
let us suppose that we are in any case presently concerned with a more 
descriptivist version of entity realism, since we have in any case acknowledged the 
need for the attribution of at least some properties in order to characterise an 
entity. 
 
Perhaps it is not surprising that structural realism entails entity realism, since the 
former is in some sense a more ‘ambitious’ form of realism. A relation of entailment 
in the other direction, however, would seem to be more contentious. Chakravartty 
nevertheless argues as follows. Belief in entities under entity realism is 
underpinned by the postulation of certain relations (“detection properties”). 
Moreover, we would expect these relations still to be found in subsequent theories 
which attempt to describe the same entities. So, because entity realism is 
committed to the existence of certain relations which are preserved across theory 
change, it is committed to structural realism.  
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Chakravartty himself suggests the most obvious objection to this claim, and gives a 
response to it: 
 
 “It may be objection that surely not all structures have to with causal 
relations involving the detection properties of entities. Clearly we can 
imagine different kinds of structures, such as ones linking auxiliary 
properties. But for the advocate of [structural realism], such flights of fancy 
are not particularly helpful, for not just any structure will do. [Structural 
realism] requires stable structures – ones which are, in fact, likely to be 
preserved.” (Chakravartty, 1998, p. 400, emphasis in original) 
  
This clearly mirrors the complaint, in section 5 above, that the structural realist 
would seem to be committed to all kinds of ‘superfluous’ structure. However, 
whereas I argue that the structural realist requires some additional criterion by 
which to pick out only the ‘essential’ structure, Chakravartty appears to believe that 
the structural realist is already committed to the essentialness of “detection 
properties”. 
 
The major problem with Chakravartty’s proposed identification of structural realism 
with entity realism is that it appears to trade on an equivocation in the notion of a 
“detection property”. At least in the first instance, Chakravartty wishes to identify 
detection properties with the “low-level causal properties” of entities which Hacking 
argues we appeal to when we successfully manipulate these entities. Hacking 
does not, however, provide a detailed account of which of the theoretical posits in 
actual scientific theories are to be understood as describing these “low-level causal 
properties”. It is nevertheless reasonable to assume that the distinction between 
such low-level properties and more abstract theoretical properties maps onto 
Cartwright’s distinction between phenomenological and fundamental laws. But if 
detection properties are those that underlie descriptively accurate 
phenomenological laws, then the structural realist is a realist about more than just 
detection properties. Chakravartty’s use of the structural realist’s favourite 
illustrative example, namely Fresnel’s equations, is therefore puzzling. These 
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equations do not directly describe any actual observable state of affairs; they are in 
fact abstract rules which are used (often very successfully) to derive 
phenomenological models for particular cases. So “detection property” can be 
given either a limited or an expansive reading, but the distinction between low-level 
phenomenological laws and abstract theoretical posits cannot simply be elided. 
Chakravartty’s semi-realism, therefore, can be either a form of 
entity/phenomenological realism or a form of structural realism, but not both.  
 
7. Working posits 
 
Both the “working posits” idea due to Kitcher (1993) and the “divide et impera” 
strategy due to Psillos (1999) claim, in broad terms, that the essential posits of a 
successful theory are those that are involved in the actual derivations of successful 
predictions. I will outline each of these views in term, before examining some 
criticisms of the broad position.  
 
Kitcher (1993) presents the concept of “problem-solving schemata”. These are 
generic sentences, each of which expresses some regular pattern of reasoning 
found in a particular scientific theory. The primary ingredient of a schema is a 
sentence containing “dummy letters” at certain locations. The “filling instructions” of 
the schema tell us what sort of entities can be put in place of the dummies to 
create a potential explanation. Consider, for instance, the schematic sentence 
"Organisms homozygous for A develop P" found in classical genetics. The filling 
instructions say that the name of an allele should be put in place of A, whereas P 
should be replaced by the name of a phenotypic trait (ibid, p. 82). Kitcher views 
these schemata as the major workhorses of science, producing explanations and 
predictions for particular observed occurrences of phenomena.  
 
Using this concept, Kitcher goes on to state the working posits idea as follows: 
 
“Distinguish two kinds of posits introduced within scientific practice, working 
posits (the putative referents of terms that occur in problem-solving 
166 
 
schemata) and presuppositional posits (those entities that apparently have 
to exist if the instances of the schemata are to be true).... The moral of 
Laudan's story [in the 1981 paper] is not that theoretical positing in general 
is untrustworthy, but that presuppositional posits are suspect. The ether is a 
prime example of a presuppositional posit, rarely employed in explanation or 
prediction, never subjected to empirical measurement ..., yet seemingly 
required to exist if the claims about electromagnetic and light waves were to 
be true.” (ibid, p. 149) 
 
The essential elements of a theory, therefore, are none other than those actually 
found in problem-solving schemata12. Notice that Kitcher also uses the Fresnel 
case study, but gives a different rationale to Worrall for regarding the luminiferous 
ether as inessential.  
 
Before examining Psillos’ positive account, it is interesting to note that he sets the 
stage by attacking Kitcher’s account, and does so by anticipating Stanford’s 
complaint against retrospective variants of partial realism. Psillos focuses on a 
comment made by Kitcher: 
 
“But for Fresnel and many of those who followed him, the existence of such 
an ether was a presupposition of the successful schemata for treating 
interference, diffraction, and polarization, apparently forced upon wave 
theorists by their belief that any wave propagation requires a medium in 
which the wave propagates. All the successes of the schema can be 
preserved, even if the belief and the presupposition that it brings in its train 
are abandoned.” (Kitcher, 1993, p. 145) 
 
From this passage, Psillos interprets the major distinction between working and 
presuppositional posits to be that only the latter are “eliminable without derivational 
loss”. He then argues that “[T]his suggestion is retroactive and open to the charge 
                                            
12
 Though recall from the discussion in section 3 that Kitcher’s account also partly depends on a 
causal theory of reference. In this section, the focused is narrowed to the more “descriptive” part of 
Kitcher and Psillos’ accounts.  
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that it is ad hoc: the eliminable posits are those that get abandoned” (Psillos, 1999, 
p. 106). Incidentally, Psillos himself in certain passages can be read as offering 
either retrospective or prospective accounts. However, the fact that he criticises 
Kitcher on precisely the grounds that he interprets the latter as endorsing a 
retrospective account certainly suggests that he does not in fact endorse such an 
account himself. 
 
It is, however, also a mistake on Psillos’ part to read Kitcher as endorsing a 
retrospective account. Kitcher does indeed state that paradigmatic 
presuppositional posits, such as Fresnel’s ether, tend to be progressively 
eliminated in later rounds of theorising without any loss of empirical power. 
However, this is not the primary means by which he picks out inessential elements. 
Given the importance he attaches to explanatory schemata in earlier parts of this 
book, it is much more natural to interpret the definition of working and 
presuppositional posits in terms of these schemata as the primary one. 
Eliminability without derivational loss therefore emerges as a consequence of the 
posits in question being inessential; it is not definitive of inessentiality. In any case, 
as I argue in the following section, the criterion of eliminability without derivational 
loss is not necessarily applicable only with hindsight.  
 
His misinterpretation of Kitcher notwithstanding, Psillos articulates his divide et 
impera strategy as follows:  
 
“My claim is that it is precisely those theoretical constituents which scientists 
themselves believed to contribute to the successes of their theories (and 
hence to be supported by the evidence) that tend to get retained in theory 
change. Whereas, the constituents that do not ‘carry-over’ tend to be those 
that scientists themselves considered too speculative and unsupported to be 
taken seriously.” (Psillos, 1999, p. 107) 
 
So both Kitcher and Psillos claim that the essential elements of a theory are those 
actually used by scientists to derive results. Despite some remaining differences 
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between the two approaches, I will therefore address my remarks in the remainder 
of the section to this underlying idea.  
 
A major problem with this view is that it is still extremely unclear how we are to 
distinguish working and idle posits. In the remainder of this and the following 
section, I will offer several plausible interpretations of “working posit”, and 
ultimately argue that none is satisfactory, thus setting the stage for my own view in 
section 10. It is possible to start getting a sense of the difficulties of interpretation 
by way of a particularly illuminating exchange between Psillos and Chang, centred 
on the science of heat in the early nineteenth century. The dominant research 
programme at this time posited that heat was constituted by a material substance 
called “caloric”. This programme achieved several indisputably successful 
explanations and predictions of empirical phenomena, notably Laplace’s 
remarkably accurate derivation of the speed of sound in air. And yet we now 
believe that caloric does not exist, so this case represents an instance of the 
classic PMI-type challenge.  
 
Psillos (1999, ch. 5) attempts to show that the existence of caloric was not a 
working posit for Laplace by focusing on the details of his derivation. This begins 
by postulating that a region of air experiences isothermal compression when the 
pressure of the sound wave initially strikes it. This is followed immediately by 
adiabatic heating as the compression causes the temperature of this region to 
increase13. Psillos notes that this derivation does not explicitly appeal to any 
microphysical properties of the system, and indeed that the macrophysical 
“explanation of the propagation of sound in terms of an adiabatic process is 
essentially correct and has been retained in the subsequent theoretical accounts of 
heat” (ibid., p. 115). Hence positing the existence of a substance with the particular 
microphysical properties attributed to caloric is not essential to the explanation. 
 
                                            
13
 “Isothermal” denotes any process occurring at constant temperature. “Adiabatic” denotes a 
process that involves no transfer of heat between the system and its surroundings. In Laplace’s 
derivation, heating is assumed to be adiabatic because it is so rapid that there is no opportunity for 
heat to be transferred. 
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Chang (2003) responds by arguing that Laplace’s mechanistic reasoning about 
these macrophysical processes was crucially underpinned by “assumptions about 
the material nature of caloric”. Laplace thought of caloric as a “subtle fluid”, the 
particles of which are attracted to ordinary matter but experience mutual repulsion 
as a function of proximity. Temperature is a measure of the amount of “free” caloric 
in a region of space (i.e. not bound to ordinary matter). This accounts for the 
temperature increase during adiabatic compression of a gas, as the mutual 
repulsion between bound caloric particles forces them into the empty space 
surrounding the gas molecules.  
 
Chang implicitly understands “essential” elements as those that are causally 
essential for the derivation. Since he (quite plausibly) doubts that Laplace could 
have conceived of the necessary macroscopic processes had he not believed 
some story about the underlying microphysics, he therefore regards the 
microphysical posits as essential. Psillos differs from Chang’s causal interpretation 
in that he focuses on the theoretical posits that Laplace was sufficiently confident 
about that he was willing to explicitly invoke them when deriving his result. So, both 
authors appeal to some notion of “working posits” to determine which elements are 
essential for the derivation of an empirical result. Speaking very roughly, we can 
say that Psillos interprets this notion logically or even psychologically, whereas 
Chang interprets it causally. There are, in fact, several other possible 
interpretations of the working posits idea. I will address these, and critically assess 
their adequacy, in the following section.  
 
8. Differing interpretations of the working posits idea 
 
The two competing interpretations of the working posits idea due to Chang and 
Psillos do not remotely exhaust the space of possible interpretations14. In this and 
the following section, this space is explored in more detail. The first interpretation 
                                            
14
 A large part of the following list was filled in with the help of participants at the Physics and 
Philosophy of Kirchhoff’s Theory of Diffraction colloquium held at Durham University on the 29th of 
May 2012, particularly Peter Vickers and Juha Saatsi.  
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to consider is that attributed to Chang in the discussion above, namely that (i) a 
working posit is that which causally contributes to a successful derivation. The 
second interpretation is that attributed by Psillos to Kitcher, namely that (ii) a 
working posit is that which is not eliminable without derivational loss. The third 
interpretation has not been discussed in the literature, but was suggested by Pete 
Vickers in conversation. It states that (iii) the working posits in a derivation are 
those which cannot themselves be derived without appealing to more than one 
logically prior assumption, and any posits logically derivable from these. The fourth 
and fifth interpretations are both found in Psillos, and are closely related to each 
other. They are nevertheless worth distinguishing clearly. The fourth interpretation 
states that (iv) a working posit is that which the scientists performing a derivation 
believe to contribute to the success of this derivation. The fifth interpretation states 
that (v) a working posit is that which is explicitly invoked in the formal derivation of 
a successful result. The sixth interpretation (vi) is a hybrid of some of these other 
positions, and has recently advocated by Vickers (forthcoming). This sixth 
interpretation is addressed by itself in section 9.  
 
Before examining each of these interpretations it detail, it is worthwhile recalling 
the motivation behind this exercise. The interpretation that emerges from this 
discussion is supposed to pick out those posits of a theory which, if true, will 
explain the success of the theory or derivation in which they feature. Assuming the 
soundness of the NMA, belief in the truth of these posits would then be justified. 
So, because the following assessment of the various interpretations relies on the 
notion of explanation, it is worth making a few remarks about it before proceeding. 
The first point to be made is that there are at least two kinds of explanation. The 
explanandum of a causal explanation is an event, and the explanation attempts to 
outline some sequence of prior events that results, by physical processes, in the 
occurrence of the explanandum. A car accident might, for instance, be explained 
by noting, among other things, that the car was travelling fast and that its brakes 
were faulty. The explanandum of a logical explanation is the assertion of a 
proposition by some people, and the explanation attempts to trace some process 
of reasoning undertaken by these people of which the explanandum is the justified 
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conclusion. Jane’s belief that all ravens are black, for instance, is explained by her 
observation of several black ravens and her allegiance to the principle of induction.  
 
The second point to be made is that a successful explanation, either causal or 
logical, generally makes reference (often implicitly) to a “foil” or possible scenario in 
which the explanandum did not occur, or occurred in a different way (Lipton, 1990).  
For instance, one cannot simply explain why the leaves on the trees turn yellow in 
November; any sensible explanation proffered will actually explain, say, why they 
turn yellow in November rather than in January. Similarly, a satisfactory 
explanation of why Jane believes that all ravens are black will explain why she has 
this belief as opposed to the belief that they are all white, or to not having any 
belief on this question at all.  
 
The advantage of the causal interpretation (i) is that we generally have at least an 
intuitive grasp of causal explanation. So, if it is the case that certain theoretical 
posits are causally essential to the success of a derivation, it is relatively 
straightforward to explain how these posits are responsible for that success. The 
problem, from the realist perspective, is that this explanation need not appeal in 
any way to the truth of these posits. That they are part of the causal chain leading 
to the success is sufficient. Thus Fresnel’s belief in a luminiferous ether and 
Laplace’s belief in caloric are both counted as essential to the success of their 
respective theories. This, of course, is grist to the anti-realist’s mill.  
 
The causal interpretation, however, casts its net even more widely than this type of 
contentious metaphysical posit. For instance, since neither Fresnel nor Laplace 
could have theorised successfully without being able to breathe, a causal 
interpretation would also seem to count as essential the presence of oxygen in the 
atmosphere surrounding them while they were working. Of course, even the anti-
realist is primarily concerned with posits that have actual propositional content. But, 
even supposing the discussion is limited to theoretical beliefs, under the causal 
account: 
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“Credit will have to be attributed to all [causally] responsible constituents, 
including mere heuristics (such as mystical beliefs), weak analogies, 
mistaken calculations, logically invalid reasoning, etc.” (Lyons, 2006, p. 543) 
 
Indeed, it is very often the case that posits which scientists themselves quickly 
realise are mistaken nevertheless direct those scientists to fertile ground. The point 
is that, even before considering examples like Chang’s, no realist who has given 
the matter any thought would sign on to the causal account in the first place. 
Causal responsibility therefore cannot be the right way to interpret the notion of a 
“working posit”. An adequate interpretation of this notion must instead invoke some 
sort of logical explanation.  
 
The simplest purely logical interpretation (ii) states that essential elements are just 
those which cannot be is eliminated without derivational loss. As alluded to in the 
previous section, Psillos’ claim that this interpretation can only be applied 
retrospectively is unsound. Although certain logical relations will only become 
apparent with time, it is nevertheless possible at a purely logical level to identify 
which assumptions are required for a given derivation to proceed. To give an 
example, the proposition that light propagates in the form of a transverse wave 
follows logically from the assumption that an elastic solid luminiferous ether exists. 
It is nevertheless the case that the same results can be derived if the ether posit is 
eliminated and it is simply assumed that light propagates as a transverse wave. 
The ether posit is thus eliminable without derivational loss and so is not a working 
posit.  
 
The problems with this account become evident upon closer examination of the 
actual counterfactual scenario invoked when one is asked to judge that some posit 
is eliminable without derivational loss. Specifically, it seems that this scenario not 
only eliminates the posit in question but assumes at least one of its logical 
consequences. However, if it is legitimate to take an intermediate result as an 
assumption and regard as inessential the assumptions used to derive it, the 
inevitable consequence is that almost nothing is essential. This process of 
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elimination can be continued until we take the final result itself as an assumption 
and regard all other theoretical posits leading up to it as inessential. Everything 
except the most concrete statement of the phenomenon to be explained, in fact, 
can be eliminated without sacrificing the “derivation” of this statement. This is a 
reductio of this interpretation of the working posits approach, which must 
consequently be abandoned15.  
 
Since the third interpretation (iii) is relatively abstract and has not yet been 
proposed in the literature, a simple analogy will give some sense of what it 
requires. Imagine a theoretical derivation as a river of propositions, with the initial 
assumptions as tributaries. The initial assumptions ‘converge’ at ‘confluence points’ 
to yield intermediate results, and the entire system eventually converges at the 
‘main stem’, representing the final result. Under this interpretation, the essential 
posits of a derivation are those propositions on which several logically prior 
assumptions converge and the propositions which follow from these. Inessential 
posits, in contrast, are those which are derivable from a single logically prior 
assumption. Continuing with the river metaphor, the idea is that the logical 
branching structure of the derivation is essential, but the tributaries can be pared 
away until the outermost confluence points. 
 
Vickers proposed this interpretation as a way to avoid the catastrophic outcome of 
adopting the simple logical interpretation (ii). There is also at least some intuitive 
reason for regarding a posit that is a ‘confluence point’ as having greater 
explanatory weight than one which (in the context of the particular derivation) is 
merely a ‘tributary’. The intuition is that the real work of the derivation involves the 
combination of assumptions to give novel theoretical results. We can say of an 
assumption that is logically ‘upstream’ of a confluence point something to the effect 
that its ‘only function’ is to give rise to other assumptions which are actually used in 
the derivation.  
 
                                            
15
 Though notice that, depending on how the “final result” of the derivation is defined, this endpoint 
may in fact be very similar to phenomenological realism.   
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Although this interpretation is intuitively appealing, it is at least incomplete. It may 
certainly be true within the scope of a single derivation that a given posit can be 
eliminated without altering the branching structure of the main argument. A given 
theoretical posit may, however, be involved in several derivations. The caloric posit 
is, it seems, eliminable from Laplace’s derivation of the speed of sound along the 
lines suggested by this interpretation. But this posit was also involved in other 
derivations in the broader theory of heat. From the perspective of the single 
derivation, then, the posit is an isolated tributary, the truth of which explains very 
little. But from the perspective of the broader theory, its truth explains a great deal. 
This point is addressed in more detail in section 10, where a positive account of 
essentialness is proposed.     
 
The fourth interpretation (iv) involves a relatively straightforward appeal to the 
judgement of working scientists. However, it should be obvious immediately that 
there is a historiographical problem inherent in applying this interpretation. 
Scientists will not always publicly distinguish which elements of their theories they 
are more or less confident about. So frequently one will have to infer that a 
scientist is more confident about a given element from the fact that she uses it in 
derivations in a certain way. This is likely why Psillos frequently slips between the 
purely psychological interpretation (iv) that he offers initially and a more logical or 
historical interpretation (v) that depends on which posits scientists explicitly invoke.  
 
Putting such practical issues aside, it is still worth underlining that a purely 
psychological interpretation cannot be adequate for the realist. Firstly, there are 
simply too many obvious counterexamples. It is true that scientists will often hedge 
their commitments to more abstract theoretical posits, especially if there are other 
extant theories in competition with their preferred account. As Psillos himself points 
out, this was exactly the case with Laplace, who was aware of the “vibratory” 
theory of heat, even if he rejected it. There are also, however, cases where 
scientists very confidently endorsed abstract posits which turned out, from the 
perspective of later theories, to be false. Fresnel and other early nineteenth-
century physicists’ attitude towards the luminiferous ether is in fact one such case, 
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especially since at that time it was difficult even to conceive of the propagation of a 
wave without the presence of a mechanical medium (see the more detailed 
discussion of this case in Chapter 2.3 and section 5 of this chapter).  
 
A second, related, argument against the psychological interpretation is that it is, so 
to speak, intellectually incurious. Stating that scientists were committed to certain 
theoretical posits and that from these certain empirical results can be inferred 
does, indeed, explain the empirical success of the theory. But stated thusly, this is 
no different from the simple causal interpretation (i). The psychological 
interpretation draws its force from the notion that scientists have some genuine 
insight into what parts of their theories are “actually responsible” for these empirical 
successes. So, supposing this is true, a complete explanation of the empirical 
success of a theory should address the criteria scientists apply when they make 
such judgements, and demonstrate that these are appropriate criteria. The 
psychological interpretation must therefore be supplemented with some more 
substantial logical interpretation. 
 
The fifth interpretation (v) focuses on those posits which are explicitly invoked in 
the derivation of a result. This does make some prima facie sense. If we are 
concerned with explaining how the successful result was obtained, it seems 
sensible to focus on the actual reasoning of the scientists involved, independently 
of what other beliefs they may have had ‘in the background’. Notice, however, that 
if we include posits which are explicitly invoked at any stage in a scientist’s 
reasoning, then we are again stuck with the elasticity of the ether and so on. One 
way around this is to draw a distinction between reasoning in general and the 
derivation of a result, considered relatively narrowly16.  
 
But then this interpretation seems to be committed to the notion that scientific 
reasoning comes in two “modes”. Scientists start off doing some informal, intuitive 
reasoning to motivate assumptions, and this reasoning will often involve more 
abstract and/or metaphysical assumptions. Then they finish with the informal 
                                            
16
 This distinction occurred to me in the course of a conversation with Juha Saatsi, and I cannot 
recall to which of us the credit belongs.  
176 
 
reasoning, write down some assumptions and get going with a formal derivation. 
The contention that this distinction is explanatorily relevant is, however, highly 
problematic. The first problem is that the boundary between the two modes of 
reasoning is deeply contingent. A major factor determining when scientists will 
apply formal reasoning is the complexity of the problem in question. Problems that 
involve too many working parts to be stored in a human being’s working memory 
need to be simplified via the use of symbols, written down, and broken into 
collections of smaller problems that can be worked through piecemeal. But where 
informal reasoning stops and formal reasoning takes over is therefore contingent 
on the reasoning capacities of the person or people involved. Someone with a well-
developed ‘physical intuition’ will, in constructing a model for a particular 
circumstance, be able to write down fairly complex assumptions straightaway. In 
contrast, a lesser scientist may need to start with more basic assumptions and 
derive the more accomplished scientist’s initial assumptions as intermediate 
results. The exact point in a chain of scientific reasoning where the formal 
“derivation” begins is therefore too contingent on the particulars of the scientists 
involved to bear the explanatory weight that this interpretation would place on it.   
 
The second problem is that, even assuming that this distinction between modes of 
reasoning can be made, it is unclear why it is explanatorily relevant. If one is 
concerned with a logical explanation for some belief, it seems that one should be 
interested in how the believer reasoned, irrespective of whether this reasoning was 
formal or informal. As argued in Chapter 2.10, all else being equal, the truth of 
theoretical posit is certainly a better explanation of the success of an empirical 
prediction if there is a deductive relationship between the two. But this does not 
imply that, if the relationship is weaker than deductive entailment, the truth of the 
posit cannot explain the success of the theory sufficiently well that the explanation 
is an instance of the NMA.  
 
  
177 
 
9. Essentially contributing parts of derivation internal posits 
 
The sixth interpretation (vi) has recently been advanced by Vickers (Vickers, 
forthcoming), and represents the most sophisticated attempt yet to cash out the 
notion of a ‘working posit’. I will thus devote considerably more analytical attention 
to it than I have to the other interpretations outlined above. Vickers’ interpretation 
can be characterised as an attempt to identify a logically minimal set of posits that 
are actually involved in the derivation of a successful result, and as such 
represents a synthesis of interpretations (ii) and (v) given above. Vickers begins by 
attempting to distinguish more clearly between “derivation internal posits” (DIPs) 
and “derivation external posits” (DEPs). Unlike Psillos, he does not draw this 
distinction on the basis of which posits scientists invoke explicitly, but on the type 
of logical connection the respective posits have to the final result. For Vickers, the 
DIPs are those which (possibly together with other posits) eventually result in the 
final result via “truth-preserving inference”, whereas DEPs at best “influence” or 
“inspire” scientists to adopt other posits.  
 
His illustrates the distinction between DIPs and DEPs by discussing the 
construction of the first “achromatic lenses” for telescopes. A normal convex lens 
will differentially refract different wavelengths of incoming light and so produce 
“chromatic aberrations” in the resulting image. An achromatic lens is constructed 
by pairing a convex and a concave lens of different materials in such a way that the 
overall lens is still convex (and so focuses light), but does not differentially refract 
different wavelengths of light. Interestingly, this design was directly inspired by the 
structure of the human eye, in which light passes through several distinct materials 
(the lens and the humours) before being captured at the retina. However, as it 
turns out, and contrary to the belief of the scientists concerned, the human eye 
does not eliminate chromatic aberration. Instead, the brain simply compensates for 
this effect. Nevertheless, Vickers argues, although the assumption that the eye 
eliminates chromatic aberration turned out to be false, we should not in any case 
consider this a working posit in the derivation of the accurate empirical prediction. 
Insofar as this assumption contributes to this prediction, it is only by means of the 
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vague suggestion that a construction of the appropriate type is possible. It is thus a 
DEP. The detailed, truth-preserving calculations begin only with more specific 
assumptions about the refractive properties of the materials involved in the actual 
construction of the telescope lens. These assumptions are therefore the DIPs.  
 
Vicker’s further distinguishes the “essentially contributing parts” (ECPs) of the 
DIPs, which he identifies as the true working posits of the theory. To find the ECPs 
of a given DIP, we are enjoined to ask whether the derivation in which this posit is 
involved could have proceeded by assuming, instead of the actual posit used, 
some weaker posit which is a consequence of it. To illustrate this point, Vickers 
returns to a paper he co-authored with Saatsi concerning Kirchhoff’s diffraction 
formula (Saatsi & Vickers, 2010). This formula produces accurate predictions for 
the diffraction pattern of light which has passed through an aperture in an opaque 
screen. Saatsi and Vickers’ concern is that one of the crucial assumptions, a DIP in 
fact, in the derivation of the formula is that the intensity of the light in the aperture is 
as if there was no screen at all. This assumption is manifestly false from the 
perspective of modern optics. According to Vickers, however, we can identify an 
ECP of this DIP which is not compromised from our modern perspective. Drawing 
on work by Brooker (2008), he notes that, the intensity of light at the aperture 
under Kirchhoff’s assumption can be represented by a Fourier function with 
infinitely many terms. As it happens, many of these terms make only negligible 
contributions to the final predicted diffraction pattern. Taking only the non-negligible 
terms, it becomes apparent that they together give a picture of the behaviour of 
light at the aperture which is quantitatively nearly identical to that which is predicted 
by our modern theory of optics. So Kirchhoff’s assumption, although not a working 
posit itself, has as a consequence a weaker claim which is a working posit.   
 
As emphasised above, Vickers interpretation of the working posits idea is the most 
sophisticated yet to appear in the scientific realism literature, and is extremely 
appealing. Ultimately, however, it is not satisfactory. Consider first Vickers’ idea of 
identifying the working posits within DIPs by picking out the ECPs of these posits. 
An obvious objection to this is the same as that applied to interpretation (ii). If one 
179 
 
is simply allowed to take logical consequences of particular posits to be the ECPs 
of those posits, then what is to stop one from simply regarding all but the most low-
level empirical claims of a theory as “inessential”? The only apparent solution to 
this problem relies on the major difference between the present proposition and 
interpretation (ii), namely that in Vickers interpretation the DIPs are already 
specified. The challenge is only to pick out the logically minimal parts of a given set 
of posits, not of the overall derivation. But this response just leads to the question 
of which posits, exactly, are the DIPs, which is where the true difficulties with 
Vickers’ account lie.  
 
Vickers is more convincing than interpretation (v) in attempting to distinguish two 
distinct ‘modes’ of scientific reasoning. Nevertheless, the earlier objection – that 
the line where informal reasoning ends and formal reasoning begins is indistinct 
and contingent – still has bite. A well-trained scientist, for instance, might through 
intuition be able to skip various steps in a derivation that a lesser practitioner would 
have to go through explicitly and formally. It seems that Vickers is getting at a 
similar point when he remarks:  
 
“Suppose (as here) we are only considering deductive derivations. 
Nevertheless, we might want to label some posit internal on the grounds 
that there are implicit posits which logically connect it to the other 
derivation‐internal posits. In other words, what on the surface looks like 
mere influence can be turned into an inferential relationship if other ‘implicit’ 
posits are added.” (Vickers, forthcoming, emphasis in original) 
 
The distinction between DIPs and DEPs is, in other words, not as clear-cut as 
initially suggested.  
 
Although, Vickers largely puts this line of criticism to one side in the forthcoming 
paper, he has addressed it briefly elsewhere: 
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“My claim now, in light of these considerations, is simply this. So long as it is 
clear-cut that a given posit is ‘internal’, then the realist should consider 
making a commitment to ECPs etc. The line between internal and external 
may well be vague, and the realist can just (for now) stay silent about the 
vague area. The challenge I am taking up first and foremost is to try to 
express how the realist should commit in cases where posits in a derivation 
clearly are connected to the prediction in a deductive chain. We go 
upstream so far, and stay silent about a possible realist commitment to 
posits any further upstream than that.” (Vickers, 2012, personal 
communication) 
 
So, although the line between DIPs and DEPs is “vague”, there are nevertheless 
many cases where a given posit is clearly connected to an empirical result by a 
chain of deductive reasoning. So a realist commitment under his account is only 
justified in respect of “at least some posits in at least some cases” (ibid., his 
emphasis). This is highly reminiscent of van Fraassen’s argument in response to 
the criticism that “observable” is a vague term: 
 
“In Sextus Empiricus, we find the argument that incest is not immoral, for 
touching your mother's big toe with your little finger is not immoral, and all 
the rest differs only by degree. But predicates in natural language are 
almost all vague, and there is no problem in their use; only in formulating the 
logic that governs them. A vague predicate is usable provided it has clear 
cases and clear counter-cases.” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 16) 
 
It is, in other words, not an effective criticism of any philosophical position simply to 
note that it appeals to some vague terms.  
 
The issue, however, is not simply that which theoretical elements count as DIPs is 
vague, but that this is radically indeterminate. As Vickers himself (2011) has 
argued, it is seldom helpful to ask what theoretical posits comprise “the” theory. He 
makes a similar point when he remarks that: 
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“[S]ometimes it is entirely unclear—given the complexities of science and its 
history—how to identify the derivation of some predictive success, or even 
whether there is such a thing. Posits external to one reconstruction of a 
derivation might be internal to another reconstruction, such that there is no 
simple matter of distinguishing DIPs and DEPs.” (Vickers, forthcoming), 
emphasis in original) 
 
There is, of course, a core set of propositions that will be included in any 
formulation of “classical electrodynamics”, for instance. But, as stated by the 
Duhem-Quine thesis (Duhem, 1906/1954; Quine, 1961), it is very rare that any 
empirical results follow deductively from just these core propositions. Derivations of 
empirical results generally require the postulation of additional assumptions, 
boundary conditions, etc. By the same logic, even the derivation of lower-level 
theoretical posits from more abstract posits also generally requires additional 
assumptions. So whether a given posit is related by deductive entailment to any 
empirical results depends on what other assumptions are included.  
 
Since a DIP is defined as a posit that is connected to an important empirical result 
by truth-preserving (i.e. deductive) inference, a given posit only achieves the status 
of a DIP because of the role it plays in a larger collection of propositions. DEPs, 
moreover, may only fail to deductively entail the relevant empirical results because 
the requisite assumptions are not explicitly stated. Indeed, it is a basic theorem of 
propositional logic that a deductively valid argument can be constructed from a 
given premise in support of any conclusion, provided one is free to select additional 
further premises at will. So there is always some logically possible formulation of a 
theory under which any given posit counts as a DIP. Any definition of DIPs which 
appeals to ‘pure’ logical relationships is therefore decidedly unhelpful. 
 
This discussion has, however, drifted into a somewhat uncharitable reading of 
Vickers. Although his formal definition of a DIP makes relies heavily on the notion 
of deductive entailment, he also makes it clear that his intent is to pick out those 
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“posits which were actually used to derive the impressive result” (Vickers, 
forthcoming). The partial realist is attempting to explain how particular empirically 
significant results were actually derived. So she should not be concerned about 
assumptions that could conceivably be considered part of a given derivation, but 
those that actually historically were part of it. Vickers’ criteria for picking out the 
ECPs of the DIPs only comes into effect once this relatively small set of theoretical 
assumptions is already specified.  
 
One obvious difficulty with this proposal is that, as argued above, that there will 
generally be several plausible reconstructions of a given historical derivation. This, 
however, can be resolved relatively straightforwardly by stipulating that the 
reconstruction which appeals to the smallest set of assumptions should be 
regarded as the actual derivation. This is in line with Vickers’ approach of 
attempting to define a minimal core realist commitment; to “at least some posits in 
at least some cases”. Thus refined, Vickers’ position states that the essential 
elements of an empirically successful theory are the ECPs of the DIPs of the most 
minimal derivation which was actually used to obtain the empirical result in 
question. 
 
Vickers’ account is similar to interpretation (v) given in the previous section, in that 
it partly relies on a description of what posits were actually appealed to in a 
successful derivation. Moreover, given the contingency of scientific history, it can 
always be argued that Vickers’ account might have categorised as essential more 
posits than those it does actually so categorise. Unlike interpretation (v), however, 
his account is not undermined by this contingency, precisely because it adopts 
such a minimal conception of what elements are essential. Vickers’ strategy is 
simply concede that he has not given the means for identifying all the essential 
elements of a theory, while maintaining that adopting a realist attitude towards 
those he can identify is still a substantial commitment.  
 
Vickers seems to be arguing that it is better to pick out theoretical elements that 
one can be relatively sure are covered by the NMA than to provide a more 
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ambitious account which might fall short. Perhaps he is (quite understandably) 
worried that our reach will exceed our grasp. The problem is that, while the truth of 
the minimal set of posits picked out by Vickers’ criterion does explain the empirical 
success of the theory in which they are found, it will frequently not provide a full 
explanation. That it counts as an explanation at all is simply because an argument 
with true premises that has the explanandum as its conclusion is, in general, a kind 
of explanation. But, by the same principle, the existence of a single black raven is 
explained by the proposition that all ravens are black. Explanations of this sort are 
unsatisfactory precisely because the explanatory principles in operation can 
legitimately be applied with wider scope. Analogously, by failing to apply the NMA 
more broadly, Vickers’ approach, as it were, leaves money on the table. A better, in 
the sense of more complete, explanation of the empirical success of a theory will 
(where appropriate) appeal to the truth of theoretical posits which guided scientists 
in the right direction, albeit not with the force of a deductive argument.  
 
The strongest objection to Vickers’ interpretation follows on from the previous 
objection by pointing the way towards a more complete pattern of explanation. This 
objection is a variant of that raised against interpretation (iii) (the “convergence 
point” proposal) above. Suppose that a logical consequence of a posit is an ECP of 
that posit in respect of some particular derivation. But now suppose, as happens 
frequently in science, that this posit is involved in several derivations. Which of its 
consequences we ought to regard as “essentially contributing” may well differ from 
derivation to derivation. In this case, what is common to all the derivations will be 
broader than just the part that contributed essentially to the first derivation. Indeed, 
the common part may be nothing other than the entire posit. Another way of putting 
this is to recall that the propositions of a theory do not only converge, like the 
tributaries a river, but may also diverge to give rise to various empirical 
consequences (some of which will turn out to be correct). This information is 
readily available from the historical record and, more importantly, is explanatorily 
relevant. So Vickers’ account fails to provide complete explanations of the 
empirical success of scientific theories at least in part insofar as it fails to use this 
information. In fact, as will be argued in depth in the following section, the most 
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satisfactory account of essentialness depends crucial on identifying these logical 
‘divergence points’. 
 
10. The empirically successful sub-theory approach 
 
To introduce this section, let us summarise where things stand. Suppose that some 
theory of interest produces a statement that a phenomenon will occur. This 
phenomenological statement is entailed by some theoretical posit (together with 
boundary conditions, auxiliary assumptions, etc), which is in turn entailed by a 
‘higher-level’ posit, and so on. An empirical success occurs when the ‘low-level’ 
phenomenological claim matches up with what is actually observed. The challenge 
that faces the partial realist is how ‘far up’ the hierarchy a realist attitude is 
warranted in light of the successful prediction. The naive realist thinks the whole 
theory is confirmed. The phenomenological realist thinks that only the low-level 
phenomenological models are confirmed. Both the structural realist and the 
proponent of the working posits idea attempt to stake out a middle ground. For the 
reasons outlined thus far, none of these approaches is without serious defects. The 
positive account of essentialness offered in this section is an attempt to match the 
intuitive appeal of some of these other approaches, while staying clear of the 
obstacles that they have encountered.  
 
When in doubt, it is often helpful to start from first principles. The aim of this 
chapter is to determine which parts of theories should be counted as essential to 
their empirical success. This, surely, must depend at least partly on what is 
counted as empirically successful. As argued in Chapter 2, the most satisfactory 
account of empirical success is the “unification view” (UV). This view is 
summarised by the slogan that an empirically successful theory is one which gives 
rise to more verified empirical content than that required for its construction, and 
does not give rise to excessive falsified content. The intuitive appeal of this account 
stems from its compatibility with the NMA. We expect that theories which are 
constructed to fit particular data should account for those data. In contrast, when a 
theory generates many more empirical truths than are required to construct it, 
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some special explanation seems called for. And, under the NMA, an important part 
of that explanation is the (partial and/or approximate) truth of the theory.  
 
The positive account of essentialness defended here is called the empirically 
successful sub-theory account (ESSA). The crucial idea of the ESSA is that the UV 
of empirical success does not confirm entire theories, but rather provides a means 
for picking out the confirmed elements within theories. To see how this is supposed 
to work, assume that a scientific theory consists of a set of propositions and their 
deductive closure. Given this picture, it is always possible to designate a subset of 
the theory (or ‘sub-theory’). To pick out the essential elements of the theory, start 
with a sub-theory consisting of statements of its most basic confirmed empirical 
consequences. These, after all, are the parts of a theory that all parties (even 
constructive empiricists) agree we should be realists about. Further propositions 
are added to this sub-theory by a recursive procedure. Consider any theoretical 
posit not in the sub-theory. If it entails more propositions in the sub-theory than are 
required to construct it (and does not entail too many negations of these 
propositions), tag it as confirmed under the UV, and so add it to the sub-theory. 
Otherwise leave it out. When there are no more theoretical posits to consider in 
this way, the sub-theory contains the essential elements of the original theory.  
 
This procedure can be illustrated by Fresnel’s theory, a simplified version of which 
is depicted graphically in Figure 3. The initial sub-theory simply states all the 
particular observational consequences of the theory that happen to be confirmed. 
This corresponds to all the boxes on the lowest level of the diagram, minus 
predictions of the speed of light varying depending on the orientation of the 
measuring device (labelled “Speed of light”). Now consider the propositions, on the 
next level up, which express phenomenological laws or models of the type 
discussed by Cartwright et al.. Since “Polarisation” and the “Fresnel equations” 
both entail more confirmed empirical content than that required to construct them, 
these propositions are added to the sub-theory. In the next round, the proposition 
that light consists of “Transverse waves” is added, since this successfully unifies 
lower-level posits. As expected, however, the posit of a luminiferous ether is not 
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added. The only reason for introducing this posit is to account for the fact that light 
obeys wave equations. And this posit does not entail any additional verified content 
from the sub-theory.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A diagram showing some elements of Fresnel’s theory of light. Posits are 
represented by boxes, and deductive relations by arrows between them. 
 
How well the ESSA measures up against some of the desiderata for an account of 
essentialness articulated above, as well as its additional consequences and 
potential difficulties, is best explored by contrasting it with the alternative views 
discussed in this chapter. One major difference between the ESSA (and the 
working posits idea, incidentally), on the one hand, and entity/phenomenological 
realism and more restrictive versions of structural realism, on the other, is that the 
former does not make any general claims about which ‘level’ of a theory contains 
the essential elements. In some specific cases, the algorithm sketched out above 
will terminate with statements of phenomenological laws. The London model of 
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superconductivity may well be just such a case. In other cases, such as Fresnel’s 
theory, there is a stronger case for adopting a ‘realist attitude’ about ‘mid-level’ 
theoretical generalisations. And, in yet other cases, highly abstract ‘metaphysical’ 
claims may turn out to be essential under the ESSA. For instance, if, 
counterfactually, the ether wind had turned out to be a real phenomenon the ESSA 
would demand a realist attitude towards the luminiferous ether. 
 
There are also, however, crucial differences between the ESSA and the notion of 
working posits. Whereas neither attempts to make an a priori distinction between 
posits at different ‘levels’, the latter (especially in Vickers’ interpretation, but also in 
Psillos’) does distinguish between posits that are “internal” versus “external” to a 
derivation. Notice, moreover, that Vickers’ distinction between DIPs and DEPs 
mirrors Cartwright’s distinction between the role played by phenomenological laws 
and fundamental laws. Recall that, in Cartwright’s view, particular empirical models 
are not deductively derivable from fundamental laws, although their construction is 
“guided” by such laws. This is sufficiently similar to Vickers’ description of DEPs as 
posits that are not connected to empirical results by a truth-preserving derivation, 
but serve to “inspire” such a derivation, that the two arguments may be addressed 
together. 
 
Several arguments have already been offered to the effect that the distinction 
suggested by Cartwright and Vickers does not justify a differential ‘realist attitude’ 
towards the posits concerned. The first set of arguments was provided in section 9 
of this chapter, and aimed to demonstrate that the proposed distinction cannot bear 
the weight placed upon it. However, although no firm distinction between ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ posits is likely to be tenable, there is certainly, as argued in section 4 
of this chapter, some “spectrum” of cases. At one end of this spectrum lie cases 
where a theoretical posit, together with a few ‘natural’ assumptions and boundary 
conditions, entails the required empirical model. At the other end lie cases where 
the requisite auxiliary assumptions are far less ‘natural’ and, indeed, are likely only 
to be invoked so that high-level theory can be offered as a post hoc explanation of 
some successful empirical model. Cartwright, by focussing on cases where the 
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deductive link is more tenuous, gives the misleading impression that there are no 
cases where it is more straightforward. Presumably, Vickers would assent to this 
criticism.  
 
Nevertheless, it seems that Vickers would agree with Cartwright regarding cases in 
the ‘middle’ of the spectrum, where high-level theoretical posits can be said merely 
to “guide” the formation of a model. Cartwright is willing to infer that a particular 
entity exists if this is the best causal explanation of a given empirical regularity. As 
argued in section 4, however, this type of reasoning should apply equally well to 
types of causal interaction, and thus to posits of high-level theory which describe 
such interactions. Neither Vickers nor Cartwright adopt this position because both 
focus on individual derivations of empirical results or models. From such a 
perspective, the postulation of a causal interaction which is logically far-removed 
from the particular empirical result seems quite superfluous. However, when the 
focus turns to a collection of derivations, and it is apparent that the same abstract 
posit serves a common inferential role in all of them, the criterion of unifying power 
may quite justifiably lead one to regard this posit with a realist attitude.  
 
This is not, of course, to claim that any “unifying” hypothesis ought to be regarded 
as probably true by the NMA – the connection between hypothesis and the various 
empirical results may nevertheless be so tenuous and post hoc that the inference 
does not follow. As emphasised in Chapter 2.10, there are several factors which 
together comprise the unifying power of a particular theoretical posit. At stake in 
the present discussion are at least two of these factors, namely the ‘breadth’ of 
unity and the ‘strength’ of the logical connection between hypothesis and the 
empirical results. 
 Since both of these factors vary on a gradient, there will always be cases where it 
is unclear to what degree a realist attitude is warranted. Nevertheless, contra 
Cartwright and Vickers, there will also be cases where a realist attitude is 
warranted towards a hypothesis that merely “inspires” empirical results simply 
because it has this relationship to many and varied such results.  
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This discussion of unity raises another advantage that the ESSA has over the 
working posits idea. As was made apparent in the previous two sections, one of 
the major difficulties in interpreting the working posits idea is the tension between 
causal/historical and logical interpretations. Either demand, when expressed in its 
purest form, leads to disaster. Vickers has made an extremely impressive attempt 
at developing a stable compromise in response to these competing demands but, 
as argued in the previous section, this ultimately fails. The ESSA, unlike the 
working posits account, is able to offer a purely logical criterion of essentialness 
without catastrophe. This is because it focuses on a different logical relationship, 
namely unification as opposed to derivability. Or, applying the metaphor given in 
the previous section, the ESSA can be said to focus on divergence rather than 
convergence points in the ‘stream’ of logical derivation.  
 
I turn now to the question of whether the ESSA provides the means to explain why 
a given theory produces accurate empirical claims. In answering this question, it is 
worth being clear on exactly what is meant by “empirical success”. Considering a 
particular empirical success, i.e. one instance of an empirical prediction of the 
theory matching up with observation, it is not obvious that the ESSA is able to 
furnish a satisfactory explanation. The ESSA claims as essential those 
propositions of a theory which, by deductive or less strict forms of inference, unify 
verified lower-level propositions of the theory. But it is not at all clear that the 
occurrence of a particular empirical result is explained by the truth of proposition 
which unifies it with other empirical results. Indeed, since the proposition may 
count as unifying under the UV even if the relationship between it and all the 
empirical results it unifies falls well short of deductive entailment, the truth of this 
proposition does not explain this empirical success even by the logical derivability 
standard dismissed as inadequate above. The truth of a unifying hypothesis does 
not, in other words, explain each instance of successful empirical prediction 
individually. But it can explain the overall empirical success of a theory, i.e. its 
ability to correctly state the results of many and varied empirical observations. The 
counterfactual formulation makes the intuitive appeal of this statement more 
obvious: If the unifying hypothesis were not true, then we would not expect to see 
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such broad empirical success. So the truth of a unifying hypothesis does explain 
the broad empirical success of a theory in which it is found. 
 
This brings us to a final point. The ESSA is motivated by the unification view of 
empirical success and, as argued in Chapter 2.9, the extent to which a theory is 
unifying can only be determined when considered in light of the overall construction 
of a theory “from nothing”. By the same argument, then, the degree to which a 
particular theoretical posit unifies must also be understood within this larger 
context. Figure 4 is therefore a more complete (though not exhaustive) picture of 
Fresnel’s wave theory of light, using the additional details concerning the 
construction of this theory discussed in Chapter 2.9. Notice that all the information 
found in Figure 3 can be found embedded in this larger picture, although some 
details have been omitted for clarity.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Theories of light up to Fresnel. Logical relationships between posits are 
shown by arrows, with the proposition at the foot of an arrow entailing that at its 
head. Dashed boxes denote theoretical posits, and solid boxes represent 
descriptions of empirical phenomena. 
 
Every particular instance of a theory entails the more general version from which it 
is derived. So both the wave and particle theories of light, for instance, entail the 
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reception theory and all its associated consequences. Reading off the figure, it is 
apparent, for instance, that both wave and particle theories have the consequence 
that the speed of light is finite. When considering whether a given posit ought to be 
accepted under the unification criterion, one should therefore tally up all empirical 
consequences it gives rise to, and assess whether these are greater than what 
would be required to deduce this posit “from nothing”. Equivalently, but more 
practically, we can determine whether each step in the (actual or hypothetical) 
construction of the theory increases unifying power. For instance, the non-specific 
wave theory of light correctly predicts interference and diffraction phenomena, 
which is more additional confirmed empirical content than that required to derive it 
from the more general reception theory. 
 
There remain legitimate grounds for criticism of the ESSA, as it has been 
presented above. The most important criticisms emerge from the simplifications 
that have been introduced in order to give the neat ‘tree’ picture of scientific 
theories exemplified by Figures 3 and 4. The first of these simplifications is that, in 
characterising a theory as a set of propositions and entailment relations, a 
“syntactic” view of theories has been presupposed. This is opposed to a “semantic” 
view, which understands theories to be characterised by families of models. 
Although the semantic view is currently the prevailing fashion, I tend towards the 
view (following Worrall, 1984; and French, 2009) that these two views simply 
express different sides of the same coin. In brief, the argument for this view is that 
a given class of model can be characterised by the propositions that they satisfy, 
and vice versa. So, although the syntactic view is used here for clarity of 
exposition, it is plausible that the same basic arguments can be made, mutatis 
mutandis, in the semantic framework.  
 
The second major simplification is that the ‘tree’ picture also seems to imply that all 
the important intratheoretical relations are straightforwardly deductive. In light of 
the arguments provided in Chapter 2.10 and in this chapter against the view that 
deductive relations have a qualitatively different epistemic status, this is obviously 
not the case. The Fresnel theory, as an example, conforms to the deductive model 
192 
 
relatively well. But, in general, the simple tree picture must be made be 
complicated. Posits which merely “influence” or “guide” the proposal of empirical 
statements or lower-level theoretical posits should be included, with dotted arrows 
showing these ‘weaker’ logical relations. The essentialness of a hypothesis is thus 
understood as the product of at least two factors, namely the ‘breadth’ of the 
empirical results that follow from the hypothesis and the ‘strength’ of the logical 
connection between the hypothesis and these results. 
 
A picture of scientific theories that includes non-deductive relations immediately 
poses two problems, however. Firstly, since the unifying power of a posit is held to 
depend partly on the ‘strength’ of its logical connection to other posits, there must 
be some account of how this strength is to be determined. Secondly, because it is 
not at all clear how to decide whether a particular model conforms to a set of 
propositions that includes non-deductive relations, this picture seems incompatible 
with the semantic view of theories after all.  
 
The most promising solution to both problems is simply to ‘fill in’ the assumptions 
required to turn these weaker relations into deductive relations. This immediately 
resolves the issue of compatibility with the semantic view. And the strength of a 
given non-deductive relation can quite straightforwardly be determined on the 
assumption that it is inversely dependent both on the number of additional 
assumptions that must be invoked for it to be rendered deductively valid and how 
‘natural’ these are. Of course, very significant questions remain over how we are to 
categorise assumptions as more or less “natural”. These questions are, of course, 
an endless source of problems to philosophers of science, and they will not be 
tackled here. The intent of this admittedly rough discussion has been simply to give 
a sense of how the ESSA could be applied to the details of actual cases. A more 
concrete demonstration will come via the consideration of actual case studies in 
the following chapters. 
 
11.  Chapter summary 
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The goal for this chapter has been to give a satisfactory account of which elements 
of empirically successful theories we ought to be realists about, assuming the 
validity of the no-miracles argument. We have sought, in other words, to give a 
general story about which elements of theories we ought to regard as ‘essential’ to 
their success. To this end, I have examined five broad approaches to this question 
which are already present in the literature, namely: referential continuity 
approaches; entity or phenomenological realism; structural realism; semi-realism; 
and the working posits idea.  
 
Although several of the other accounts of essentialness draw upon the notion of 
referential continuity, in section 2 I considered a relatively ‘pure’ form of the notion, 
which regards any two theoretical terms as co-referring just in case they are both 
used when causally interacting with the same actual entity. However, since any two 
scientists who attempt to describe a given empirical phenomenon will undergo the 
same causal interactions, the demand for continuity between theories will be far 
too ‘easily’ satisfied. This is not to mention the fact that an account of essentialness 
constructed along these lines will be essentially backwards-looking and so 
relatively uninteresting. To give a non-trivial account of essentialness, therefore, 
requires that we designate some parts of the theory which attribute properties 
(including relational properties) to entities as being essential to the theory’s 
success. Once we have such an account in hand, we can make the post hoc 
judgement that the parts of the theory so designated refer. But this is a sort of 
metaphysical ‘optional extra’. 
 
In section 4, I discussed somewhat different forms of entity realism due to Hacking 
and Cartwright, as well as a development of Cartwright’s views which has been 
termed “phenomenological realism”. What all these views have in common is that 
they regard as essential just the most basic empirical laws or models of a theory. 
Equivalently, we can say that these accounts regard as essential the most basic 
properties by which we identify particular entities (the “detection properties” of 
these entities, to use Chakravartty’s term). My objections to this type of view were 
twofold. Firstly, I argued that there are many cases where the statement of low-
194 
 
level empirical laws or basic properties follows quite directly from higher-level 
theoretical posits. The phenomenological realist’s arguments for regarding these 
theoretical posits as inessential therefore fail in these cases. Secondly, even in 
cases where the connection between abstract posits and empirical laws is more 
tenuous, the truth of the abstract posit might nevertheless feature in the best 
explanation of the success of the empirical laws and so be worthy of a realist 
attitude. As I argued in section 8, this is especially the case where a high-level 
posit is involved in deriving several accurate empirical laws.  
 
In section 5, I considered structural realism, which regards as essential only the 
structure of a theory, i.e. the overall set of relations posited to exist between 
entities. The decisive argument against structural realism has been articulated by 
Chakravartty and Stanford. It notes simply that the notion of ‘structure’, defined as 
above, is overly inclusive and thus fails to exclude paradigm cases of ‘inessential’ 
theoretical posits such as the luminiferous ether. A structural description of a 
theory, although it may help to clarify the logical relationships between elements, 
therefore must be supplemented by some additional criterion of essentialness. And 
so it is clearly not an adequate account of essentialness in its own right.  
 
I have devoted a great deal of space – sections 7-9 – to a discussion of the 
working posits idea, since it is currently so influential in the literature. I have 
pointed out, however, that this basic idea is in fact open to several different 
interpretations. The primary tension animating the different interpretations is that 
between causal and logical accounts. A ‘pure’ causal account is narrowly focused 
on which theoretical beliefs were actually involved in bringing scientists to the 
explanatory or predictive feats that are our paradigms of scientific achievement. A 
‘pure’ logical account, in contrast, is concerned with which theoretical propositions 
are logically required to achieve these empirical successes. Either type of pure 
account results in unacceptable consequences. Vickers attempts to achieve a 
stable compromise between these two by arguing that the essential elements are 
the “essentially contributing parts” of “derivation-internal posits”. I have argued, 
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however, that has not succeeded resolving the underlying tension between causal 
and logical considerations.  
 
Finally, I offered my own the empirically successful sub-theory account. This 
suggests that the essential elements of a theory are just those which successfully 
account for more empirical phenomena (or lower-level theoretical posits) than that 
required to construct them. This has major advantages over all the other accounts 
outlined above. Both referential approaches and an inclusive version of structural 
realism are insufficiently selective, in their own ways, and thus trivial. The ESSA, in 
contrast, allows us to say prospectively which elements of a theory are or are not 
essential. Note, however, that the ESSA can very naturally be applied to a 
structural interpretation of a theory, thus giving an ‘essential structure’ account. 
The theoretical terms picked out by the ESSA, moreover, can be interpreted as 
‘referring’ or ‘representing reality’, although I do not wish here to be drawn into 
metaphysical debates regarding whether these interpretations are well-founded. 
Unlike phenomenological realism and certain interpretations of the working posits 
idea, the ESSA does not attempt to argue that only theoretical posits which 
deductively entail empirical results are ‘essentially involved’ in the derivation of 
these results. The most important reason for this is that the truth of a hypothesis 
which has some inferential, but not necessarily truth-preserving, link to a set of 
empirical claims can be a part of the best explanation of why these claims 
successfully describe the phenomena. So, because the ESSA connects neatly to 
the explanatory considerations which motivate scientific realism, and because its 
relevant competitors suffer from major weaknesses, the ESSA is the best account 
of which parts of scientific theories ought to be regarded as essential to their 
empirical successes.  
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Chapter 4. Rationality and theory choice 
 
1. Chapter overview 
 
The major aim of this chapter is to address the long-standing question concerning 
rationality in theory choice in light of the accounts of scientific realism developed 
above. The stage is set by Kuhn’s claims that any assessment of a “paradigm” is 
dependent on epistemic values that are themselves paradigm-dependent. This 
suggests that there are not any objective, rational standards for theory choice. 
 
Section 2 surveys four broad views on the role of objective standards in theory 
choice. The criterion of rationality under “Whig history” is acceptance of whichever 
theory is most similar to the current best theory. But this dependence on hindsight 
means that Whig history fails to offer normative criteria of judgement that might 
have been applied by actual historical scientists, who of course do not know what 
theories future scientists will accept. The “Strong Programme”, in contrast, states 
that theory choice is largely driven by non-rational factors, such as political 
sentiment. It is implausible, however, that rational factors (even paradigm-
dependent ones) play no role in theory choice. The two views that are considered 
more seriously in this chapter are “Kuhnian history” and “rationalism”. Kuhnian 
history states that there are objective criteria for theory choice, but that these do 
not fully determine what is rational in most cases. Non-rational factors therefore 
play some role. Rationalism, in contrast, states that it is possible in many or most 
cases to determine clearly which of the theories on offer it is rational to accept. 
 
A particular version of rationalism, named “partial rationalism”, is described in 
section 3. It states that, during episodes of theory change, scientists are rational to 
accept those parts of theories responsible for empirical successes (and have 
largely done so). This position follows relatively directly from partial realism, since 
to state that certain parts of a theory accurately represent the world is a fortiori to 
regard to them as rationally acceptable. It also follows from deflationary realism, 
since a belief in the general continuity of science generates a practical commitment 
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to preserving the essential elements of current theories. An interesting 
consequence of partial rationalism is that, in some cases, it demands (and 
predicts) the creation of a synthesis containing the essential parts of competing 
theories, rather than a choice between them. This is in direct opposition to the 
Kuhnian approach to theory choice. 
 
Sections 4-6 provide detailed case studies in support of the partial rationalist 
position. Section 4 focuses on the Copernican revolution. Following Worrall and 
contra Kuhn, it is argued that the Copernican model of the universe was indeed 
rationally superior to the competing Ptolemaic system, and this rational superiority 
explains its eventual dominance in the community. Sections 5 and 6 focus on 
cases of theoretical synthesis. Section 5 examines the “neo-Darwinian revolution”, 
in which the concept of natural selection from Darwinian theory was combined with 
Mendelian particulate genetics to yield a unified account of genetic change in 
biological populations. Section 6 examines the “prion revolution” in molecular 
biology. Prior to this, it had been argued that biological replication always involved 
the transfer of sequence information in the form of nucleic acids. The prion theory 
postulated another form of biological information, namely protein conformational 
information, which could also be replicated.  
 
2. Rationality and theory choice 
 
A useful starting point for any discussion of rationality in science is Kuhn’s 
(1962/1996) Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The central thesis of this book is 
that the scientific research taking place in any given discipline at any given time is 
framed and guided by a particular “constellation of group commitments”, which 
Kuhn refers to as a “paradigm”. There are several elements to a paradigm, 
including a set of shared examples of successful scientific practice upon which 
further scientific research is to be based. Crucially for the present discussion, a 
paradigm also includes shared “values” which govern what count as pressing 
scientific problems, and what count as solutions to these problems. Because 
different paradigms involve commitments to different epistemic values, disputes 
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between competing paradigms tend to involve circular arguments. The practice of 
a particular group of scientists cannot be assessed by reference to some external 
set of epistemic standards, since each group judges the value of scientific 
achievements precisely according to the values of the paradigm it accepts.  
 
A seemingly inevitable consequence of this picture is that episodes of theory-
change in the history of science cannot be considered “rational” by any objective 
standard. Kuhn makes this point quite clearly by arguing that these episodes are 
analogous to political revolutions. It is worth quoting the relevant passage at length:  
 
“At that point [in a political revolution] the society is divided into competing 
camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, 
the others seeking to institute some new one. And, once that polarization 
has occurred, political recourse fails. Because they differ about the 
institutional matrix within which political change is to be achieved and 
evaluated, because they acknowledge no supra-institutional framework for 
the adjudication of revolutionary difference, the parties to a revolutionary 
conflict must finally resort to the techniques of mass persuasion, often 
including force... The remainder of this essay aims to demonstrate that the 
historical study of paradigm change reveals very similar characteristics in 
the evolution of the sciences. Like the choice between competing political 
institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice 
between incompatible modes of community life. Because it has that 
character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the 
evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in 
part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue.” (ibid., pp. 
93-94) 
 
Since all rational standards for determining which of two scientific paradigms is 
superior are themselves paradigm-dependent, the choice between the two will 
inevitably depend partly on non-rational factors (though in the sciences, thankfully, 
the resort to force is less common than in the political realm). 
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These remarks are highly suggestive, but do not give a completely clear picture of 
whether, and to what extent, objective rational factors play a role in scientific 
reasoning. The remainder of this section is therefore a survey of four broad 
accounts of scientific rationality in the context of theory choice. These are: (i) Whig 
history; (ii) the Strong Programme; (iii) the (mature) Kuhnian view; and (iv) 
rationalism. I will argue that the first two approaches are untenable, leaving only 
the latter two as viable options. Following on from this, in section 3, one particular 
version of rationalism, namely partial rationalism, will be articulated. Partial 
rationalism and Kuhnian history will then be compared and assessed by reference 
to particular historical case studies.  
 
Butterfield’s (1931/1965)) aim in coining the term “Whig history”, in the context of 
political history, was to diagnose and criticise the pernicious tendency (as opposed 
to a consciously-endorsed position) among historians to project their own concerns 
and beliefs anachronistically onto actors in the past. The basic idea of Butterfield’s 
argument is simply that historical actors behaved as they did for reasons that may 
have differed markedly from our own. Their actions may, in the long run, have had 
the effect of bringing about consequences which we ourselves value. It is, 
however, very frequently just historically inaccurate to think of them as acting with 
the intention of producing these consequences or, if they did aim at these 
consequences, to think that they did so with the same motivations that we have in 
achieving them. What goes for descriptive accuracy also goes for normative 
evaluations – it is frequently a mistake to regard some actor as a hero (villain) 
because she acted in such a way as to bring about a goal we ourselves value 
(abhor).  
 
 In the history of science specifically (Jardine, 2003), “Whiggishness” results in the 
mistaken ascription of epistemic virtue to historical scientists who supported 
theories that are approximately correct from the perspective of our current theories. 
So, in instances of theory change, whichever scientists supported the theory 
closest to our own is automatically described as rational. And, since newly-
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proposed theories have typically been closer to ours than their pre-existing rivals, 
this usually amounts to a judgement in favour of the proponents of novel theories. 
Their opponents, in contrast, are usually viewed either as irrational – mistaken 
about some factual matter, or in the grip of some cognitive delusion – or acting 
from motives that are not (scientifically) rational, perhaps to preserve their positions 
of power and social influence. 
 
This asymmetric treatment of proponents versus opponents of novel scientific 
theories is extremely difficult to justify as an a priori attitude. While we are certainly 
entitled to judge that past actors were incorrect in their scientific judgements, it 
seems entirely unwarranted to judge that they were irrational simply on that basis. 
The task of any criterion of rationality is to warrant certain inferences against a 
background of beliefs and observations already accepted by the actor concerned. 
A Whiggish criterion of rationality fails in this task, as it takes as its starting point 
beliefs and observations available to the later historian, but not to the historical 
actor being judged. We may, of course, legitimately conclude that one or other 
party is less rational than another, but this can only be done after examination of 
the information available to each of them.  
 
Notice, incidentally, that this criticism of Whig history mirrors very closely the 
criticism found in Chapter 3.3 of retrospective accounts of essentialness. This 
similarity emerges because assessing whether some (part of a) theory is 
responsible for empirical success is logically related to assessing whether it is 
rational to accept this theory. The parallels between delimiting realist commitment 
and rational criteria for theory choice are drawn out in more detail in the following 
section of this chapter.  
 
The “asymmetry” of Whig history is tackled directly by the second approach to the 
history of science, namely the “Strong Programme”, most famously associated with 
Barnes and Bloor (1982; 1996; Bloor, 1976). The primary doctrine of the Strong 
Programme is the so-called “equivalence postulate” or “symmetry thesis” which 
states that: 
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“[A]ll beliefs are on par with another with respect to the causes of their 
credibility… This means that, regardless of whether the sociologist 
evaluates a belief as true or rational, or as false and irrational, he must 
search for the causes of its credibility.” (Barnes & Bloor, 1982, p. 23) 
 
While strongly worded, it seems that few could object to this statement, in light of 
the obvious flaws of Whig history.  
 
In fact, however, the Strong Programme is controversial because of the emphasis 
that its adherents have placed on non-rational factors in influencing the course of 
scientific history. For example, in one highly-regarded product of the movement, 
Shapin and Schaffer’s (1985) Leviathan and the Air Pump, the authors examine 
the struggle between the competing scientific approaches of Boyle and Hobbes in 
Restoration-era England. They argue that it was ultimately because the complex of 
ideas associated with Boyle was politically successful that his scientific ideas 
triumphed. This conclusion is stated explicitly in the closing chapter of the book:  
 
“We have attempted to show … that the contest among alternative forms of 
life and their characteristic forms of intellectual product depends upon the 
political success of the various candidates in insinuating themselves into the 
activities of other institutions and other interest groups. He who has the 
most, and the most powerful, allies wins.” (ibid, p. 342)  
 
So, whereas Whig history casts one side of a scientific dispute as rational, and its 
opponents as irrational or at least non-rational, the Strong Programme refuses to 
attribute rationality to either side. Political ideologies, personal interests and other 
‘sociological’ factors essentially decide the outcome of these disputes. Another way 
of putting this is that proponents of the Strong Programme interpret the analogy 
offered by Kuhn in the previous section very literally – there is no substantive 
difference in the type of discourse that occurs in political versus scientific 
revolutions.  
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The Strong Programme’s initial diagnosis of the error in Whig history is entirely 
correct. The truth of some scientific theory (from the perspective of a later theory) 
is, indeed, not by itself a sound explanation for the success of that theory at an 
earlier point in history17. But this only excludes one possible account of rationality. 
By weighing in against rationalist accounts of science in general, the proponent of 
the Strong Programme is therefore tacitly endorsing the same mistaken account of 
rationality as the Whig! In general, an explanation by reference to truth is not the 
same as an explanation by reference to rationality. To say that the proponents of 
some theory were “rational” is simply to say that they had good arguments in their 
favour. And a theory having good arguments in its favour is a perfectly acceptable 
explanation for its success. It is surely uncontroversial to state that human beings 
do, at least some of the time, behave in certain ways because they were convinced 
by argument to behave in those ways. Moreover, given the large amount of time 
that scientists spend presenting arguments for and against theories, it is 
implausible to claim that all this activity is merely a sideshow to the political 
manoeuvres which actually decide the issues. So considerations of rationality must 
play some role in episodes of theory change. The two remaining views considered 
in this section differ over exactly what this role is.  
 
The third approach to the history of science emerges from the later work of 
Thomas Kuhn (1962/1996, see especially the 1969 postscript; 1977). Here, Kuhn 
appears to retreat somewhat from his apparent wholesale dismissal of objective 
values in the first edition of Structure. Instead, he articulates a view about the 
rationality of scientific revolutions that is a hybrid of rationalist and anti-rationalist 
accounts. He argues that scientists apply “values” or “objective factors” in choosing 
between scientific theories. These include the accuracy with which the theory 
matches phenomena; the theory’s consistency, both internal and with reference to 
other theories; its scope; its simplicity; and how fruitful it is in generating further 
research.  
 
                                            
17
 This, of course, is virtually the same argument made by Stanford et al. against retrospective 
versions of partial realism (see Chapter 3.3). 
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These criteria, however, may conflict in particular cases, and even the application 
of a single criterion can lead to conflicting judgements. One theory may, for 
instance, be highly accurate in accounting for a given class of phenomena, but less 
accurate than its rival in another domain. Providing a fully objective and 
deterministic “algorithm” for theory choice would require some additional standards 
for applying these virtues, and for weighing the relative importance of virtues when 
they conflict. But, argues Kuhn, there are no such objective higher-order standards. 
The demands of rationality are therefore indeterminate. Kuhn believes that it is 
non-rational factors which ultimately ‘close the gap’ between rationality and theory 
choice. Scientists are to some irreducible degree guided by aesthetic or otherwise 
idiosyncratic personal preferences, social and political pressures, etc. when 
deciding the extent to which a given theory satisfies the theoretical virtues. And all 
of this counts as rational for Kuhn, so long as these other factors do no more than 
narrow down the range of possible answers that are compatible with the basic 
values of rationality.  
 
The fourth and final approach to the history of science is what might be called 
“rationalist”. This view is somewhat aligned with Kuhn’s account, in that it suggests 
that there are scientific values or “virtues” which theories might fulfil and that 
fulfilment of these virtues makes it rational to choose them over their competitors. 
However, where Kuhn argues forcefully against the notion of an “algorithm” that will 
uniquely choose the best theory amongst several contenders, rationalism claims 
that there is a hierarchy among the virtues, or some other general principle that will 
at least sometimes render accepting one theory, on balance, more rational than 
accepting its competitor.  
 
It should be emphasised that rationalism involves two distinct commitments, one 
normative and one descriptive. Normatively, it claims that there is some objective 
rational standard or algorithm for deciding between scientific theories. The 
descriptive claim is that, in most or all actual instances of theory change in the 
history of science, the theory that eventually became dominant did so because it 
was superior by these standards. There are different forms of rationalism 
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corresponding to different views on which set of epistemic standards is to be 
normatively endorsed. In the following section, one particularly promising 
formulation will be articulated and defended.  
 
3. Partial rationalism 
 
Partial rationalism ultimately originates from a criticism of Kuhn’s view given by 
Worrall: 
 
“[Kuhn’s] argument against the objectivist nonetheless goes through only if 
we accept the initial assumption that the objectivist can do no better than 
supply a “laundry list” of objective factors, and is therefore left entirely 
without recourse when two factors from the list pull in opposite directions. 
But I know of no objectivist [i.e. rationalist] who would accept Kuhn’s list as it 
stands and none who would be happy to leave any such list unstructured. 
For example, for Duhem, Poincaré, Lakatos, and many others, there is a 
basic criterion: that of predictive empirical success. When this criterion is 
properly understood, it informs most of those on Kuhn’s list.” (Worrall, 1990, 
pp. 333-4) 
 
In the remainder of this section, this quotation will be interpreted in a way which 
may well, but does not necessarily, accurately represent what Worrall himself was 
attempting to convey. Firstly, “predictive empirical success”, instead of being 
understood by reference to the UN account, will be read as “success under the UV” 
(as discussed in Chapter 2). Secondly, the notion of “theory confirmation” in the 
quotation above will be interpreted in the light of scientific realism. That is, it will be 
assumed that theories which enjoy predictive empirical success should be 
understood as true (albeit only approximately, at the structural level, etc.). Given 
this commitment, it is not at all surprising that empirical success should be the 
basic theoretical virtue in cases of theory choice. Empirical success (of the 
appropriate sort) is, by hypothesis, sufficient to underwrite the belief that a theory is 
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(partly and/or approximately) true, and the standard for believing that a theory is 
true is surely stronger than that for merely preferring it over rival theories! 
 
It is worth giving a general idea of how Worrall’s claim that the criterion of UN 
predictive success “informs most of those on Kuhn’s list” ought to be interpreted. 
Recall that the UV states that a theory (or theoretical posit) is confirmed just in 
case it gives rise to more accurate statements about empirical phenomena than 
that required to construct it (and does not give rise to too many inaccurate 
empirical statements). From this definition, it is immediately apparent that the virtue 
of (i) accuracy is easily incorporated. Similarly, a unifying posit must have relatively 
broad (ii) scope. This is clearer when stated negatively – a hypothesis which 
entails only a single set of empirical phenomena by definition fails to unify 
phenomena. As argued in detail in Chapter 2, the criterion of unifying power is also 
intimately related to the virtue of (iii) simplicity. Briefly, the more simple a theory is, 
the fewer assumptions or free parameters it contains, and thus the fewer verified 
empirical results are required to construct it.  
 
The virtue of fruitfulness does not fit quite so neatly, and so warrants somewhat 
more extensive discussion. Worrall expresses his view on the topic as follows: 
 
““Fruitfulness” too is intimately connected to predictive success. A general 
theoretical approach... shows its fruitfulness by supplying ideas for 
developing specific theories independently of empirical results. Such an 
approach will be judged barren... only when all these ideas have been tried 
without predictive success; and hence the approach has been reduced to 
tagging along behind the empirical data, always accommodating it post hoc 
rather than predicting it in advance.” (Worrall, 1990, pp. 334, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Notice, firstly, that the conclusion of Worrall’s argument, as it stands, states merely 
that fruitfulness and empirical success are regularly associated, not that the former 
is partly constitutive of the latter. This is perhaps not surprising since, from the 
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realist perspective, fruitfulness has at best a very weak claim to being an intrinsic 
theoretical virtue. The hypothetical ‘final theory of everything’ (or even of some 
particular empirical domain) cannot be improved upon, and so poses no further 
research questions.  
 
A second thing to notice is that Worrall appeals to a novel prediction account of 
empirical success, not the UV. Nevertheless, there is at least one argument for 
thinking that fruitfulness is associated with empirical success under the UV. This 
argument links fruitfulness strongly to the idea of scope which, as pointed out 
above, is partly constitutive of unifying power. The argument starts from the 
(uncontroversial) claim that we are nowhere close to a ‘final theory’ in any given 
scientific domain (if this is even a possibility). In this context, a fruitful theory is one 
which poses many interesting research problems, i.e. which makes many specific, 
but as-yet unverified, empirical claims. But a theory with wide scope, i.e. which 
gives rise to a wide variety of verified empirical results, is very likely also a theory 
which gives rise to as-yet unverified empirical results. So a unifying theory is 
therefore likely to be fruitful.  
 
Finally, Worrall claims that one item on Kuhn’s list is not in fact a virtue at all, 
namely consistency with existing theories: 
 
“It is surely a virtue in a theory, rather than a vice, if it clashes with some 
well-entrenched claim – provided that there is strong evidence for the theory 
in the form of predictive empirical success... Scientists will, no doubt 
correctly, downgrade... new theories that clash with well-established ones – 
but only when there is no independent evidence for the new theory.” 
(Worrall, 1990, p. 335, emphasis in original) 
 
So, just as one might expect from Worrall’s realist motivations, empirical success 
(understood, on the present reading, under the UV account) is regarded as the 
sole genuine theoretical virtue. Other putative virtues are valuable only insofar as 
they represent aspects of, or are reducible to, unification.  
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The advantage, from the rationalist perspective, of having a single basic theoretical 
virtue is that Kuhn’s arguments for indeterminacy are rendered inapplicable. All 
theories are, as it were, measured on the same scale. Moreover, although some 
might dispute the particular account of empirical success favoured in this thesis, 
each of the candidates discussed in Chapter 2 is at least relatively clearly defined. 
There is thus far less scope for the situation where each of several competing 
theories is superior on differing interpretations of a single theoretical virtue.  
 
However, while this form of rationalism avoids certain types of indeterminacy, it 
threatens to create others. Consider, for instance, the scenario where two or more 
mutually exclusive theories are both empirically successful to some degree. To 
choose one of these theories is to discard the other. But, by hypothesis, the fact 
that each is empirically successful implies that it is at least partially and/or 
approximately true. So to discard one of these theories would seem to require 
rejecting some true statements.  
 
The dilemma created by this situation strongly mirrors that highlighted by the 
pessimistic meta-induction, as discussed in Chapter 1. And, similarly, this dilemma 
is resolved by conceding that the no-miracles argument for realism, at best, 
supports only partial realism. So, to the extent that realism entails a commitment to 
rationalism, the form of rationalism it entails what might be called “partial 
rationalism”. Partial rationalism states that, during episodes of theory change, 
scientists are rational to accept those parts of theories responsible for empirical 
successes (and have largely done so). And, while theories taken as a whole may 
be mutually incompatible, it is much less likely that the ‘essential’ parts of each of 
the theories concerned will form an inconsistent set. 
 
There are at least two types of case of prima facie theoretical incompatibility which 
the partial rationalist must address. The first is that in which the older of two 
competing theories, although strictly incompatible with the newer theory, is 
nevertheless approximately true by lights of the latter. For instance, although it has 
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been superseded by relativity, Newton’s theory of motion gives quantitatively 
accurate predictions in cases where all the objects concerned have low speeds 
relative to that of light. Although the new theory is more empirically successful than 
the older, and so is chosen over it, the empirically successful parts of the older 
theory are nevertheless retained. Therefore no true statements are rejected. One 
example of this sort of case is illustrated in section 4 of this chapter.  
 
This first type of case is the usual subject of case studies by partial realists. There 
is also, however, another type of case, where no such relation of approximate 
preservation exists between the competing theories. Here no choice between 
theories is possible without outright rejection of some essentially contributing parts 
of one or other theory. The partial rationalist does have another point to make, 
however, namely that in these sorts of cases the Kuhnian emphasis on a choice 
between theories is in fact extremely misguided. In these cases, partial rationalism 
demands instead that we accept all the parts of the competing theories which are 
essential to their respective empirical successes. It demands, in other words, 
synthesis rather than a choice. This somewhat abstract point will be illustrated with 
examples, in sections 5 and 6 of this chapter.  
 
Before moving on to illustrative case studies, it is worth briefly outlining how the 
remarks made in this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis amount to arguments for 
partial rationalism. The first argument is a priori. It begins with the arguments for 
partial realism, including the version of the no-miracles argument which regards 
unifying power as a marker of truth. If it is accepted that partial realism is well-
founded, partial rationalism then follows readily as a consequence, as 
demonstrated above. The second argument is premised instead on the truth of 
deflationary realism. The descriptive claim of partial rationalism follows 
straightforwardly from DR. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 1.8, a belief in the 
actual continuity of science generates, by pragmatic reasoning, a normative 
commitment to preserving the essential elements of currently successful theories in 
proposed successor theories.  
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The third argument is suggested by Worrall in the quote above, where he states 
that: “When this criterion [of predictive empirical success] is properly understood, it 
informs most of those on Kuhn’s list.” This can be interpreted as an argument for 
partial rationalism, as follows. Suppose it is accepted that each of Kuhn’s 
theoretical virtues has at least some intuitive appeal. Now suppose that each of 
these virtues is quite naturally interpreted as a component or aspect of one basic 
virtue. This basic virtue is also intuitively appealing in its own right. By parsimony, it 
is then reasonable to conclude that these other virtues are not normatively 
desirable in their own right, but that their intuitive appeal can be attributed solely to 
their relationship to the basic virtue. Thus, if the arguments which purport to 
demonstrate that Kuhn’s theoretical virtues (with the exception of consistency) are 
reducible to the criterion of empirical success are well-taken, partial rationalism is 
supported.  
 
 The fourth argument for partial rationalism replicates a pattern of argument found 
frequently in philosophy of science. This pattern of argument begins from the 
premise (i) that scientists’ actual reasoning at least closely approximates what is 
normatively desirable. It then states (ii) that scientists actually do reason as we 
would expect if they endorsed the methodological norm that is being defended. 
Finally, it concludes (iii) that application of this norm is, in fact, normatively 
desirable. Issue may be taken with this type of argument, especially with premise 
(i). Nevertheless, if it is in general sound, an argument for partial rationalism can be 
constructed on the basis of historical examples which demonstrate that scientists 
do at least some of the time reason as if they accepted partial rationalism. The 
case studies which follow in this chapter can therefore be read as underpinning 
such an argument.  
 
The fifth argument for partial rationalism also relies upon the case studies cited by 
the third argument, but has the logical form of a disjunctive syllogism. Grant the 
premise that rationalism and the Kuhnian view (broadly understood) are the only 
viable candidates for an account of theory choice. If some of the case studies are 
incompatible with the Kuhnian view, then it must (tentatively!) be regarded as 
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refuted, implying that the rationalist view is correct. The particular target here is 
Kuhn’s (1962/1996) holist view on scientific theories or paradigms. This view is in 
evidence, for instance, when he compares a scientist’s changing of allegiance 
between paradigms to the “gestalt switches” that occurs when one looks at a duck-
rabbit picture. One can ‘see’ either the duck or the rabbit, but not both 
simultaneously. In the same vein, he describes competing paradigms as 
“incommensurable” and states that proponents of different paradigms “live in 
different worlds”. Since holism implies that one cannot simply accept the most 
important posits of a theory in isolation from the rest of the theoretical structure, 
this view would therefore appear to be refuted by cases of theoretical synthesis, 
two of which are discussed in sections 5 and 6. 
 
4. The Copernican revolution 
 
Worrall’s (1990) claims the Copernican revolution as an important positive instance 
for his own rationalist account. He argues that Copernicus’ model of the solar 
system was both superior to the competing Ptolemaic model by the standard of 
novel predictive success and eventually victorious because of this superiority. This 
is in direct opposition to Kuhn, who interprets this case study as a positive example 
for his own account. The historical and technical details of this section are very 
largely drawn from Kuhn’s (1957) own detailed study of this episode. 
 
Ptolemy’s Almagest, produced around 150 AD in Hellenistic Egypt, proposed a 
detailed geocentric or geostatic model of the universe. Despite some innovations 
accumulated during the Middle Ages, this was substantially the system to which 
Copernicus was introduced in the late 15th century. It envisages a universe 
contained between two concentric spheres. The surface of the earth is the inner 
sphere, and the much larger outer sphere holds “fixed stars”. The outer sphere 
rotates around the inner, with the period of rotation defining a day. In between 
these two spheres move the planets, a term which applies to the sun, moon, 
Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. The sun and moon appear as discs, 
whereas the other planets, like the fixed stars, appear as mere points of light. All 
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the planets move with the outer sphere, but also move slowly across the sphere 
along a path called the ecliptic. The period of the sun’s path once through the 
ecliptic defines a year, whereas that of the moon defines a lunar month.  
 
The motion of the remaining planets is more complex, and accounting for their 
behaviour was the major task of astronomers in both the ancient and early modern 
periods. Like the sun and moon, the planets progress along the ecliptic, but are not 
strictly tied to it and may be found as much as 8° away from it on either side. 
Moreover, while each planet has a characteristic period of movement around the 
ecliptic, this is only an average; the speed of progression varies over time. In 
addition to varying in speed, the planets will occasionally reverse course entirely in 
a so-called “retrograde motion”, before continuing in their usual direction along the 
ecliptic (see Figure 5). The two “inferior” planets, Mercury and Venus, are each to 
be found within a limited angular distance from the sun, progressing and then 
retrogressing back and forth across its position in the sky. The remaining “superior” 
planets may be found at any angular distance from the sun, but only retrogress 
when they are on the opposite side of the ecliptic to it (“in opposition”).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Retrograde motion of a planet relative to the fixed stars (reproduced from 
Kuhn, 1957, p. 48). 
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Ancient and medieval astronomers devised various mathematical devices to 
account for these complex observed motions. The focus in this section will be on 
the best-known of these, namely the deferent-epicycle system. This posits that 
each planet is carried not just on a great circle centred on the earth (the deferent), 
but on a smaller circle (the epicycle) carried on the larger circle. The combination 
of the motion of the two circles produces the motion of the planet. Importantly, the 
motion of the planet along the epicycle contrary to the overall direction of motion 
along the deferent gives rise to retrograde motion (see Figure 6). Fixing the speed 
of rotation of the epicycle fixes the frequency of retrograde motion.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. The deferent-epicycle system (reproduced from ibid, p. 61). Panel (a) 
shows the overall construction of the system; panel (b) shows the resultant 
apparent motion of the planet 
 
The Copernican system, introduced with the publication of De Revolutionibus in 
1543, remained substantially in the Ptolemaic tradition of astronomy in terms of its 
mathematical techniques and of the basic data set it took as evidence. Its key 
innovation is that it posited a heliocentric or heliostatic universe, with an immobile 
sun at the centre, and the earth and other planets revolving in circles around this 
fixed point. It placed the known planets in the order that is accepted today: Mercury 
innermost, followed by Venus, then the earth, Mars, Jupiter and finally Saturn. The 
motion of the moon remained centred on the earth. The key advantage of this 
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system is that it accounts for many of the basic features of the observations very 
naturally, without the need for epicycles. The distinction between inferior and 
superior planets emerges naturally – the former are simply within the orbit of the 
earth, whereas the latter are further out. The retrograde motion of the planets is 
also explained very simply by the fact that the earth itself is a moving observation 
platform. It will occasionally ‘overtake’ the superior planets, or in the case of the 
inferior ones, be overtaken by them. In both cases the effect is that the planet 
appears to reverse its direction of motion. It also explains why the superior planets 
should only undergo retrograde motion when in opposition to the sun (the earth 
passes between the planet and the sun as it overtakes the planet), while the 
inferior planets pass back and forth regularly across the position of the sun.  
 
However, while Copernicus easily accounts for these gross qualitative features of 
the data, his system does not yield precise quantitative prediction any more easily 
than does Ptolemy’s. Indeed, Copernicus’ system employed just as many epicycles 
to achieve roughly the same level of accuracy as contemporary geostatic systems 
did. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly for the reception of the theory, 
Copernicus’ system contradicted several claims that were thought to be 
established pieces of knowledge at the time. For instance, by removing earth from 
the centre of the universe, the Copernican system was incompatible with 
Aristotelian physics. This system of physics, among other postulates, explained 
motion under gravity by stating that various substances have an intrinsic tendency 
to move either towards (earth, water) or away from (air, fire) the centre of the 
universe.  
 
A problem which was especially pertinent to professional astronomers was that 
Copernicus’ model required a vastly larger universe than had hitherto been 
postulated. The easiest way to see this is to imagine observing a particular star 
from the earth. As the earth moves in a large circle around the sun, the position of 
the observer changes and so the observed relative positions of the stars ought to 
change as well. This phenomenon is known as parallax and is easily observed, for 
instance, by observing some scene first through one’s left eye only and then 
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through the right eye only. One should notice that the relative positions of objects 
appear to change, and that the effect is more noticeable for objects closer to one’s 
vantage point. That there was no parallax observed for any of the fixed stars at that 
time (and was not measured at all until 1838) implied either that the earth did not 
move, or that the sphere of the fixed stars was many thousands of times larger 
than the orbit of the outermost planet. It may be noted that there was, in 
Copernicus’ time, no direct observational evidence for accepting any particular 
value of the distance to the fixed stars. Yet the existing cosmology posited that the 
motion of the entire system originated with the rotation of the fixed stars, which was 
thence mechanically transmitted to the spheres of the planets. Since such a 
mechanism would require direct contact between successive spheres, it obviously 
could not be at work if a vast distance separated the fixed stars from the planets.  
 
Many of the objections to the heliostatic system were met by subsequent 
astronomers. In 1609, Kepler was able to produce remarkably accurate predictions 
of planetary positions by positing elliptical orbits. He thus discarded altogether the 
system of perfect circles and the associated requirement of ever-more-elaborate 
epicycles. In the same year, Galileo’s began making telescopic observations of the 
heavens. These observations produced powerful new arguments in favour of the 
heliocentric model. The observation of Jupiter’s satellites, for instance, provided 
concrete evidence of bodies that orbited something other than the earth. And the 
observation of the phases of Venus showed that this planet could not orbit around 
the earth. These developments changed the terms of the debate decisively in 
favour of the heliocentric universe, and scientific opinion came around relatively 
rapidly. As Kuhn puts it, “By the middle of the seventeenth century it is difficult to 
find an important astronomer who is not Copernican; by the end of the century it is 
impossible.” (ibid, p. 227) 
 
However, it is noteworthy that Kepler and Galileo were convinced by the evidence 
available for the Copernican model before they made their contributions, 
notwithstanding the difficulties with the theory mentioned above. How are we to 
assess the rationality of these scientists and their opponents? For Kuhn, the 
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“Copernican revolution” is the primary illustrative case for his thesis that rationality 
is underdetermined. There are several theoretical virtues in play. Because their 
detailed quantitative predictions match the observations about equally well, 
empirical accuracy does not support either system. Simplicity tends to favour the 
heliocentric hypothesis, since so many of the broad qualitative features of the data 
fall out of it naturally. Consistency, on the other hand, favoured the heliocentric 
model, since it does not require any major modifications to either the physics or the 
other astronomical beliefs of the time.  If the virtues give conflicting judgements, 
there is nothing intrinsically rational or irrational in preferring one hypothesis over 
the other. So neither the Copernicans, like Galileo and Kepler, nor their Ptolemaic 
opponents can be faulted for lacking rational justifications for their positions.  
 
For Worrall (1990), however, once the basic Copernican model had been 
proposed, accepting it was clearly more rational than acceptance of the Ptolemaic 
model. The latter achieves a fair degree of empirical accuracy, but only at the 
expense of great theoretical complexity. Virtually all of the interesting empirical 
consequences of the theory, such as the retrogression of the planets, are used in 
setting appropriate values for the size and rotational speed of the deferents, 
epicycles and so on. This model therefore achieves neither use-novel predictive 
success nor theoretical unification in predicting these consequences. In contrast, a 
great many of the features of planetary motion that had been observed by that time 
– such as retrograde motion – simply “drop out” of the basic Copernican model. 
These particular predictions are therefore use-novel and the overall theory counts 
as unifying. Moreover, Kuhn’s suggestion that the Copernican model sacrifices 
credibility by contradicting existing scientific theories is forthrightly rejected by 
Worrall, as noted in section 3.  
 
So, under Worrall’s form of rationalism, the Copernican model was clearly 
rationally superior to the Ptolemaic model. In addition, the Copernican model (with 
Kepler’s modifications) did come to dominate astronomy, so the descriptive claim 
of rationalism is satisfied by this case. Moreover, as demanded by partial 
rationalism, the genuine empirical regularities entailed by the Ptolemaic model, 
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such as the occurrence of planetary retrogressions, were at least approximately 
preserved in the later theory. The partial rationalist who holds that unification is the 
sole theoretical virtue can therefore claim the Copernican revolution as an example 
in her favour.  
 
5. The neo-Darwinian synthesis 
 
The “neo-Darwinian” synthesis occurred in the early twentieth century and, in 
broad terms, involved the synthesis of ideas from Mendelian genetics with the 
Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection. The historical details of this case 
are largely drawn from Bowler (2009) and Gould (2002).  
 
Darwin defended two major theses in his 1859 Origin of Species. Firstly, he 
claimed, all contemporary species have evolved from earlier forms, and all forms of 
life on earth are ultimately derived in this way from a common ancestor. Secondly, 
he proposed a mechanism for this process of evolution, namely natural selection. 
Natural selection occurs whenever there is heritable variation in phenotypes 
between organisms, and different phenotypes are associated with different levels 
of reproductive success. Those characteristics which are associated with 
reproductive success will gradually increase in frequency in a population, possibly 
resulting in a population whose features differ markedly from those of the original 
population, i.e. a new species. In the years following publication of Origin, Darwin’s 
first thesis was largely accepted by the scientific community. Indeed, Darwin was 
not the first to propose it, though he did amass far more evidence for it than any 
earlier author had achieved.  
 
The second thesis, however, was not so widely accepted. One major reason for 
this is that a “blended” theory of inheritance was dominant in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, and this seemed to be incompatible with the evolution of 
distinct species by natural selection (Jenkin, 1867). Under a blended inheritance 
theory, any given trait of an organism will have a value that is intermediate 
between that of the corresponding values in its parents. The child of a tall mother 
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and a short father, for instance, will typically be of middling height. However, any 
individual organism that differs markedly from the remainder of the population must 
eventually breed with more typical individuals. Thus, even if the individual’s 
unusual phenotype represents an adaptive advantage, none of its descendants will 
possess this phenotype to the same degree. Thus it will be extremely difficult for a 
novel phenotype to spread through the population, and so for speciation to occur.   
 
The blended theory of inheritance was eventually overthrown by a “particulate” 
theory of inheritance, which holds that many or most phenotypic features are 
propagated from parent to offspring in discrete, indivisible heritable elements (now 
referred to as “genes”). A trait can therefore, under many circumstances, be 
passed completely intact from parent to offspring. Indeed, even if the phenotype 
associated with a given gene fails to be expressed in immediate offspring due to 
the effects of other genes, the gene can still circulate in the population and be 
expressed in later generations. The particulate theory of inheritance is derived from 
a very natural interpretation of Mendel’s 1865 paper Experiments on Plant 
Hybridisation, although he does not explicitly propose it himself. The theory only 
began to be disseminated when Mendel’s paper was “rediscovered” by the broader 
community of biologists from 1900 onwards.  
 
Mendel’s discoveries were initially interpreted as a further blow to the thesis that 
speciation occurs via natural selection. Particulate inheritance would seem to imply 
that differences between organisms must be relatively large and discrete. So new 
species should typically appear via “jumps” or saltations, not via the gradual 
modification of existing traits. Advocates of saltationism included de Vries, Correns 
and Bateson. They were opposed by the so-called “biometricians”, including 
Weldon and Pearson, who emphasised the continuous variation of phenotypes 
within a population. Both parties had some empirical evidence in their favour. 
Indeed, in his 1894 book Materials for the study of variation, Bateson provided 
many actual examples of both of characters that vary continuously in a population 
and of characters where there is discontinuity.  Neither party, however, was able to 
provide a fully satisfactory theory of evolution. 
218 
 
 
Fisher (1918; 1930) made a breakthrough in resolving the biometrician-saltationist 
dispute by arguing that a given phenotypic feature may be governed by the 
cumulative effect of several distinct Mendelian genes. This renders a particulate 
mechanism of inheritance compatible with apparently continuous phenotypic 
variation for many traits. In addition to dissolving the saltationist-biometrician 
dispute, Fisher’s insight provided a plausible mechanism for speciation by natural 
selection. If a trait is favoured by natural selection under certain circumstances 
then, all else being equal, genes associated with that trait will increase in frequency 
within a given population. The degree to which that trait is expressed in individual 
organisms possessing the gene need not be reduced in successive generations. 
Moreover, if a particular subpopulation is subject to selective pressures which the 
majority of the population is not, it may accumulate genetic differences to the 
extent that it comes to form a distinct species. Fisher’s approach, under the label of 
“population genetics” rapidly came to dominate theoretical biology.  
 
The brief account given above neglects to mention many interesting features of the 
neo-Darwinian synthesis, and many scientists who were important in its 
development. Nevertheless, it should be clear that it is an instance of theoretical 
synthesis as described in section 3. Both the Darwinian/biometric research 
programme and the Mendelian/saltationist programme were well-supported by 
empirical evidence. Nevertheless, they were initially mutually incompatible. The 
crisis was resolved because scientists such as Fisher were able to identify the 
elements of each theory essential to its predictive success, and weaken their 
commitment to those elements that are not essential. For instance, the standard 
explanation of Mendel’s results is based on two assumptions: (a) that inheritance is 
particulate; and (b) that the traits under observation are governed by the activity of 
only one, or a small number of, genes. The modern synthesis is partially based 
upon recognising that the second assumption need not apply to organisms 
generally18. And, once this assumption is understood as a contingent boundary 
condition rather than an essential element of the “Mendelian” theory, the conflict 
                                            
18
 Indeed, Mendel needed to breed his plants for some time to obtain “pure” strains that exhibited 
the observed pattern of inheritance. 
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between it and the Darwinian theory is resolved, yielding a synthesis which was 
more empirically successful than either of its constituents. 
 
6. The prion revolution 
 
The “prion revolution”, which largely took place between the 1960s and the 1990s, 
is another example of a major theoretical change in biology. The historical details 
of this episode are taken from an excellent pair of papers by Keyes (1999a, 
1999b). For the sake of brevity, the following exposition will be admittedly 
somewhat “Whiggish”, focusing largely on hypotheses and experimental results 
which, in hindsight, led towards the theoretical approach which is now accepted.  
 
A key part of the background to this episode is the so-called “central dogma” of 
molecular biology (see Crick, 1958; 1970). The paradigmatic set of processes 
associated with the dogma begins with the transcription of a portion of DNA to a 
complementary strand of messenger RNA. This is then translated into a 
corresponding protein. The eventual sequence of amino acids in the protein is 
encoded in the sequence of bases in the DNA. Sequence information can pass 
from RNA into DNA by the action of reverse transcriptase enzymes. However, 
“once ‘information’ has passed into protein it cannot get out again” (Crick, 1958), p. 
153, emphasis in original). The dogma asserts, in other words, that there is a one-
way flow of information from nucleic acids to protein sequence. An important 
corollary of this assertion is that any biological agent which replicates must contain 
a nucleic acid, as replication requires the propagation of sequence information.  
 
A major challenge to the dogma arose indirectly, through the investigation of a 
disease called scrapie. This disease affects primarily sheep but can also infect 
other mammals, and is characterised by severe and invariably fatal degeneration 
of the brain tissue. It has been known since the 1930s that the disease can be 
transmitted to healthy animals by inoculating them with infected tissue. In the 
1960s, however, it started to become apparent that the scrapie pathogen did not 
resemble any other known infectious agent. Firstly, scrapie can be transmitted by a 
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suspension of brain tissue that has been filtered so finely that no whole cells 
(including bacterial cells) could be present. This result is compatible with the 
infectious agent being a virus. However, infected tissue was also found to be 
infectious after treatment with heat or chemical agents which would normally 
inactivate any viruses present. Infectivity was also preserved after treatment with 
ultraviolet radiation of a wavelength particularly destructive to nucleic acids. Further 
studies of the infectious agent revealed that it is far smaller than any known virus, 
and is more comparable in size to protein molecules. Such a small particle is 
unlikely to harbour a nucleic acid molecule long enough to code for even a single 
protein. These results together suggested that the infectious agent does not in fact 
rely upon nucleic acids for its replication at all.  
 
These results sparked a wave of speculation as to the chemical identity of the 
scrapie agent. None of these speculations could be confirmed or refuted, however, 
until the scrapie agent was purified and examined in more detail. Much of this work 
was carried out at by Prusiner and colleagues at the University of California in San 
Francisco (UCSF). In the early 1980s, this team (Prusiner et al., 1981; Prusiner, 
1982) demonstrated that the scrapie agent was inactivated by substances and 
processes known to disrupt protein structure, but which do not affect nucleic acids, 
and was conversely unaffected by enzymes which destroy nucleic acids. Together, 
these results suggested that the agent is a protein, or “prion” (for proteinaceous 
infectious particle). The UCSF group subsequently isolated a particular protein 
which they concluded is the scrapie agent and which they therefore named PrP (for 
“prion protein”, (McKinley et al., 1983; Prusiner et al., 1982). This conclusion was 
supported by several experiments. For instance, whenever PrP was obtained from 
brain tissue, even by different purification methods, the resulting fraction was 
infectious. And chemical treatments which denatured PrP also eliminated the 
infectivity of a sample.  
 
Pattison and collaborators had, in the 1960s and 70s demonstrated that scrapie 
could sometimes occur spontaneously in animals, or after ‘infection’ with the brain 
tissue of a healthy animal. To Pattison (1982), this suggested that infection with 
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scrapie was simply the “unmasking” of a entity already present in the brain. This 
hypothesis would also explain the inability of the UCSF group to find nucleic acid in 
infectious particles. To test Pattison’s hypothesis, part of PrP protein was 
sequenced, and a probe was constructed to match the corresponding DNA 
sequence (Oesch et al., 1985). Using this probe, it was found that the relevant 
gene is, indeed, found in the genome of healthy animals. Moreover, the 
corresponding messenger RNA is found in both healthy and scrapie infected 
animals, and at identical concentrations. This suggests that the PrP protein is 
produced in healthy animals at the same rate that it is in infected animals. Indeed, 
it was soon found that a chemically distinct version of this protein (labelled PrPC) 
was present in both healthy and infected animals. The apparent upshot of these 
results is that normal PrPC is produced in the brain of all scrapie-susceptible 
mammals and, in infected animals, is somehow converted into the disease-
associated form PrPSc.  
 
These results were compatible with a “protein-only” hypothesis of scrapie 
transmission. This hypothesis continued to face resistance, however, on the 
grounds that it contradicted the extremely well-confirmed central dogma (see, for 
instance, (Carp et al., 1985; Gajdusek, 1985). Moreover, the prion theorists had not 
yet provided evidence for any plausible mechanism by which a protein might carry 
“genetic information”. One possible mechanism, suggested by Griffith (1967), is 
that the protein might induce its own expression in host cells. This hypothesis, 
however, is not compatible with the fact that healthy and infected tissues 
apparently produce PrP at the same rate. Moreover, from the 1970s it became 
apparent that there are several distinct “strains” of scrapie. This, together with the 
fact that there is only one copy of the PrP gene on the mammalian genome, would 
seem to suggest that infectious particles do not merely unlock some potential that 
is latent in cells, but carry strain-specific information which is replicated in daughter 
particles. The emphasis therefore shifted to another version of the hypothesis, that 
the scrapie protein PrPSc directly converts the normal PrPC into copies of itself. 
Versions of this hypothesis were discussed by Griffith, by the UCSF team (Oesch, 
et al., 1988; Prusiner, 1984), and by Bolton and Bendheim (1988).  
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Keyes (1999b) emphasises that this sort of hypothesis by itself represents a 
significant departure from the central dogma, because it distinguishes between 
types of biological information. Sequence information is still transmitted in the 
standard way from nucleic acids to proteins. However, information might also be 
encoded in the post-translational state of the protein and propagated ‘horizontally’ 
between protein molecules. There were, however, by the late 1980s still several 
viable candidates for exactly what form this encoding might take. Protein molecules 
can be chemically altered in various ways, by the modification of an amino acid 
residue, or by the addition of a chemical group. However, lacking any evidence of 
chemical alteration, Prusiner and co-workers (1990) favoured the hypothesis that 
the difference between PrPC and PrPSc is conformational. “Conformation”, in this 
context, refers to the exact three-dimensional shape that a two-dimensional chain 
of amino acids adopts after translation. Although conformation is of course 
dependent on the linear sequence, it is not at all rigidly determined by it19. 
Importantly, the conformational hypothesis is able to explain the existence of 
different strains of scrapie, as there can be many conformational variants of a 
given protein.  
 
This conformational hypothesis has been steadily accepted by the scientific 
community since 1990, with further supporting evidence emerging from various 
sources. Prusiner himself won the Nobel Prize in 1997, indicating that the theory 
was understood to represent well-established knowledge. Moreover, it is now 
standard to find some discussion of prions in the chapter on protein folding in 
mainstream biochemistry textbooks (see, for instance, Nelson & Cox, 2005, ch. 4). 
There are, of course, scientists who continue to reject all versions of the protein-
only hypothesis and promote nucleic acid theories of scrapie, although these 
represent a dwindling minority.  
 
Even allowing for the possibility that the prion theory is mistaken, it is worth 
outlining how the present consensus represents a synthesis of two apparently 
                                            
19
 Indeed, at the time or writing, it is still beyond our capabilities to predict the final stable 
conformation of a protein given its amino acid sequence. This is the so-called “folding problem”.  
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incompatible theories. The central dogma of molecular biology states that 
biological information can only be replicated in the form of nucleic acids. The prion 
theory of scrapie states that biological information can be replicated ‘horizontally’ 
between proteins. The current synthesis between the two is achieved by 
distinguishing between sequence and conformational information, then narrowing 
the domain of the central dogma to include only the former. Thus all the known 
empirical successes of this dogma are accounted for, while also accommodating 
the empirical success of the prion theory.  
 
7. Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, the problem of rationality in theory choice in science was introduced 
via Kuhn’s treatment of this topic in Structure. Writing in 1962, Kuhn appears to 
imply that instances of theory choice are not at all governed by objective standards 
of rationality. This radical interpretation of Kuhn’s early work is endorsed by 
proponents of the Strong Programme, who deny any role to objective standards of 
rationality. They claim that which of several competing theories ends up dominating 
the field is determined largely by the political and/or social power of these theories’ 
respective supporters. The deficiency of the Strong Programme is that it is too 
radical – objective (or at least widely shared) rational standards surely play at least 
some role in theory choice. 
 
In this chapter, three views which accord some role to rational standards have 
been surveyed. The first is so-called “Whig history”, which designates as rational 
just those historical theories which can be viewed as predecessors of our current 
best theories. This was rejected on the grounds that it does not really provide any 
standards of rationality which can sensibly be applied prospectively against a 
background of already-accepted beliefs. The second is Kuhn’s later view, which 
holds that there are objective standards of scientific rationality, but that these 
underdetermine theory choice in many or most actual cases. Scientific decisions 
are therefore at least partly dependent on non-rational factors, such as the 
aesthetic preferences of individual scientists. The third view is rationalism, which 
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holds that it is usually possible to determine which of several competing theories it 
is more rational to believe and moreover that the most rational preferable theory 
has indeed come to prominence in most actual instances of theory change.  
 
In this chapter, a particular version of rationalism called “partial rationalism” has 
been defended. Partial rationalism claims that scientists are rational just in case 
they accept those parts of theories responsible for empirical successes (and have 
largely acted rationally by this definition). This view has been illustrated (although, 
of course, not generally proven) by several case studies. Following Worrall, it has 
been demonstrated that the victory of the Copernican over the Ptolemaic model of 
the solar system represents the victory of the more empirically successful theory 
(by either the use-novelty or the unification standard). In the case of both the neo-
Darwinian synthesis and the prion revolution, it has been demonstrated that the 
theory which was eventually accepted is constituted by (among other elements) the 
essential parts of the ostensibly competing theories.  
 
The following chapter will focus upon some case studies which are, at least prima 
facie, problematic for partial realism, and thus for partial rationalism. After 
examining these cases in detail, some remarks will therefore be made on the 
tenability of partial rationalism.  
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Chapter 5. Problem cases 
 
1. Chapter overview 
 
In this chapter, several putative counterexamples to deflationary realism, and thus 
to partial realism and partial rationalism, are examined in detail. The stage is set in 
section 2, where several lists of potential counterexamples that have been 
proposed by other authors are reproduced. From these lists, two particular cases 
are selected for more detailed study, namely the miasma theory of disease and the 
phlogiston theory of chemistry. They are chosen because they are both cases of 
theories that were, at least on the face of it, empirically successful, and yet their 
essential posits were not preserved in successor theories. 
  
In section 3, the miasma theory of disease is examined particularly in the context of 
nineteenth century England. Several notable developments occurred in this period. 
Firstly, there were large scale changes to urban water supply and sewage 
infrastructure, and these changes were partly motivated by the miasma theory. 
Secondly, England, and particular London, was struck by epidemic cholera, the 
transmission of which was at least initially blamed on atmospheric miasmas. 
Thirdly, the miasma theory, at least insofar as is applies to cholera, was eventually 
rejected in favour of a waterborne theory of transmission. In section 4, it is 
demonstrated that, although changes in public health infrastructure did eventually 
eliminate the spread of cholera, these changes were ineffective and in fact 
counterproductive when carried out under the influence of the miasma theory. It 
was only the waterborne theory of transmission that allowed for effective 
intervention in the spread of disease. Thus the miasma theory was (at least in this 
episode) not empirically successful and so fails as a counterexample to DR.  
 
Section 5 gives a briefly outline of the evolution of chemical theory over the course 
of the eighteenth century, during which the phlogiston theory gave way to 
Lavoisier’s oxygen theory. In light of this history, in section 6, it is argued that the 
phlogiston case presents a significant challenge to the scientific realist. This theory 
226 
 
was empirically successful, and applies concepts that are structurally similar to 
those found in modern electrochemistry. These concepts are not, however, 
preserved in the immediate successor theory to phlogiston, namely the oxygen 
theory. It is argued that this course of events poses a serious challenge to the 
descriptive component of the realist view, i.e. the claim that the essential elements 
of successful theories will generally be preserved in instances of theory change. 
Thus deflationary realism and the descriptive component of partial rationalism are 
also challenged. The normative components of these views, and the claim that 
such elements accurately represent the world, are not, however, challenged.  
 
2. Putative counterexamples to realism 
 
In this thesis so far, several historical case studies have been discussed for the 
purposes of illustrating realist and/or rationalist views. However, having thoroughly 
described these views in the preceding chapters, it is time to examine some 
putative counterexamples to them. As stated in Chapter 1, a putative 
counterexample to deflationary (and thus partial) realism has the form of a 
historical episode in which some theory is empirically successful, certain elements 
of the theory are essential to this success, and yet this element is not preserved in 
successor theories. Several authors have offered lists of historical episodes which 
purportedly match this template. These will be reviewed briefly below. Following 
this, two of them will be examined in more detail, to determine whether they do, in 
fact, stand as counterexamples.  
 
Laudan, in support of his pessimistic meta-induction, offers a list of theories “which 
were both successful and (so far as we can judge) non-referential with respect to 
many of their central explanatory concepts” (Laudan, 1981, p. 33):  
 
• the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy;  
• the humoral theory of medicine;  
• the effluvial theory of static electricity;  
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• 'catastrophist' geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) 
deluge;  
• the phlogiston theory of chemistry;  
• the caloric theory of heat;  
• the vibratory theory of heat;  
• the vital force theories of physiology;  
• the electromagnetic aether;  
• the optical aether;  
• the theory of circular inertia;  
• theories of spontaneous generation. 
 
Several of these examples have already been discussed in detail by scientific 
realists, with the aim of discrediting them as counterexamples. Frequently, the 
approach has been to argue that the particular theoretical posit highlighted by 
Laudan was not, in fact, essential to the empirical success of the theory in 
question. Following several papers by Worrall (1989a, 1989b), for instance, it is a 
standard realist tactic to argue that the posited existence of an “optical aether” did 
not play an essential role in the successful predictions of nineteenth-century 
theories of light. Psillos (1999) has offered a similar analysis for the posited 
existence of caloric. Another frequent tactic is to argue that the theory highlighted 
by Laudan was not sufficient empirically successful to warrant application of the 
no-miracles argument in the first place. For instance, although Worrall (1990) does 
not discuss “crystalline spheres” per se, he does adopt this approach in his 
treatment of the Ptolemaic model of the solar system (discussed in Chapter 4.4).  
 
Stanford (2006) shifts emphasis away from Laudan’s “pessimistic induction, 
preferring instead to talk about the “problem of unconceived alternatives”. He 
argues that scientists throughout history have simply failed to conceive of theories 
that were at least equally well-confirmed by the evidence available to them as the 
theories they actually did accept. We know that such alternatives existed because 
our modern theories are, of course, well-confirmed by this evidence. He therefore 
proposes a “new induction” focusing on the epistemi
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themselves, with the conclusion that we are likely to be in the same position as 
these historical scientists. That is, we are unable to imagine the theories that would 
account for our empirical observations (and presumably also deal with anomalies) 
better than our current theories do. Stanford’s argument is clearly, as Lewens 
(2006) puts it, a “close relative” of the pessimistic induction. Whatever the exact 
nature of this relationship, the problem of unconceived alternatives, like the 
pessimistic induction, is effective as an argument against partial realism insofar as 
it can point to examples of where the “essential elements” of empirically successful 
theories were not preserved in successor theories. Stanford’s examples, to a 
certain extent overlapping with Laudan’s, are as follows:  
 
• from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl’s phlogiston theory 
to Lavoisier’s oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary 
chemistry 
• from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of 
embryology 
• form the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary 
thermodynamic theories 
• from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the 
electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism 
• from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ 
theories of disease 
• from eighteenth century corpuscular theories of light to nineteenth century 
wave theories to the contemporary quantum mechanical conception 
• from Darwin’s pangenesis theory of inheritance to Weismann’s germ-plasm 
theory to Mendelian and then contemporary molecular genetics 
• from Cuvier’s theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static 
biological species and from Lamarck’s autogenesis to Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory. 
 
Another author who has offered such a similar list is Lyons (2002). He has, 
however, attempted to respond to realist criticism of Laudan and Stanford’s lists by 
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citing only episodes in which the theory concerned achieved novel predictive 
success (by the use-novelty account). Nevertheless, his list still overlaps somewhat 
with their lists. It is as follows: 
 
• Caloric theory 
• Phlogiston theory 
• Rankine’s nineteenth century vortex theory (of thermodynamics) 
• Newtonian mechanics 
• Fermat’s principle of least time (in optics) 
• Maxwell’s ether theory 
• Dalton’s atomic theory 
• Kekulé’s theory of the benzene molecule 
• Mendeleev’s periodic law 
• Bohr’s 1913 theory of the atom 
• Dirac’s relativistic wave equation 
• The original (pre-inflationary) big bang theory 
 
Although, from the partial realist standpoint, Lyons is to be credited for including 
only predictively successful theories, it is highly contentious that in all these cases 
the relevant essential elements were not preserved in successor theories. As 
argued in Chapter 1.6, both Newtonian mechanics and Mendeleev’s periodic law, 
for instance, are at least approximately preserved.  
 
Finally, Vickers (forthcoming) lists no fewer than twenty-one putative cases of 
predictively successful theories that are not even approximately and/or partially 
true from the perspective of later theories. Since he explicitly draws on the lists 
given by Laudan, Lyons and Stanford, only items not suggested by these other 
authors will be cited here. These include: 
 
• The teleomechanist theory of biological development 
• The Titius-Bode law of planetary orbits 
• Kepler’s prediction of the rotation of the sun  
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• Kirchhoff’s theory of diffraction 
• Sommerfeld’s prediction of the hydrogen fine structure 
• Velikovsky and Venus (as discussed in Chapter 2.10) 
• Steady-state cosmology 
• The achromatic telescope (as discussed in Chapter 3.8) 
• The momentum of light 
• S-matrix theory of particle physics 
• Lorentz’s theory of variation in electron mass with velocity 
• Taking the thermodynamic limit 
 
All of the cases cited by the authors above deserve further philosophical 
consideration. However, in the remaining sections of this chapter, two in particular 
will be examined in further detail. These are the miasma theory of disease, which is 
included on Stanford’s list; and the phlogiston theory in chemistry, included by all of 
the authors cited above.  
 
These two cases are chosen because a strong prima facie case can be made for 
each of them as a counterexample to deflationary realism (DR), as it has been 
defined in Chapters 1-3 of this thesis. Recall that DR is primarily committed to the 
continuity of science. As such, it is a logical consequence of partial realism and is 
identical to the descriptive component of partial rationalism. Thus, if either of the 
case studies carried out below refutes DR, it also refutes these more substantive 
views. However, at certain points, the implications of a particular historical turn of 
events for partial rationalism will be addressed directly. This is because the idea of 
theoretical synthesis, although it also follows as a logical consequence of DR and 
PR, has been addressed primarily with reference to this position. 
 
3. The miasma theory of disease and the contagionist revolution 
 
The miasma theory of disease maintains that the primary cause of at least certain 
diseases is atmospheric pollution arising from rotting organic matter. The first 
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recorded mention of this theory is attributed to one of the great authors of classical 
antiquity, Hippocrates (1978), who makes the connection between marshy terrain 
and fevers. This connection is still preserved in the name of the disease malaria, 
literally “bad air” in Italian (Reiter, 2000). This theory poses a prima facie challenge 
to DR because it posits a certain mechanism for the spread of disease – namely, 
atmospheric pollution – which modern scientists universally agree does not exist. 
Moreover, as discussed below, it appears that this theory was at least somewhat 
empirically successful. Although this theory enjoyed some currency among medical 
practitioners for at least two millennia, the focus on this chapter will be nineteenth 
century Britain, where it was eventually rejected by the medical community. 
 
The major competitor to the miasma theory by the early nineteenth century was the 
contagion theory of disease. This holds that disease is primarily transmitted from 
afflicted to healthy individuals by close contact. The contagion theory, in fact, has 
origins that are just as ancient as those of the miasma theory. These are 
articulated indirectly, for instance, in various prohibitions on contact with “unclean” 
persons or substances found in the Jewish Old Testament (Ackerknecht, 
1948/2009, p. 8). The contagion and miasma theories in fact co-existed, although 
somewhat uneasily, during the early nineteenth century. Ackerknecht characterises 
the medical profession at this time as comprising two “extreme wings” of committed 
contagionists and miasmists, with a moderate and ecumenical centre of 
“contingent contagionists” – those who believed that contagion was possible, but 
only under certain circumstances. Moreover, even the most extreme miasma 
theorists acknowledged certain cases of contagion – syphilis, for instance, was 
universally understood to spread directly via sexual contact. So, in practice and 
despite their ideological commitments, medical professionals typically applied 
theoretical frameworks to particular diseases on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Major changes in theories of disease were catalysed by the series of cholera 
epidemics that struck Europe in the nineteenth century, beginning in the 1830s. 
The historical details of these epidemics are largely drawn from  Longmate (1966). 
Cholera is a disease characterised by extreme intestinal dysfunction, resulting in 
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large quantities of watery diarrhoea and vomiting. It originated in and is endemic to 
the area around the lower Ganges river and first became a global pandemic in 
1817, following the extensive international trade and communication routes that 
had been established by European colonial empires by that time. This first 
pandemic, continuing until 1826, did not reach Europe. However, subsequent 
pandemics affected Britain in the years 1831-1832, 1848-1850, 1853-1854, and 
finally in 1866. In what follows, the focus will be on the metropolis of London, 
where cholera epidemics were especially severe, and where many of the important 
theoreticians carried out their work.  
 
Both the miasma and contagion theories appealed to features of water supply and 
sanitation in their explanations of the aetiology of cholera, although in different 
ways. Therefore, before discussing the development of medical theory directly, it is 
worth providing an overall picture of the evolution in urban water infrastructure that 
was also in motion at this time. This evolution was characterised by two 
interconnected developments, namely the abandonment of the cesspool system in 
favour of flush toilets; and the abandonment of water obtained directly by 
households in favour of water piped from distant sources. This topic is addressed 
in illuminating detail by Hardy (1984; 1991) and Halliday (1999).  
 
The ancient system of human waste disposal in cities involved the emptying of 
chamber pots into cesspools, which were typically shared between a small group 
of houses. When a cesspool was full, its contents were hauled away by cart, 
typically to be used as agricultural fertiliser. This elegant system for recycling 
organic matter started to break down in London as the city expanded, and the cost 
of hauling material out in the countryside increase proportionately. Even more 
devastating, from about 1847, vast amounts of cheap guano (bird droppings) 
became available on world markets, drastically undercutting the price of human 
manure. In consequence, hauliers charged higher prices for emptying cesspools, 
and poorer residents were less willing or able to pay for removal. The result is that 
cesspools were dug deeper to accommodate more waste, contaminating 
groundwater, or simply allowed to overflow.  
233 
 
 
Over the first half of the nineteenth century, just as the cesspool system was 
becoming uneconomical and beginning to pose an increasing threat to human 
health, flush toilets became steadily more common. The large amounts of waste 
water produced by a flush toilet must, of course, go somewhere, and so private 
houses were connected to sewer systems. London had a pre-existing sewage 
system, but this was intended primarily to channel water from storm drains. This 
changed in 1815, when it became legal to dump household waste into the sewage 
system. For reasons that are obvious to the modern reader, it is extremely 
unfortunate that this sewage system initially emptied directly into the river Thames. 
Contemporaries, too, became progressively more dismayed at the polluted state of 
this river, which culminated in the “Great Stink” during the summer of 1858. The 
Great Stink served as the impetus for the massive programme of sewer 
construction under Bazalgette, which took place largely in the 1860s. The smaller 
sewers were consolidated into larger pipes and, although the resulting effluent was 
still dumped into the Thames, the outlet was far downstream of London. Thus, the 
extreme pollution of the river was a phenomenon predominantly of the middle part 
of nineteenth century.  
 
Prior to the nineteenth century, most of the water consumed in London was either 
obtained from relatively shallow wells, or directly from rivers and canals. However, 
over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, various private 
water companies were established to supply piped water to homes and other 
establishments (Dickinson, 1954). Notice that a copious supply of piped water is 
also, of course, essential to the functioning of the flush toilets which were being 
installed at this time. However, because piped water supplies were often beyond 
the means of poorer residents, and were generally unreliable in any case, many 
inhabitants of the metropolis continued to depend on groundwater obtained from 
pumps or on surface water.  
 
Interestingly, many of the changes in water and waste removal infrastructure were 
motivated directly by the miasma theory of disease. Thus, this theory can be 
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considered empirically successful to the extent that these changes were successful 
in reducing the burden of disease. The influence of the miasma theory is clear in 
the writings of the so-called sanitarians who promoted these changes. For 
instance, Chadwick, a lawyer and Benthamite social reformer, in 1842 authored 
The Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population. This argued that: 
 
“the various forms of epidemic, endemic, and other disease [are] caused, or 
aggravated, or propagated chiefly amongst the labouring classes by 
atmospheric impurities produced by decomposing animal and vegetable 
substances, by damp and filth, and close and overcrowded dwellings ... 
where those circumstances are removed by drainage, proper cleansing, 
better ventilation, and other means of diminishing atmospheric impurity, the 
frequency and intensity of such disease is abated” 
 
“The primary and most important measures [for improving sanitary 
conditions] ... are drainage, the removal of all refuse of habitations, streets, 
and roads, and the improvement of the supplies of water. [The] expense [of 
removing decomposing refuse] may be reduced ... or rendered 
inconsiderable, by the use of water and self-acting means of removal by 
improved and cheaper sewers and drains.” (Chadwick, 1842, section 9, 
emphasis added) 
 
Notice that Chadwick advocates both flush toilets (“self-acting means” of waste 
removal) and the improvement of water supplies. It is clear from other remarks, 
however, that he is less concerned with the quality of drinking water than that there 
was sufficient water that houses may be cleaned and waste washed away more 
quickly.  
 
Chadwick’s recommendations proved to be hugely influential on government policy 
(Halliday, 1999, pp. 48-57; Porter, 1999, pp 411-412). The Public Health Act of 
1848 established a General Board of Health (of which Chadwick was a member) 
with the function of enforcing public health standards across England and Wales. 
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The Board was empowered to force local government entities to establish and 
maintain sewer systems, clear up refuse, and so on. The Metropolitan Sewers Act 
of 1848 forcibly amalgamated most of the sewer commissions operating in the 
London area into a single Metropolitan Sewers Commission (with Chadwick, again, 
one of the commissioners). The Act required, among other things, that all new 
houses be built with toilets and drains up to a certain specification, and empowered 
the Commissioners to order existing houses be connected to the sewage system. 
The Metropolis Water Act of 1852 required that the water companies operating in 
London draw their water from a section upstream of the heavily-polluted tidal 
section of the Thames. The passing of this Act should not, incidentally be taken as 
an indication that the government believed that disease could be transmitted 
directly through contaminated drinking water; miasma theorists had their own 
reasons for objecting to “foul-smelling”, polluted water. Moreover, this measure 
was not treated as a priority. This is underlined by the fact that the Act was very 
poorly enforced, with several companies failing to comply for more than a decade.  
 
Returning to questions of medical theory, it becomes quickly apparent that 
Chadwick’s acceptance of the miasma theory was not merely dogmatic. Several 
pieces of evidence appeared to support it quite decisively over the contagion 
theory. Firstly, various quarantine measures that were enacted in an attempt to 
limit the spread of the 18331-32 pandemic proved utterly ineffective. Secondly, 
people and areas who were in regular contact with afflicted persons or regions, 
without the benefit of quarantine, often did not themselves become afflicted 
(Ackerknecht, 1948/2009, p. 12). Moreover, in addition to negative evidence 
against the contagion theory, there appeared to be quite good evidence supporting 
atmospheric transmission. In what remains a seminal work in the foundation of 
epidemiology, Farr (1852), a statistician and civil servant working at the General 
Register Office, produced a report on cholera mortality in England from 1848 to 
1849. In this report, he noted an extremely regular connection between the 
elevation of a London inhabitant’s dwelling above the river Thames and his or her 
chance of dying from cholera. Some of his data are reproduced in Table 1. 
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Mean Elevation of the 
ground above the 
Highwater Mark (feet) 
Mean mortality from 
Cholera (per 10000) 
0 177 
10 102 
30 65 
50 34 
70 27 
90 22 
100 17 
350 7 
 
Table 1. The correlation between elevation and cholera mortality in London during 
the epidemic of 1848-1849 (ibid, p. 63) 
 
This was viewed as confirmatory evidence for the miasma theory precisely 
because, as indicated above, low-lying areas nearer to the Thames were so foul-
smelling by this time.  
 
Snow (1849), in his On the mode of communication of cholera, proposed a theory 
that was opposed to both the miasma view and to versions of the contagionist 
theory which emphasised direct transmission between persons. He suggested that 
cholera was caused by some “material” which acted to irritate the intestinal wall, 
and could be spread to others when they inadvertently ingested the discharge of 
an afflicted individual20. Moreover, he argued, the most common means for the 
spread of this material is via the contamination of drinking water. Snow supported 
this hypothesis by citing various incidents where a cluster of cholera cases had 
occurred in association with faecal contamination of the water supply. For instance, 
he describes a group of houses named Albion Terrace in Wandsworth, in which 
many inhabitants became ill, although none of the other residents of the immediate 
                                            
20
 Note that Snow wrote before the germ theory of disease became widely accepted, and so he did 
not think of this “material” as a living organism. 
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area did. The only thing that obviously distinguished these residents from their 
neighbours is that they shared a water supply, and that this had become 
contaminated by the cesspools behind their houses.  
 
Snow produced a substantially expanded edition of his book in 1855, in which he 
adduced several more lines of evidence for his theory. The most famous of these 
from the modern perspective is his study of the epidemic of 1854 at Golden Square 
in Soho. Using records obtained from Farr’s office, he was able to systematically 
chart the place of residence of cholera victims in relation to the various water 
pumps in that neighbourhood. A detail of his map is reproduced in Figure 7. What 
this map showed is that cases of cholera were centred on a water pump on Broad 
Street, with the number of deaths decreasing with distance from the pump. 
Moreover, the residents of a nearby workhouse (marked on the map) with its own 
water supply were relatively unaffected.  In addition, Snow systematically 
interviewed acquaintances of all known victims, demonstrating that each had at 
least very probably drunk water from this pump. Perhaps the most impressive such 
case was that of an afflicted woman who lived in Hampstead, several miles away 
from Soho. It emerged that she had lived near the Broad Street pump some years 
before, and had acquired a taste for its water. She therefore had specifically 
obtained some for her own consumption, and became ill the following day. Finally, 
Snow was able to demonstrate that the water supply of this particular pump was 
contaminated by a nearby cesspool. Using this evidence, Snow convinced the 
authorities of the local parish to remove the handle of the pump (meaning water 
could not be drawn from it), and the epidemic ceased shortly thereafter. As Snow 
himself admitted, however, this in itself was not decisive evidence for his theory, as 
the epidemic was in any case abating by this point.  
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Figure 7. A reproduction of Snow’s (1855) map showing the spatial distribution of 
cholera deaths around Golden Square in Soho. The dashes tally deaths at a given 
location, and pumps are represented by circular dots. The Broad Street pump is 
located roughly in the centre of the image.  
 
As pointed out by several authors (see, for example, McLeod, 2000), another 
analysis of the 1854 epidemic carried out by Snow  was in fact more convincing to 
his contemporaries. South London, at that time, was served by both the Lambeth 
and the Southwark and Vauxhall water companies. Moreover, there were certain 
areas in which they competed for business, even serving different houses on the 
same street. The geographic distribution of their pipes is depicted in  
Figure 8. The Lambeth Company, as it happened, had complied with the 
Metropolitan Water Act of 1852 and so had moved its water inlet upstream of the 
tidal part of the Thames. The Southwark and Vauxhall Company, in contrast, still 
drew from a heavily polluted section of the river. Despite many difficulties in 
ascertaining exactly which household was supplied by which company, Snow was 
able to establish to that customers of the Lambeth Company suffered significantly 
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less during the 1854 epidemic than did those of the Southwark and Vauxhall 
Company.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. A reproduction of Snow’s (1855) map showing the areas of south London 
to which the Lambeth and the Southwark and Vauxhall companies provided water.  
 
Snow died in 1858, but his analysis of the south London epidemic had convinced 
Farr of the waterborne theory of cholera transmission, and he became its primary 
champion (Eyler, 1973; 2001). When mortality reports for the 1866 epidemic began 
coming in, Farr (1868) was very rapidly able to determine that residents in the 
catchment area of the East London Waterworks Company were disproportionately 
affected. He instigated an investigation of the company, which revealed that some 
of its water was being illegally pumped from the Old Ford reservoir on a polluted 
section of the River Lea. This exposure forced the company to discontinue using 
water from this source, whereupon the epidemic abated rapidly. This success more 
or less definitively confirmed the waterborne theory in the minds of most 
contemporary physicians, and it is accepted to this day.  
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4. Assessing the miasma theory 
 
For the miasma theory in nineteenth-century England to count as a 
counterexample for deflationary realism, it must be demonstrated, firstly, that this 
theory enjoyed empirical success and, secondly, that the proposition that disease 
spreads via atmospheric miasmas was essential to this success. If these 
conditions are met, then the fact that this proposition is not preserved in successor 
theories violates the requirement of scientific continuity and thus refutes DR. In this 
section, it will be argued that, despite prima facie appearances, the miasma theory 
was not empirically successful and therefore fails as a counterexample to DR.  
 
It may be argued the large-scale construction of sewage systems in the mid-
nineteenth century, including Bazalgette’s in London, is the result of a use-novel 
prediction of the miasma theory. It follows quite naturally from the basic principles 
of the theory that reducing humans’ proximity to faecal matter would reduce the 
incidence of cholera, and yet this disease had certainly not previously been 
successfully controlled by these means. And the reformers responsible for these 
construction projects were, at least in their early stages, largely motivated by the 
miasma theory. Moreover, it seems like the theoretical prediction was successful – 
the dramatic decline in cholera and other diseases after the 1860s is largely 
attributable to infrastructure improvements of this type.  
 
Furthermore, applying the unification criterion of empirical success more directly, it 
appears that the miasma theory genuinely unifies several lower-level empirical 
regularities. This unity is manifested, for instance, in Chadwick’s report of 1842. 
Although the report is, for obvious reasons, rather focussed on the problem of 
cholera, it also mentions malaria in connection with poor drainage and the 
presence of rotting material:  
 
“… I visited the district, and examined the cottages and families living there. 
The land is nearly on a level with the water, the ground is marshy, and the 
sewers all open. Before reaching the district, I was assailed by a most 
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disagreeable smell; and it was clear to the sense that the air was full of most 
injurious malaria” (Chadwick, 1842, s. 1) 
 
Although the disease we now classify as malaria was indeed endemic to parts of 
England from the mid-17th until the beginning of the 20th century, primarily in 
marshy lands on the southeast and east coasts21, it should be made clear that 
contemporary medical practice did not distinguish it from other fevers with broadly 
similar symptoms. Chadwick himself refers to “malaria” in connection with areas  
where it is extremely unlikely that it ever existed (Dobson, 1989; Hutchinson & 
Lindsay, 2006). Nevertheless, it is clear that these apparently very different 
diseases were thought of as operating by broadly the same mechanism.  
 
It is undeniable that human beings do, indeed, tend to become ill in the presence of 
various kinds of rotting organic matter. Fevers like malaria and yellow fever are 
usually contracted around swamps and marshes. The presence of faecal matter in 
the environment leads to cholera and typhoid. And the bubonic plague, among 
many other diseases, visibly spreads more rapidly to homes that contain food 
waste and are generally dirty. What is challenging in all this for the realist is that 
this commonality is, from our modern perspective, completely “accidental”. The 
mode of disease transmission in each case is different: malaria is transmitted by 
the bites of the mosquitoes that live in the swamp; cholera by the drinking of 
contaminated water; and bubonic plague by the bites of the fleas that live on rats – 
and these rats happen to be attracted to food leftovers. 
  
The most convincing realist response to these challenges, following Vickers’ 
(forthcoming) discussion of Velikovsky’s theory (Chapter 2.10) and the achromatic 
telescope (Chapter 3.8) is to point out simply that the alleged “predictions” of the 
miasma theory are extremely vague. The various diseases that are allegedly 
explained by this theory are all extremely different in presentation, mortality, and 
                                            
21
 It was eventually eradicated by draining of the marshes. Interestingly, however, there is no 
evidence that this was an intentional goal of these land-use changes – marshes were drained 
primarily in order to turn land over to more economically productive tilling or pasturage (Packard 
2007, pp. 45-53). 
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pattern of spread. The theory gives no natural account of why the miasmas 
produced by faecal pollution should have such different effects to those produced 
by marshes, nor why faecal miasmas may give rise to cholera at some times and 
typhoid at others. This immediately suggests that the miasma theory is simply 
being used as a post hoc hypothesis to give some mechanistic explanation of an 
observed regularity. 
 
And, in the case of cholera and sanitary reform, where the miasma theory was 
used to derive more specific predictions, these were disastrously incorrect. It had 
been observed, accurately, that ‘proximity’ to human faecal matter increased the 
chances of contracting this disease. The miasma theory predicted specifically that 
it was contact with the airborne emanations from this pollution that caused illness. 
Hence, to prevent the disease, the most important goal was removing this noxious 
material from people’s homes as soon as possible. This led, eventually, to the 
construction of advanced sewage systems which directed human waste far 
downstream of London. However, it initially led to the installation of flush toilets and 
the associated sewers which emptied directly into the parts of the Thames from 
which drinking water was drawn. It is doubly unfortunate that, facilitated by the 
water companies, the use of this water was increasing, at the expense of 
groundwater from wells, at just the same time that it was becoming more polluted. 
But as demonstrated by the Chadwick quote above, the use of piped water was 
also promoted by the miasma theorists! So, although these trends were no doubt 
also encouraged by the sheer convenience of piped water and flush toilets, the 
influence of the miasma theory probably increased the severity of the mid-century 
cholera epidemics. Thus, the miasma theory was hardly empirically successful in 
mid-nineteenth century Britain, and this case therefore does not pose a significant 
challenge to scientific realism. 
 
5. The phlogistion theory and the chemical revolution 
 
The phlogiston theory is included in many of the above authors’ lists. This is 
because, firstly, it was widely accepted by chemists during the eighteenth century 
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and is reckoned to have enjoyed some degree of empirical success. Secondly, 
however, it is now believed that one of the central posits of this theory, namely that 
there exists a substance matching the properties ascribed to phlogiston, is false. 
This poses an obvious prima facie challenge to the deflationary realist, and hence 
to the partial realist and partial rationalist.  
 
This challenge will be addressed from the perspective of the “chemical revolution” 
of the late eighteenth century, during which the phlogiston theory was largely 
superseded by Lavoisier’s oxygen theory. This section will give a broadly 
chronological outline of the various experimental results and theoretical innovations 
which, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, combined to support the oxygen 
over the phlogiston theory in the minds of most chemists. As the goal of this 
section is to determine whether this transition is compatible with deflationary 
realism, particular attention will be paid to instances where either theory enjoyed 
empirical success. Since several authors writing about this episode have 
understood empirical success by reference to the UN account, this convention will 
generally be followed here. It will be taken as read, however, that a theory which is 
(not) successful under the UN is also (not) successful under the UV. Except where 
otherwise stated, the historical details in this section are drawn from Musgrave 
(1976), Hoyningen-Huene (2008) and Chang (2012). For ease of comprehension 
to the modern reader, the first time that contemporary chemical jargon is used to 
describe a substance or process, the equivalent modern term will also be given in 
square brackets.   
 
The core ideas of phlogiston theory originated with the writings of Becher and Stahl 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Phlogiston was understood to 
be an “imponderable fluid” or “principle” which can combine with ordinary matter. It 
affects the observable properties of the substances in which it is found, and is able 
to move from one substance to another. Moreover, certain substances, like 
charcoal [mostly carbon] and sulfur, contain large amounts of it, whereas other 
substances, such as metal ores, also called calxes [metal oxides], and ordinary air, 
contain relatively little. In general, phlogiston moves from substances that have a 
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lot of it to those that have little, and this is what occurs in many chemical 
transformations. For instance, in combustion, a phlogiston-rich substance, such as 
sulphur, gives up phlogiston to the air. Another example is metal smelting, in which 
phlogiston is transferred from charcoal to an ore to produce the corresponding 
metal. One early predictive success of the phlogiston theory, described by Carrier 
(1993), was achieved by Stahl in 1697. It was known that the burning of sulphur 
and phosphorus in air resulted in vitriolic [sulphuric] and phosphoric acids, 
respectively). Since these acids were formed, Stahl reasoned, by the giving up of 
phlogiston to the air, the original materials should be recovered when these acids 
are heated in the presence of phlogiston-rich charcoal. This prediction, in fact, was 
correct.  
 
In 1766, Cavendish produced “inflammable air” [hydrogen gas] by the reaction of 
metallic zinc, iron and tin with sulphuric and hydrochloric acids. Cavendish 
described inflammable air as extremely rich in phlogiston and in fact initially 
identified it with phlogiston. At least two novel predictions followed from this 
suggestion. The first was made by Cavendish as an immediate result of these 
experiments. He reasoned that, since the reaction of phlogiston-rich metal with 
acid results in a salt plus phlogiston-rich inflammable air, the reaction of the 
phlogiston-poor calx with an acid should yield the salt only. The second prediction 
was made by Priestly in 1783. Priestley reasoned that, since metal ores can be 
reduced to the corresponding metal by reaction with phlogiston-rich charcoal, they 
should also be so reduced by inflammable air, consuming the air in the process. 
Both of these predictions were borne out by experiment. 
 
One major problem with phlogiston theory is that, if phlogiston is understood as a 
substance with mass, the release of phlogiston should (all else being equal) be 
associated with reduced weight. But many solid substances are observed to 
increase in weight as they undergo combustion or calcination [oxidation] in air. 
Phlogiston theorists offered several attempted remedies to this inconsistency in the 
middle part of the eighteenth century, including (infamously) the idea that 
phlogiston has negative weight. No solution was generally considered to be 
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satisfactory, however, and the problem was largely left to one side. Lavoisier, 
however, took this problem sufficiently seriously that he proposed to overthrow the 
phlogiston theory altogether. In 1772, he proposed that combustion and calcination 
involve the combining of the solid substance with air, rather than the emission of 
phlogiston. To account for the fact that combustion always ceases when only a 
fraction of a trapped volume of air has been depleted, he argued that it was only 
“the purest part” of the air that was involved in this process. He later named this 
“oxygen”. 
 
Applying this new oxygen theory, Lavoisier reinterpreted the phenomena of metal 
calcination and smelting. Since calcination is the combination of the purest part of 
the air with the metal, it follows that the reversal of calcination should result in the 
release of this “pure air” along with the formation of the metal. But it was known 
that the reduction of metal calxes, as in smelting, typically resulted in “fixed air” 
[carbon dioxide], which has very different properties to ordinary air. Lavoisier 
explained this by proposing that fixed air was in fact a combination of pure air and 
carbon from the charcoal usually used in smelting. So, if a calx could be reduced to 
a pure metal in the absence of charcoal, it is predicted that the result would be 
pure oxygen. This matches exactly an experimental result obtained by Priestly in 
1774. Priestley found that heating mercury calx resulted in metallic mercury and 
what he called “dephlogisticated air”. This new form of air also supported 
combustion and respiration22 better than normal air, matching exactly the 
properties that Lavoisier would expect to find for oxygen. 
 
Lavoisier’s prediction of this result was, incidentally, not “novel” by any intuitive 
standard (see Cook & Lauer, 1968; Emsley, 2001, pp. 297–304 for an account of 
the discovery of oxygen/dephlogisticated air). Scheele was the first to isolate the 
gas, in 1772, and Priestly is considered the discoverer only because he published 
his results first. Moreover, and more importantly, Lavoisier was almost certainly 
                                            
22
 Priestly found that mice could survive for longer in an enclosed volume of this air than in an equal 
volume of ordinary air and, after sampling it himself, remarked that “[t]he feeling of it to my lungs 
was not sensibly different to that of common air; but I fancied that my breast felt peculiarly light and 
easy for some time afterwards” (Priestly, 1774,  s. 5) 
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aware of Priestley’s discovery, since Priestly had visited him in France shortly after 
Priestley had performed the experiment but before Lavoisier made the prediction. 
However, the prediction still counts as an empirical success under either the use-
novelty account or the unification accounts – it is sufficient that the result follows 
naturally from the stated theoretical principles, even if this consequence was not 
actually worked out until Lavoisier heard of Priestley’s work.   
 
Another significant episode came in 1783, when Cavendish discovered that, if 
inflammable air and dephlogisticated air are exploded together, the result is pure 
water. Oxygen and phlogiston theorists interpreted this result very differently. 
Lavoisier inferred that water is in fact a compound of the elements oxygen and 
inflammable air (which he renamed “hydrogen”, meaning “water producing”). This 
led Lavoisier to several successful novel predictions. Firstly, he predicted that the 
reduction of a calx in hydrogen would also result in water, since oxygen was also 
available in the calx. Moreover, and perhaps more impressively, he inferred that, 
since the calcination (i.e. rusting) of iron or other metals in water involves 
combination with oxygen, it would produce pure hydrogen gas as a by-product. 
These predictions were duly confirmed experimentally. 
 
At the same time, Cavendish’s 1783 discovery led him to propose a new version of 
phlogiston theory. He proposed that dephlogisticated air was none other than 
dephlogisticated water and inflammable air phlogisticated water. This easily 
explains the initial observation, as one would expect the excess and deficit 
phlogiston to cancel out when the two combine, leaving only water. This new 
theory also aimed, at least in broad qualitative terms, to account for the changes in 
mass that are seen in various chemical reactions and that motivated Lavoisier’s 
theory. And, as pointed by Musgrave (1976, p. 204), it was relatively successful in 
this respect. For instance, in calcination, the metal gives up its phlogiston to the 
dephlogisticated air, forming water, and this water combines with the metal to form 
a calx heavier than the metal. When inflammable air (now phlogisticated water) 
combines with a metal calx, the phlogiston from the air combines with the metal 
and drives out the water that was associated with it, reducing the weight of 
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material. The water that is observed to form originates partly from the air and partly 
from the calx. And the formation of this water from the reduction of a metal calx is 
predicted independently by both Cavendish and Lavoisier. 
 
So, by 1783, both Lavoisier’s oxygen theory and Cavendish’s new formulation of 
the phlogiston theory explained the same core set of phenomena. Nevertheless, 
chemists began to defect en masse to the oxygen theory from around this time, 
and it was almost entirely dominant by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
challenge is to determine whether this episode is compatible with the continuity of 
science that is asserted by deflationary (and partial) realism and by partial 
rationalism. This task is tackled in the following section 
 
6. Assessing the chemical revolution 
 
Musgrave claims that the victory of the oxygen theory is attributable to its empirical 
success under the UN account. Regarding the phlogiston theory, in contrast, 
Musgrave cites with approval Lavoisier’s remark of 1783: 
 
“Chemists have made a vague principle of phlogiston which is not strictly 
defined, and which in consequence accommodates itself to every 
explanation into which it is pressed... It is a veritable Proteus which changes 
its form every minute.” (quoted in Musgrave, 1976, p. 203) 
 
The phlogiston theory, in other words, was no longer able to produce novel 
predictions. Instead, its proponents were simply making ad hoc modifications to 
accommodate the phenomena. It was a “degenerating research programme” (ibid, 
p. 203).  
 
In assessing Musgrave’s argument, it is worth distinguishing two propositions. 
Firstly, one might claim that the phlogiston theory was not at all empirically 
successful. Although broad in scope, it was only ever able to provide post hoc 
explanations of phenomena, and so never made any novel predictions. Secondly, 
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one might accept that phlogiston theory did, in fact, achieve some use-novel 
predictions, but maintain that the oxygen theory is more empirically successful 
overall. Thus, applying Worrall’s conception of predictive success as the basic 
theoretical virtue, it would be rational to accept the oxygen over the phlogiston 
theory. 
 
The first proposition suggested above is clearly not tenable, in light of the historical 
evidence Musgrave himself presents. The phlogiston theory in fact produced 
several novel predictions, noted in the historical outline above. And, although it is 
true that the phlogiston theory was modified in response to unexpected empirical 
results, this was not done in a way characteristic of a degenerating research 
programme. After all, the oxygen theorists also modified their theory, and 
sometimes in response to the same empirical results! For instance, Cavendish’s 
discovery of 1783 prompted both him and Lavoisier to alter their respective 
theories. In each case, alteration to the theory yielded verified empirical 
consequences going beyond the observation that prompted the change. Both 
actually predicted that water would be produced in the reduction of a calx by 
inflammable air. Moreover, while only Lavoisier actually made the prediction, it also 
follows from Cavendish’s version of the phlogiston theory that inflammable air will 
result from the rusting of iron in water. So phlogiston theory was predictively 
successful up to and including the period where Lavoisier’s oxygen theory was 
gaining dominance. This refutes Musgrave’s claim that phlogiston was a 
degenerating research programme.  
 
Moreover, from the perspective of modern chemistry, there is a very good 
explanation of the empirical success of phlogiston theory. Specifically, there is a 
strong structural similarity between the notions of phlogistication-dephlogistication 
on the one hand, and the modern concepts of reduction-oxidation on the other. 
This point has been made recently in the philosophical literature by Post (1971), 
Schurz (2008) and Ladyman (2009), among others. This similarity was also noticed 
some time ago by professional chemists: 
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“If [the phlogistonists] had only thought to say ‘The substance burning gives 
up its phlogiston to, and then combines with, the oxygen of the air’, the 
phlogiston theory would never have fallen into disrepute. Indeed, it is 
curious now to note that not only their new classification but even their 
mechanism was essentially correct. It is only in the last few years that we 
have realized that every process that we call reduction or oxidation is the 
gain or loss of an almost imponderable substance, which we do not call 
phlogiston but electrons.” (Lewis, 1926, pp. 167–168) 
 
As an example, consider the simple combustion reaction between charcoal and 
oxygen. A modern chemist would say of this reaction that the oxygen is reduced 
and the charcoal oxidised, or equivalently that electron density is transferred from 
charcoal to oxygen. A phlogiston theorist, analogously, would say that phlogiston is 
transferred from charcoal to dephlogisticated air.  
 
All the substances that were classified as “phlogiston-rich” or “phlogiston-poor” are 
now thought of as electron-donors/reducing agents or electron-receivers/oxidising 
agents, respectively. The two classificatory schemes are structurally similar, and 
generate similar (and accurate) predictions about which substances will react with 
which. The most striking example of this is Priestly's successful prediction that a 
calx can be reduced to the corresponding metal by the action of inflammable air. 
He was able to make this prediction because he posited some basic chemical 
similarity between inflammable air and charcoal (which was already known to 
reduce metal calxes). And, when we understand phlogiston as playing a similar 
structural role to electron density in modern chemistry, we see that this posit was 
(from our perspective) essentially correct. 
 
The second proposition suggested above, that the oxygen theory is overall more 
empirically successful than the phlogiston theory, is more plausible. However, it is 
worth pointing out that the oxygen theory, as described by Lavoisier and his 
contemporaries, did not preserve all the elements essential to the success of the 
phlogiston theory. The oxygen theory provides tools for tracking the movement of 
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elements through chemical processes, but does not offer any systematic account 
of why substances react with each other. So it cannot be argued simply that the 
oxygen theory had all the predictive success of the phlogiston theory, plus some 
additional success. The situational is much more akin to the proverbial comparison 
of apples and oranges. Assuming that some sensible comparison can be made, 
however, the Worrall-style rationalist could reasonably argue that the choice of the 
phlogiston over the oxygen theory was rationally defensible. 
 
The approach of treating empirical success as simply a theoretical virtue which 
theories may possess to a greater or lesser degree is, however, fundamentally at 
odds with the realist motivation for this form of rationalism advocated by Worrall, 
and with partial realism itself. The puzzle, from this perspective, is not merely that 
phlogiston theory is predictively successful, but that it achieves this success by 
positing a classificatory system which is completely absent from the oxygen theory. 
Moreover, this cannot be dismissed as a “happy accident” because, from the 
perspective of modern chemistry, this classificatory system appears to be roughly 
accurate.  
 
Partial rationalism predicts that the dispute between phlogiston and oxygen 
theories would be resolved by a synthesis that incorporates the essential elements 
of each theory. Modern chemistry does represent such a synthesis. Theoretical 
concepts derived from Lavoisier’s oxygen chemistry identify the basic “building 
blocks” of substances, namely the chemical elements. Moreover, the idea that 
samples of these elements are of constant mass provides effective means for 
tracking their various rearrangements into different chemical compounds. Concepts 
that are structurally similar to those of phlogiston chemistry successfully categorise 
different chemical substances by their redox potential, accounting for the transfer 
of electrons and thereby (at least in many cases) explaining why a given reaction 
takes place.  
 
However, it appears that the discipline of chemistry in the immediate aftermath of 
the chemical revolution does not represent a synthesis of these concepts as 
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modern chemistry does. It is true that various electrochemical experiments were 
conducted around the period in question, and phlogiston theorists interpreted these 
in ways that modern chemists would regard as quite natural if phlogiston is 
identified with electrons. This history is surveyed by Allchin (1992) and Chang 
(2012, ch. 2). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the phlogiston theory went into 
decline, and the abstract system of chemical classification associated with it 
passed out of use. This system only returned when thermodynamics had 
developed to the extent that it could be integrated with electrochemistry, during the 
latter part of the nineteenth-century. There was, in other words, an ‘interregnum’ 
during which concepts that contributed essentially to the empirical success of the 
phlogiston theory were not incorporated in the dominant theoretical framework in 
chemistry.  
 
Partial rationalism is committed both to the existence of objectively rational 
standards for theory choice, and to the claim that most or all actual scientists 
involved in episodes of theory change conform to this standard (though not 
necessarily self-consciously). The existence of an ‘interregnum’ in the history of 
chemistry is thus potentially disastrous for this view. Assuming that this 
interpretation of historical events is accurate, there are three broad ways in which 
one might respond.  
 
Firstly, one might take the failure of the descriptive part of the thesis as 
representing a major counterexample to rationalism in general, and thus opt for the 
Kuhnian (or some other non-rationalist) view of the history of science. Indeed, the 
proposition that certain essential elements fail to be preserved across theory-
change fits well with the concept of “Kuhn loss”. Kuhn himself discusses the 
example of the chemical revolution in these terms:  
 
“[A]s disseminated in the nineteenth century, Lavoisier's chemical theory 
inhibited chemists from asking why the metals were so much alike, a 
question that phlogistic chemistry had both asked and answered. The 
transition to Lavoisier's paradigm had, like the transition to Newton's, meant 
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a loss not only of a permissible question but of an achieved solution. That 
loss was not, however, permanent either. In the twentieth century questions 
about the qualities of chemical substances have entered science again, 
together with some answers to them.” (Kuhn, 1962/1996, pp. 148-149) 
 
In the light of the criteria of empirical success discussed in this thesis, the 
phlogistonist explanation of why the metals are “so much alike” is in fact not a 
particularly impressive achievement. That certain (not all) highly phlogisticated 
substances are shiny, malleable, etc. is certainly an interesting empirical regularity. 
But the proposition that this regularity exists, and that certain substances conform 
to it, is not entailed by any of the basic posits of the phlogiston theory. It thus does 
not contribute significantly to the unity or the degree of predictive success of the 
theory. The diagnosis of Kuhn loss is, however, more plausible in respect of the 
phlogiston system’s predictions regarding chemical reactivity.   
 
Chang (2012) has argued that the chemical revolution should be viewed as part of 
a larger trend in chemistry, namely the ascent of “compositionism” at the expense 
of “principlism”. Principlism, of which phlogiston theory is a subtype, understands 
chemical reactions as the transformation of basic elements by the addition or 
removal of special substances called “principles”. Mass is not necessarily 
conserved, but is simply another property which may be transformed by a reaction. 
The most important experimental evidence for principlist theories involves the 
qualitative features of substances. In contrast, compositionism understands 
chemical reactions as rearrangements of basic constituents. It follows that the most 
important sort of experimental evidence is found in precise quantitative 
measurements of mass, which reflects the distribution of these constituents. Chang 
argues that it is the growing dominance of these experimental practices associated 
with compositionism that drove the chemical revolution, rather than any theoretical 
argument in favour of Lavoisier’s view. 
 
Even if Chang’s particular explanation for the decline of the phlogiston in favour of 
the oxygen theory is unsatisfactory, the anti-realist is undoubtedly in a good 
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position to argue that the rationalist explanation is insufficient. And, if rationalism is 
unable to account for the chemical revolution, some ‘Kuhnian’ explanation involving 
non-rational factors must be invoked. However, as pointed out in Chapter 4.3, the 
Kuhnian view is incompatible with the cases where theoretical synthesis does 
occur. So it would seem that neither type of account is able to account for all 
historical episodes.  
 
The second possible response to the descriptive failure of partial rationalism is to 
argue that this is simply an indication that the epistemic standards of this particular 
form of rationalism are incorrect. A variant of rationalism that applies a more 
adequate set of standards would, presumably, not encounter such 
counterexamples from the history of science. This type of argument is not 
particularly plausible, however, as epistemic standards for scientific reasoning, at 
least at this fundamental level, must surely be established on a priori grounds. In 
particular, the basic architecture of partial rationalism is fixed by the requirements 
of the NMA, and any normative standard that picks out suitable targets for this 
argument will face similar restraints.  
  
The third possible response is to hold that the normative standards of partial 
rationalism are appealing on a priori grounds, and maintain that scientists 
collectively made a poor decision under the specific circumstances of the chemical 
revolution. The major prediction of partial rationalism in this case – that the 
essential concepts of both phlogiston and oxygen theories should be retained in a 
merged theory – was, after all, sustained in the end. So, even if DR, and thus 
partial rationalism, fails as a descriptive thesis, the normative/methodological 
component of these theses might nevertheless be vindicated by this example. 
Notice also, that this example does not challenge the claim of the partial realist that 
the essential elements of the phlogiston theory accurately represent the world – 
merely the secondary claim that such elements will be preserved in immediate 
successor theories.  
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This argument can be reinforced by recalling the point made in Chapter 1.9, that 
the suggested normative or methodological dimension is more strongly supported 
by cases where scientists ‘unintentionally’ achieved significant continuity between 
older and newer theories. This is significant in this case because the fact that there 
was a conceptual “interregnum” between the phlogiston theory of chemistry and 
modern electrochemistry seems to rule out the possibility that selection was 
involved in achieving the structural similarities between them. 
 
Moreover, even if this counterexample does weaken DR as a normative 
prescription, it need not utterly discredit it. As pointed out in Chapter 1.7, the 
deflationary realist retains the “fallback option” of maintaining that the continuity of 
science is sustained in the vast majority of cases. This is even compatible with the 
NMA, as this does not, in fact, require that there are no miracles, only that they are 
exceedingly rare. The viability of this idea does depend, however, on both the a 
priori plausibility of partial rationalism and the actual prevalence of disconfirming 
cases in the history of science. This thesis has provided a fair number of 
arguments for the former, but has barely skimmed the surface of the latter problem. 
It may, therefore, be the case that there are further counterexamples to DR. 
 
7. Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, two representative cases have been selected from the lists of 
putative counterexamples to scientific realism suggested by Laudan, Stanford, 
Lyons and Vickers. To impose some analytical clarity on the discussion, these 
cases have been examined specifically as counterexamples to the claim which I 
have named deflationary realism. As DR is a logical consequence of both partial 
rationalism and partial realism, these more substantive views are also potentially 
threatened by these case studies.  
 
Although the miasma theory does account for some observed regularities in the 
prevalence of disease, it does not do so with sufficient precision to be counted as 
empirically successful for the purposes of DR. This lack of empirical success is 
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manifested in the fact that application of the miasma theory very likely worsened 
the cholera epidemics which struck London in the nineteenth century. 
 
The phlogiston theory is a more difficult case, in that it is empirically successful by 
the standards of the UN account and the UV. Because the essential explanatory 
concepts of this theory were lost to chemistry, but were eventually recovered, this 
case stands as neither a confirming instance nor a simple counterexample to DR. 
Arguably, it vindicates DR as a methodological prescription, but not as a 
descriptive account of the history of science. The history of this case is compatible 
with the view that the NMA (properly applied) is a sound means for reasoning 
about scientific theories, and that scientists blunder when they fail to apply it. Even 
this view might be challenged, however, if further counterexamples emerge from 
the history of science.  
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Thesis summary 
 
The major arguments respectively for and against scientific realism are the no-
miracles argument (NMA) and the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI). Following the 
trend in much of the scientific realism literature, I have argued that the best 
response to these arguments is to endorse some version of partial realism. This 
position states that, if a theory is empirically successful and some element of this 
theory is essential for that success, then we have good reason to believe (i) that 
this element accurately describes a corresponding feature of the world and (ii) that 
this element will be preserved in successor theories. A major aim of this thesis has 
been to articulate a defensible version of this view.  
 
The aim of Chapter 2 was to articulate a defensible interpretation of the notion of 
“empirical success”. Currently the most common approach in the literature is to 
identify empirical success with one or other kind of novel predictive success. This 
approach represents what Musgrave calls a “historical” approach to theory 
confirmation. All these accounts accept, at least tacitly, that the extent to which a 
particular empirical result confirms (counts towards the empirical success of) a 
theory depends on the historical context in which it is introduced. In this chapter, it 
was argued that no historical account of confirmation can give an absolute account 
of empirical success. And an absolute account is required to warrant the inference 
under the NMA that the successful theory is (possibly only partly and/or 
approximately) true. Thus a logical account of theory confirmation is required, one 
which considers only the two-place logical relation between theory and a body of 
verified empirical results.  
 
It has been argued that, of the accounts of empirical successful proposed in the 
literature, only those which emphasise the unifying power of a theory satisfy the 
demand for a two-place logical relation. These are grouped under the title of “weak 
predictivism” because, although they deny that novel prediction is a fundamental 
epistemic virtue of theories, these accounts do imply that novel prediction is an 
indicator that a theory is unifying. A particular version of weak predictivism is 
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developed from Worrall’s use-novelty account of predictive success and named the 
“unification view” (UV). The final version of the UV articulated above states that a 
theory is confirmed just in case, and to the extent that, it precisely gives rise to 
more verified empirical content than that required to construct it, and does not give 
rise to excessive falsified content. This view is defended on the grounds that the 
major motivating intuition behind the NMA is the idea that there is something right 
about a theory where “you get out more than you put in”, and that this intuition is 
captured by the notion of unifying power.  
 
Chapter 3 has addressed the question of what parts of an empirically successful 
theory are essential to that success. The NMA is the major motivation behind 
partial realism and this argument, if valid, licences the inference from empirical 
success to those propositions that, if true, explain that success. It has therefore 
been argued that whatever elements are picked out by the favoured account of 
essentialness must be sufficient to explain the empirical success of the theory. 
However, at least if explanation is understood in the model of deductive entailment, 
it is too easy to select a set of theoretical posits that count as explanatory. Indeed, 
since the mere statement of an empirical phenomenon entails itself, a simple-
minded application of the suggested criterion could result in an account which 
regards only such statements as essential. A satisfactory account of essentialness 
must therefore pick out those elements which fully explain the empirical success of 
the relevant theory, but also exclude those elements that do not add any 
explanatory value.  
 
Applying this criterion, several accounts, namely direct reference theories and 
structural realism, are rejected as being too ‘inclusive’. Entity realism and 
phenomenological realism, on the other hand, are rejected as too ‘exclusive’. The 
working posits account, and the closely related divide et impera strategy, are 
subject to many different interpretations. It is argued, however, that all fail to satisfy 
the stated criterion in various ways. The causal interpretation is, again, too 
inclusive. Vickers’ idea of selecting the “essentially contributing parts” of “derivation 
internal posits” is the most promising interpretation. However, because it focuses 
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only on the derivations of individual results and on relations of deductive entailment 
between posits, it is also too exclusive.  
 
The view of essentialness articulated and defended in this thesis is explicitly 
modelled on the account of empirical success advocated in Chapter 2 and is 
named the “empirically successful sub-theory account” (ESSA). The ESSA states 
that the essential posits of theories are those that give rise to more verified 
empirical results and/or empirically successful lower-level posits than required to 
construct them. This view satisfies the major criterion for an account of 
essentialness because the posits it selects, if (approximately) true together unify 
the accurate empirical claims of the theory and so explain its empirical success.  
 
A second major aim of this thesis has been to defend deflationary realism (DR) as 
a minimal, “core” realist position. Because DR is a logical consequence of partial 
realism, any refutation of the former is also a refutation of the latter. So any 
assessment of DR is also an assessment of more metaphysically committed forms 
of realism. Moreover, even if a metaphysically committed form of realism is 
rejected on principled grounds, as it is by the constructive empiricist, DR can still 
be accepted as an empirical generalisation over the history of science. And the 
acceptance of this generalisation has normative consequences – if it has always 
been the case that there is continuity in science, scientists have very strong 
(inductive) grounds to seriously entertain only those new theories which preserve 
the essential elements of the older theories. This is especially so if there are many 
cases where this continuity has been achieved without any intervention by 
scientists specifically to select new theories that preserve the conceptual apparatus 
of older theories.  
 
The third major aim of this thesis has been to assess DR against some putative 
counterexamples in the history of science. Along the way, in Chapter 4, the version 
of realism defended in this thesis was used as a means of illuminating the ongoing 
debate around the rationality of scientific “revolutions”. If, as suggested in Chapter 
2, unifying power ought to be the primary criterion for accepting a theory as true, 
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this certainly has implications for cases of theory choice. The standard for believing 
that a theory is true is surely stronger than that for merely preferring it over rival 
theories! This slogan captures the basic flavour of the realist argument for 
rationalism in theory choice. A position based on partial realism as opposed to 
naive realism, however, states merely that, during episodes of theory change, 
scientists are rational to accept those parts of theories responsible for empirical 
successes (and have largely done so). A consequence of this partial rationalist 
position is that that it is sometimes rational to accept a synthesis of several 
competing theories, rather than choose between them. If this claim is sustained, it 
directly refutes Kuhn’s view, as he strongly emphasises the “incommensurability” of 
competing scientific paradigms. The partial rationalist view was found to give 
adequate grounds for accepting the Copernican model of the universe over the 
Ptolemaic model, and thus successfully account for the occurrence of the 
Copernican “revolution”. More importantly, however, several instances of theory 
change, namely the “neo-Darwinian” synthesis and the “prion revolution”, were 
shown to be cases of theoretical synthesis.  
 
Cases with a stronger prima facie claim to be counterexamples to DR were 
examined in Chapter 5. The two particular cases selected were the miasma theory 
of disease in nineteenth century England, and the phlogiston theory of chemistry in 
the eighteenth century. It was shown that, contrary to initial impressions, the 
miasma theory was not in fact empirically successful and so does not represent a 
challenge to DR. The phlogiston theory, in contrast, was empirically successful. 
And, although modern electrochemistry contains concepts that are structurally 
similar to the essential posits of the phlogiston theory, these posits were not 
preserved in the phlogiston theory’s immediate successor. It consequence of this, it 
is argued, DR does not offer a universally accurate description of the history of 
science. The phlogiston theory is only a single counterexample, however, so it is 
difficult to assess how frequently DR is inaccurate. More importantly, however, the 
normative/methodological dimension of DR is strongly supported by this case. 
Chemists would, at least potentially, have attained some of the empirical success 
of modern electrochemistry at an earlier stage if they had preserved the essential 
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elements of the phlogiston theory. Moreover, scientists did not deliberately craft 
modern electrochemistry so that it preserved the concepts of phlogiston theory 
(since the latter was not considered a salient reference point by the time the 
modern theory was constructed). This can be viewed as strong evidence for the 
general claim that scientists are well-advised, when devising new theories, to 
restrict themselves to theories that preserve the essential elements of successful 
earlier theories.  
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